Timbuktu Institute, September 2025

The resurgence of attacks is far from over in Mali. For several weeks now, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have been the target of repeated attacks by separatist and terrorist groups in various regions of the country, perpetrated in particular by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). From the province of Boulikessi in the centre of the country to Timbuktu, via the south to Mahou (Sikasso) and the north, the number of attacks and victims continues to rise. Faced with this situation of spreading terrorist danger, a stalemate in the security situation and almost simultaneous attacks perpetrated across Mali, the question of the effectiveness of the Africa Corps deployment after Wagner's departure from the country is a legitimate one. While some claim that there has been a status quo since Wagner was replaced by Africa Corps in terms of abuses and human rights violations, others are more optimistic and argue that the situation will improve in the long term. Meanwhile, the spillover from the epicentres is causing neighbouring countries to fear a domino effect with worrying consequences for neighbouring Senegal and Mauritania. So, in the name of the fight against terrorism, how should we interpret the advance of extremist groups in the region while Mali forges partnerships intended to contain a scourge that has lasted too long?

The effectiveness of Russia's deployment in Mali increasingly called into question

In May 2025, the Timbuktu Institute, in a report published on the theme of ‘The threat of JNIM in the tri-border area of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal’, was already warning of the advance of this group towards Mali's neighbouring countries, particularly Senegal and Mauritania, its desire to drive the Malian army away from areas close to Bamako, and the increase in attacks in Kayes near the border with Senegal and Mauritania. Recent attacks have been carried out in the south of the country, not far from the Senegalese and Mauritanian borders, where JNIM fighters carried out seven simultaneous attacks in Kayes city, Nioro du Sahel, and Niono, and reportedly took control of three barracks and dozens of military posts. These JNIM fighters also claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Molodo barracks.

Meanwhile, in Diboli, a Malian village located a few kilometres from Bakel in the Tambacounda region of Senegal, terrorists targeted police and customs posts in a coordinated operation involving vehicles and motorcycles set on fire, which has frightened Senegalese road transporters who regularly use these roads. As a preventive measure, the Senegalese, Malian and Mauritanian armies carried out a joint operation in May 2025, known as a regional offensive against the growing terrorist threat. In this rather alarming context, the resurgence of these attacks raises questions about the effectiveness of the Russian paramilitary troops deployed in Mali.

Indeed, since a military government led by General Assimi Goïta took power in Mali, there has been constant criticism of the French presence. The now President of Mali decided, upon his arrival, to sever relations with the French troops that had been present in the country since 2013 as part of the Serval and Barkhane operations. As a result, relations between Mali and France deteriorated to such an extent that the French army left Mali in 2022, bringing an end to what had until then been a ‘good’ cooperation. ‘Cooperation with France did not meet the aspirations of the Malian people, which is why it was discontinued,’ said Abdoulaye Diop, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to justify France's withdrawal.

While Franco-Malian cooperation is being denounced, Russia is stepping in to take over with a new form of economic, diplomatic and military cooperation that would be more favourable to Mali. Thanks to its ideological and economic positions, which overlap with those of the AES countries – and which have earned it their support – Russia has succeeded in establishing a foothold in a number of countries in the sub-region with which it maintains cooperative relations. It should be remembered that Mali already recognised the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union in 1992. Thus, after the overthrow of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta by the military, who wanted France to leave, Mali began the process of rapprochement with Russia to the point of making it its ally, which presents a major advantage: it advocates values contrary to ‘Western neo-colonialism’, which are widely defended in Mali. This appreciation of Russia would not have been possible without the help of media outlets dedicated to spreading pro-Russian influence and propaganda, such as the African Initiative, among others.

The two countries became partners through the deployment of Wagner Group mercenaries in 2021 to respond to the growing threat of separatists in the north, through the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the JNIM, which continue to carry out attacks that now extend to the border areas of Senegal and Mauritania. After nearly four years of presence on the ground, which has not resolved or even reduced the attacks in Mali, the effectiveness of Wagner, which was initially widely praised, is increasingly being called into question. The defeat suffered in Tinzawatène at the end of July 2024, costing the lives of 84 Wagner mercenaries, has contributed significantly to this dynamic. Thus, with the heavy losses suffered against Tuareg armed groups and terrorists during the last few years of collaboration between the Malian army and the Russian private security company, the latter announced on 6 June 2024 the end of this collaboration on its Telegram account. For Russia, which is ensuring stricter monitoring, a renewal is necessary: the paramilitary group Africa Corps is replacing Wagner with the Malian army. However, this new collaboration is increasingly criticised, particularly with the proliferation of attacks throughout Mali and the losses recorded by the FAMa.

Africa Corps has already suffered setbacks against armed groups. On 13 June 2025, during a skirmish with FLA forces near Kidal, a helicopter was hit and forced to retreat, while several vehicles were destroyed or damaged and several Russian fighters were reportedly killed, according to the FLA. The day before, an Africa Corps truck had already been destroyed by an improvised explosive device.

Furthermore, beyond the difficulties encountered by Russian fighters in direct confrontation with armed groups, certain events raise questions about the quality of the men sent by Moscow. On 14 June, less than two months after its deployment in Mali, a Su-24M Russian tactical bomber crashed near the military base in Gao. This loss adds to other previous incidents. In October 2022, a Su-25 crash in Gao claimed the lives of the crew, with no further details provided by the authorities. More recently, on 1 August 2025, the Africa Corps reportedly lost several soldiers in an ambush carried out by JNIM in Tenenkou, near Mopti. The recurrence of these incidents raises questions about the level of training of the pilots sent to Mali, at a time when Moscow is focusing its efforts on the Ukrainian front.

In addition, another reason that could explain the lack of effectiveness of Russian mercenaries may be the lack of manpower due to Russia's deployment in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, with the immediate consequence of a reduction in the number of personnel deployed in Mali. Added to this is the Malian government's refusal to enter into any negotiations with separatist and terrorist groups, as was the case in 2015.

A communications war heralding a possible ‘balance of terror’

On the Malian army side, as on the terrorist side, each side is communicating about a possible victory over the other, while the Malian armed forces, with a view to pushing back the enemy, are developing a new form of cooperation with Russia, notably with the arrival of the Russian paramilitary forces Africa Corps. Moreover, these Russian paramilitary forces, which have replaced the Wagner Group, do not hesitate to publish images of terrorists killed and weapons seized during their operations on their channels. Meanwhile, some observers remain convinced that the arrival of Africa Corps will only worsen the security situation in Mali, especially since it has not prevented the recent attacks in June and July 2025. With regard to the terrorists, the Malian army, through the national television channel ORTM, also announced that it had neutralised at least 80, without specifying the locations.

Meanwhile, while the Malian army claims that the situation is under control, FLA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud announced: ‘Our troops carried out a targeted action against an Africa Corps patrol on Friday. We inflicted significant material damage and human losses on the enemy's ranks.’ This statement follows recent attacks on a barracks in downtown Timbuktu. It therefore seems that, according to some media outlets reporting on the situation, the Malian army has been in difficulty, especially in recent weeks, with attacks occurring almost weekly: attack on a FAMA security post in Kouakourou, mortar attack on the military airport in Gao. Thus, the Malian army, which, according to some (Western) media outlets, is not responding to these accusations that dishonour it, claims to have ‘responded vigorously to this attack perpetrated in central Mali before retreating’.

The near simultaneity of these attacks in different parts of the country is no coincidence, especially since terrorist attacks have been on the rise in AES countries, particularly since their withdrawal from ECOWAS and the departure of French troops. The similarity between the deterioration of the security situation in Mali and that in other AES member states has given rise to a plethora of speculation, which some are quick to link to the diplomatic choices made by these countries. Still on the diplomatic front, earlier in 2024, without giving further details, the Ukrainian General Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed to have helped the Tuaregs of northern Mali in an ambush against the FAMa and Wagner Group mercenaries. If so, could the Sahel and the AES countries be the new hotbed of confrontation between Russia and Ukraine? In any case, the separatists, through the Ukrainian flags posted on social media, are engaged in an ‘existential war against Russia’, an ally of the Malian central government. Moreover, the AES countries have referred the matter to the United Nations Security Council to denounce Ukraine's interference in their internal affairs. In addition, observers are beginning to question the collaboration between the FAMa and Russian paramilitary forces, whose effectiveness remains questionable given the resurgence of attacks in Mali.