Timbuktu Institute Week 1 - March 2026

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, which has claimed thousands of lives since 2017, has taken a new legal turn. On 1 March, the Belgian courts arrested four people suspected of financing and directing the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF), the separatist group active in the English-speaking regions of Cameroon, from Europe. As part of this case for ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’, three of them have been remanded in custody by the investigating judge. Investigators are also examining the possibility that instructions for targeted attacks against Cameroonian civilians and military personnel were given from Belgium. The investigation, which was opened in June 2025 following a referral from the Norwegian authorities, is being conducted in cooperation with Norway and the United States, where similar proceedings are underway. It follows several complaints filed by the Swiss-based NGO Action 237, whose legal proceedings date back to 2020. Pending the outcome of these proceedings, the latter serves as a reminder that local armed conflicts can quickly take on a transnational dimension. In this sense, it illustrates the complexity of the financing and organisation of separatist groups, as well as the need for structured international judicial cooperation to ensure that those involved are held accountable.

Towards a constitutional revision?

According to corroborating sources within the Cameroonian state apparatus, Jeune Afrique reveals that a revision of the 1996 Constitution, which began over a year ago, is now almost complete. While there is talk of restructuring the institutional framework in terms of a potential increase in the number of representatives in local and national institutions and the creation of new municipalities and territorial units, the major change could lie in the reconfiguration of the executive branch. Indeed, the possibility of creating a nominative and non-elective position of vice-president is reportedly on the table for discussion. Furthermore, the government seems willing to make a concession on the controversial Electoral Code, as part of defining the conditions for the return of opposition leader Issa Tchiroma Bakary in a process of political dialogue. Could this revision be the result of a reshaping of the mechanisms of succession and representation by a state that does not wish to break with its presidentialist logic? The coming weeks may provide some answers to this question. In any case, if such predictions come to fruition, they could reignite the debate on managing institutional tensions through co-optation rather than through systemic reform of the electoral rules.