Timbuktu Institute Week 1, September 2026

The news was met by some with a genuine sigh of relief; and indeed, it points to a loosening of the financial vice that had been tightening around the country. Following more than two years of negotiations, the World Bank announced on 1 September that Dakar had secured agreement in principle on a new $2.2 billion program over three years, this time agreeing to undertake a “treatment” of its debt. A turning point for a government that had, for a long time, made economic sovereignty and the refusal of restructuring hallmarks of its discourse. That said, what exactly should be understood by “debt treatment” — in plain terms, restructuring or not? This is indeed one of the main questions circulating among the public since the announcement. For now, both the Senegalese authorities and the IMF are carefully avoiding the word “restructuring.” Nonetheless, behind the reshaping of budgetary balances lies a far more delicate equation: how to clean up public finances without making households bear the weight of a “treatment” whose first effects could soon be felt in their daily lives? The question is all the more sensitive given that relations between the Executive and a National Assembly dominated by Ousmane Sonko's Pastef remain conflictual.

As a reminder, this new agreement with the IMF comes after the 2024 discovery of roughly $13 billion in undeclared debt under the Macky Sall administration, which led to the suspension of the previous program and forced Dakar to rely more heavily on the regional market, at particularly costly terms. By now accepting this new agreement, Dakar is seeking to restore the sustainability of its finances and regain room for maneuver that the state had progressively been deprived of. Senegal's Debt Treatment Plan is thus meant to improve the country's debt profile, while Dakar simultaneously plans to accelerate the clearing of its arrears to the private sector, with an envelope of 300 billion CFA francs announced by the end of 2026. For Finance Minister Cheikh Diba, the agreement represents “a message of confidence, responsibility and ambition.” But, it should be recalled, the agreement in principle does not automatically mean an actual disbursement of funds. Before the program's first disbursement, Senegal will still need to secure financing assurances from its partners and finalize measures related to the “misreporting” episode. Negotiations with creditors are expected to concern nearly $5 billion in eurobonds, while more complex financial instruments could further complicate the terms. The goal, moreover, is not debt cancellation, but a loosening substantial enough to give public finances some breathing room. An essential nuance in a country that must continue meeting its obligations while trying to reduce the cost of its debt. A partial eurobond repayment of $34 million is due as early as 13 September, a reminder that, despite the IMF agreement, financial constraints remain very much present.

The test of social impact

That the bitter pill of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the 1980s has stuck in the throat of many African countries is a fact hardly open to dispute. From now on, it is on social terrain that part of the credibility of this new trajectory will be tested. First, National Assembly President Ousmane Sonko has demanded clarifications regarding “Senegal's commitments on its debt treatment” as well as the publication of a “memorandum for accurate information” on the matter. Meanwhile, in Dakar as in other cities, the rising cost of living is already fueling growing discontent. The price of certain foodstuffs, fuel, transport and rents weighs increasingly on households, while the price of a kilogram of beef has risen by around 30% in a few months in some markets. In late August, the citizen movement #30DaysForAFairPrice began rallying thousands of participants on social media, with calls for a boycott and the announcement of a peaceful march in Dakar.

This mobilization comes at a particularly sensitive moment. While the government insists it wants to preserve social rights and use the room created by debt treatment to strengthen social safety nets, the budgetary trajectory also implies difficult trade-offs. The expected reduction in energy subsidies could, in particular, add further pressure on purchasing power, just as the executive is trying to contain discontent over prices. The government points to external shocks, the international context, and the consequences of the security crisis in the Sahel, while presenting agricultural transformation as a structural response.

The National Assembly keeps up the pressure

On 2 September, the Assembly's Bureau declared admissible two new bills on the oversight of special funds and on prison healthcare. Behind this legal battle lies a deeper disagreement over the distribution of powers between the Executive and a parliamentary majority intent on maintaining pressure. It cannot be ruled out that this institutional confrontation could spread to other fronts, particularly as budgetary choices tied to the IMF agreement have to be translated into action. In this context, the General Policy Statement by Prime Minister Mouhamed Al Aminou Lo, scheduled for 8 September before the National Assembly, carries particular weight. It should offer a measure of the new executive's ability to defend its roadmap against a parliamentary majority now sitting in opposition.

In short, it appears that the IMF agreement, far from marking the end of a financial crisis, could open onto a horizon of political and social uncertainty. Dakar must simultaneously restore donor confidence, loosen the grip of debt, and preserve already strained purchasing power, all while facing a National Assembly determined to exercise its prerogatives fully. Thus, more than a mere financial adjustment, Senegal's new economic trajectory confronts those in power with an eminently political question: how far can reform go without turning the cost of “debt treatment” into a new source of unrest ?