Jnim has considerably stepped up its activities in coastal countries in recent years. Its expansion strategy oscillates between opportunism and exploiting contextual dynamics. Bakary Sambe, director of the Timbuktu Institute and a specialist in the Sahel and coastal countries, notably Benin and Togo, offers an in-depth, forward-looking analysis of the Jnim's development in West Africa. Timbuktu Institute works on preventing violent extremism by building community resilience and experimenting with agile approaches in crisis zones.

Do you think the Salafist-jihadist Jnim coalition can be contained in West Africa?

That's a complex question. But I also think we need to be careful about using the term Salafist jihadist to talk about the JNIM. The ideological approach is certainly there. It's the basis. But all the groups affiliated to the Jnim are sometimes motivated by interests that converge or diverge in terms of ideology. It has to be said that today, when we talk about Jnim (Jamāʿat nuṣrat al-islām wal-muslimīn), the group supporting Islam and Muslims, we are referring to the component that represents al-Qaeda in the Sahel region.

The largest and most important Jnim katiba in West Africa, operating out of Mali, is of course the Macina katiba. Initially, the Macina Katiba had an ethno-community connotation, but at the same time its demands were based on a desire to return to the teachings of Islam, which were considered to be the most appropriate way of regulating socio-economic life. The arguments cited were motivated in part by the rejection of secular laws which, in their view, did not meet the needs of the communities. At present, Jnim is spreading over large areas and territories. From Mali, it is extending its activities to Burkina Faso. The same applies to coastal countries such as Benin and Togo. But we should be cautious about the latest revelations of new Katiba in northern Togo.

How do you interpret the fact that Jnim is gaining more and more ground, especially in the northern fringes of coastal countries?

Jnim's aim is to play the community card. As a result, in some areas, there is a vast reorganisation of terrorist groups in the region. In particular, defections to the Islamic State and from the Serma Katiba, etc. These Katibas are difficult to identify. These Katibas, which are difficult to identify, have a degree of management autonomy. However, they still receive strict operational instructions on targets from the Jnim's central command, despite the endogenisation of Sahelian jihad. In other words, the groups operate by harassing the security and defence forces in Burkina Faso, northern Togo and Benin with highly mobile elements.

At present, they have autonomy in their relations with the traditional authorities and in the management of booty. There is also a degree of inclusion of influential community religious leaders in the local Shura (consultation assembly). This structure gives the impression of dispersion. 

‘Jnim's progress is real’

However, in my opinion, there is a division of labour between the sub-groups affiliated to Jnim. For example, Jafar Dicko's Ansaru Islam has returned to the Jnim fold with intense activity in Burkina Faso. It is now actively seeking a foothold in northern Benin. He is supported by the Serma Katiba, which is targeting the Bobo-Dioulasso region of Burkina Faso, etc. In short, there is a strategy of multiplying local jihads with the traditional wing of Ansaru Islam in Burkina Faso. The aim is to target Burkina Faso more effectively.

Meanwhile, the Macina Katiba is to a lesser extent similar to the Serma Katiba. The latter are fixed on the three borders of Mali, Burkina Faso and the Cascades region of Côte d'Ivoire. So the Jnim's advance is real. It is an advance that is trying to multiply its strategies and anchorage points, by creating gaps and setting up fallback zones.

What analysis can be made of the fact that Jnim primarily targets the defence and security forces in the West African sub-region?

Jnim is attacking people less and less. It attacks the security and defence forces more. Jnim's strategy is to seek out local incubators, alliances that make it easier to withdraw and gather intelligence. It is this strategy that explains the specific nature of operations in eastern Burkina Faso and northern Benin. In fact, elements of the Macina Katiba and the Islamic State in the Sahel are cohabiting. Jnim is counting on communities to withdraw. In the region, this strategy seems to revolve around creating zones of instability and exploiting inter-community conflicts.

In other words, Jnim is more interested in presenting itself as the protector of marginalised or ostracised communities in order to seduce them, recruit them and pit them against the central states. This will undoubtedly enable them to have local incubators from a logistical point of view to better anchor themselves and guarantee a permanent recruitment base.

Isn't the fact that Jnim is made up of several micro-groups a handicap for itself and for the West African sub-region?

It's obvious. There is a jihadist division of labour with what I call the multiplication of gaps and zones of instability. We can expect competition in the future and a long-term recruitment base for large numbers of fighters, for example in northern Benin. The harsh reality is that, under the current form of military cooperation proposed by the partners, our armies are in the process of training, putting a great deal of energy and resources into forms of battle that they will have little chance of succeeding in. Because this is an asymmetrical war, with a diffuse, invisible enemy that may already be at home.

In your view, what can we learn from the combination of the global ideology of terrorism and Jnim's pragmatic reading of local realities?

There has been a paradigm shift within al-Qaeda since the Malian experience at the beginning, when the Jnim realised that globalist strategies with a managerial supply chain were no longer working. We have very localised jihads, against a backdrop of intra-community conflicts. But there are also conflicts between the security and defence forces and the populations of cross-border areas, living under the draconian conditions imposed by security measures. In truth, this is what encourages massive recruitment in these communities. This is why every time the armies triumphantly declare that they have combed a particular area or neutralised terrorists, they are sowing the seeds of future inter-community conflicts. Which will further inflame the region.

Jnim is aware that by undermining the local armies of the various target countries in the eyes of the local populations, it is costing the defence and security forces the battle of intelligence. This battle is based on trust between the local populations and the security and defence forces. If this battle is lost, as we see in some countries, it is because we give more credit to the terrorist groups who improvise themselves as protectors of marginalised communities. This is why the all-out security strategy, with its sweeps and so on, can help to manage temporary security emergencies and imperatives.

However, they cannot help to defeat terrorism once and for all, which in my opinion must be fought with long-term strategies that take into account the imperatives of security, development and the provision of basic social services. Because what is to be feared in Benin or elsewhere is the creation of full-fledged citizens and citizens apart, to paraphrase a former Senegalese minister. We must not fall into this trap. We must not fall into this game. Because, if we look at developments in the Banikoara and Malanville areas, etc., with the tightening of security and socio-economic conditions, we need to adopt a mixed approach. At the same time, we need to manage security requirements while opening up these areas. There is also a need to build relationships of trust between the security forces and local populations.

Objectively speaking, how can our governments counter the progressive involvement of Jnim in our communities?

Ensuring that all communities, including cross-border communities, have a sense of national belonging is a battle that must be won. We often talk about the State being absent. But, in my opinion, there is a State that is absent and a State that is present. In other words, the repressive state is very present, while the protective state is less present. So we need to ensure that the State is present both in managing security imperatives and in providing basic social services. On that basis, I also think we need to break with the paradigm of all-out war and combing and try, as the President of Benin did on Friday 27 December 2024. He held talks with the Fulani community and its traditional leaders.

I think we need to continue in this vein. On top of that, the CRIET's very security-conscious approach needs to be reviewed or toned down at times, and the stigmatisation of certain communities needs to be mitigated. We need to work more within a framework of trust. It is true that transnational banditry is closely linked to the jihads present in all areas, especially in the vicinity of North-West Nigeria. Sooner or later, we will see this connection from Alibori via Borgou to Nigeria. The presence of these groups in the above-mentioned areas is a possibility for Jnim. Jnim can ally itself with these criminal groups, and we need to fight them effectively. To combat them, we need to put an end to the sources that feed the criminal economy. In addition, we need to ensure that the population has confidence in the State and the security and defence forces, if only through civil-military activities.

In your opinion, which West African country was most exposed to the terrorist threat?

I think it's difficult to say. In Benin, for example, there is a combination of factors, with extensive areas of forest such as the Pendjari Park, etc. Benin borders Burkina Faso and Niger. Benin borders Burkina Faso and Niger. The current diplomatic tension between Benin and the Aes and ECOWAS countries is making it increasingly difficult to exchange intelligence and carry out joint patrols. It would be in the interests of these countries to work together, despite their diplomatic differences. Because the countries in the region need to be part of a collective security approach. Whatever the tensions, which in my view are avoidable.

Benin currently presents a number of risks due to the spread of terrorism. Although the situation seems to have been brought under control by Operation Mirador and other measures, it is still important to focus on what I call the involvement of local populations in security measures. Since it has been shown that the greater the level of inclusion of communities, the greater their involvement in a form of human security, by providing human intelligence but also by refusing to be complicit or instrumentalised by terrorist groups. Just because today there is a strategy of communitarisation of the jihad on the part of the JNIM. To this end, we also need a strategy with a holistic approach that includes all sections of civil society in prevention.

Some analysts believe that Benin is a transit country for terrorism in West Africa because of its geographical location. Can you confirm or refute this argument?

I can neither confirm nor deny. But all I know is that Benin's major challenge is to build national resilience in an increasingly unstable regional environment, alongside natural areas that can serve as safe havens for terrorist and criminal groups. Nevertheless, I believe that Benin can still win the bet. If we invest in the resilience of communities and build their confidence so that they accept security measures, everything is still possible. This will be achieved through compliance, but also by mitigating the all-security approach and establishing ongoing community dialogue.

Finally, we must avoid at all costs the proliferation of local incubators of jihad. That's how we can avoid a potential no-win situation where our armies find themselves in a position where they can win neither the war against terrorism nor peace with the local populations. There is still time for the coastal countries to learn from the mistakes of the Sahel instead of repeating them.

Source : Bénin Intelligent