Against a backdrop of growing insecurity in the Sahel and Africa, the Timbuktu Institute has published two recent reports analysing the dynamics of conflict and its cross-border repercussions. Following the first, entitled ‘The JNIM threat in the border areas of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal’ (April 2025), the Institute has published ‘JNIM in Kayes: Economic Fragmentation and Cross-Border Threat’ (September 2025), which highlights the strategic offensive of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Kayes region, a key economic and migration hub in Mali. This latest report deciphers how JNIM exploits social divisions and targets vital infrastructure to stifle the Malian economy and explores the strategies of armed groups across the Sahel to destabilise states through attempts at economic blockades and the exploitation of community tensions. This interview with Dr. Bakary Sambe, President of the Timbuktu Institute, conducted by Senego, examines the implications of this offensive. How do the economic and security disruptions in Kayes threaten Senegal and Mauritania? What risks of regional contagion emerge from porous borders and cross-border community tensions? What strategies should be adopted to counter this growing threat?

Dr Sambe, thank you for granting us this first interview. The Timbuktu Institute recently published a note on the JNIM offensive in the Kayes region. Can you explain why this region has become a strategic target for this terrorist group ?

Dr Bakary Sambe : Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this. As detailed in our September 2025 report, Kayes is an economic and strategic hub for Mali, contributing significantly to the national GDP, particularly through its gold production, which accounts for around 80% of Mali's gold. Its geographical position in the far west, bordered by Senegal, Mauritania and Guinea, makes it a key commercial and migratory crossroads. For example, National Route 1 (RN1), connecting Bamako to Dakar via Kayes and Diboli, facilitates 30% of Mali's land imports, or 2.7 million tonnes of goods per year, including fuel and cereals. JNIM targets Kayes to disrupt these vital flows, as evidenced by the coordinated attacks on 1 July 2025 against five military positions in Kayes and Diboli, aimed at economically suffocating Bamako. Our second report on this area, which we monitor continuously, highlights that this strategy is part of a broader strategy of regional destabilisation, exploiting social tensions and attacking vital infrastructure as well as foreign interests and investments in order to extend its influence.

The JNIM appears to be waging an ‘economic jihad’ by targeting logistics routes such as the RN1. What are the concrete consequences of this strategy for Mali ?

Dr. Bakary Sambe : Our reports highlight a deliberate strategy by the JNIM to paralyse the Malian economy by targeting vital logistics routes, as I have explained. For example, the sabotage of the RN1 on 31 August 2025, where construction equipment belonging to the Chinese company COVEC was set on fire, disrupted the rehabilitation of this essential road, limiting cross-border trade. Similarly, the attacks on 1 July 2025 in Diboli, 1.3 km from the Senegalese border, targeted security infrastructure, temporarily paralysing traffic. These actions have led to increased food insecurity, affecting 1.52 million people in Ménaka and elsewhere, and a rise in the prices of essential goods. The blockade – real or imagined – announced on 3 September 2025, prohibiting the transport of fuel from Senegal, Mauritania, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, is exacerbating this crisis. As our second report indicates, by forcing dependence on secondary roads often under insurgent control, JNIM is strengthening its financial grip through taxes on informal networks, further weakening the Malian state by seeking above all to delegitimise the authorities with the persistence of insecurity.

You mention in your note attacks against foreign economic interests, particularly Chinese ones. What is the JNIM's objective behind these actions ?

Dr. Bakary Sambe : The first report highlights that the JNIM targets foreign economic interests to undermine the Malian state's finances and discourage investment. In July-August 2025, the group attacked seven foreign industrial sites in Kayes, including the Diamond Cement Factory, where three Indians were kidnapped. These raids target key sectors such as the gold mines in Bafoulabé, along the RN22, a vital logistics corridor. By disrupting these activities, JNIM aims to deprive Bamako of essential revenue, as Kayes accounts for 80% of Mali's gold production. These attacks also target partners such as China, which invested £2.5 billion in Mali between 2000 and 2020, according to the American Enterprise Institute. Our second report notes that this strategy aims to undermine the legitimacy of the Malian government, accused of failing to secure its partners, isolating Bamako on the international stage while financing JNIM operations through extortion and control of illicit markets, such as gold and livestock. Despite debates within Katiba Macina, the growing interest of terrorist leader Abu Leith Al-Lîby, known to be one of the leading experts in hostage-taking, is worrying the state and economic actors investing in the area.

JNIM is imposing blockades, such as in Kayes and Nioro-du-Sahel. How could this affect cross-border trade with Senegal ?

Dr Bakary Sambe : Our analyses show that the blockade announced on 3 September 2025 by Abu Houzeifa Al-Bambari, targeting Kayes and Nioro-du-Sahel, is severely disrupting the Bamako-Dakar corridor, which facilitates 70% of Malian imports via the port of Dakar. The ban on fuel transport and the suspension of Diarra Transport's activities, for example, illustrated by the burning of a bus near Karangana on 5 September and three tanker trucks on the Bamako-Kayes road on 5-6 September, have reduced cross-border trade. The Union of Road Transporters of Senegal (UTRS) has reportedly announced the possible suspension of its routes as of 2 July 2025 in response to these threats, increasing the cost of transport and essential goods in Senegal. As already indicated in our first report last April, these disruptions threaten Malian exports, such as gold, livestock and timber, transiting through Dakar, and strengthen the informal networks controlled by JNIM, affecting the Senegalese economy.

The report also mentions the risks of regional contagion, particularly for Senegal and Mauritania. What are the main short-term dangers ?

Dr. Bakary Sambe : Both of our reports highlight porous borders as a major risk factor. In Senegal, incidents near Diboli and Melgué, such as the attacks on 1 July 2025, show a risk of JNIM infiltration into the east of the country. The pressure on Nioro-du-Sahel, where the influential Mauritanian figure Chérif Bouyé Haïdara resides, could exacerbate community tensions, particularly in the Hodhs and Assaba regions. For example, sensing this pressure, Mauritanian internet users have even gone so far as to call for military intervention to protect the Sharif, illustrating the cross-border sensitivity of the issue. The second report warns against trade disruption, such as the blockade of Kayes, which encourages illicit trafficking and smuggling, strengthening criminal networks. Without regional cooperation, these dynamics risk spreading insecurity, putting pressure on Senegal's security capabilities, already mobilised by the deployment of the Garsi in Goudiri.

You refer to this frequently in the report. How does JNIM exploit social tensions in Kayes, such as conflicts related to descent-based slavery, to establish its influence ?

Dr. Bakary Sambe : Our first report detailed how JNIM exploits social divisions in Kayes, particularly conflicts related to descent-based slavery in municipalities such as Oussoubidiagna, where tensions between the ‘lambé’ (considered noble) and the Collectif des Sans-Papiers (Collective of Undocumented Migrants) have created grievances that have been exploited elsewhere. These conflicts, sometimes marked by clashes and land expropriations, are amplified by the circulation of weapons and modern influences via social media and certain diasporas, revolted by still conservative positions. The JNIM would use these divisions to perhaps facilitate local recruitment in the future, although this is limited by the economic resilience guaranteed by migration-related income. However, our second report notes that this strategy is part of a regional logic of exploiting tensions, as in Farabougou, where, after its capture in August 2025, JNIM imposed zakat and strict rules, positioning itself as an alternative authority to gradually weaken community cohesion.

What solutions do you propose to counter this JNIM offensive and limit its regional repercussions ?

Dr. Bakary Sambe : Our reports emphasise the need for enhanced regional cooperation between Mali, Senegal and Mauritania, going beyond a strictly security-based approach and focusing also on intelligence sharing and securing corridors such as the RN1. For example, the deployment of Garsi in the Goudiri area and its surroundings must be accompanied by better social intelligence to integrate local socio-cultural dynamics. In Kayes, endogenous mediation mechanisms, such as those led by village chiefs, neutral families and young community volunteers, need to be strengthened. Despite their effectiveness, these mechanisms are compromised by a certain degree of polarisation, as noted in our first report. Our various studies recommend proactive preventive strategies that address socio-religious and economic grievances in order to counter the JNIM's exploitation of social divisions. Without these measures and cross-border cooperation, growing insecurity, illustrated by the announced takeover of Farabougou or the blockade of Kayes challenged by the authorities, risks isolating Bamako and destabilising the West African sub-region, particularly neighbouring countries. Senegal and its partners should also consider how to further strengthen resilience beyond strictly security-related measures, as we are not dealing with a conventional war but with the complexity of an asymmetric threat.