Timbuktu Institute – December 2025

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The recent kidnappings of foreigners and the substantial ransom of $50 to $70 million reportedly paid to JNIM to secure the release of two Emiratis and one Iranian have reignited questions about the security of investments and even the viability of economic sites in the Sahel region. This phenomenon certainly accentuates the effects of the strategy of economic suffocation, but it also internationalises the echo of an economic “jihad” that also seems to be part of an effort to weaken the military regimes in place. The offensive by Jamâ'at Nasrat al-Islâm wal Muslimîn (JNIM) is inflicting increasing economic damage on foreign interests, turning foreign investors and companies into strategic targets of a hybrid and endemic threat. Attacks now directly target economic infrastructure, mining sites and logistics convoys, with the strategic objective of suffocating local economies and delegitimising the regimes in place. In 2025, JNIM intensified its operations against foreign targets, demonstrating at the same time a growing ability to strike on several fronts simultaneously.

Several raids were carried out in the gold-mining region of Kayes. On 1 July, three Indian nationals were kidnapped from the Diamond Cement Factory, prompting an immediate response from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Between late July and August, six Chinese industrial sites, mainly gold mines, were attacked, resulting in the kidnapping of Chinese nationals. Beijing is said to have demanded that the Malian authorities improve security for projects in this area. On 22 August, the Bougouni lithium mine in Mali, operated by the British company Kodal Minerals, was targeted, killing a security guard and forcing a tightening of security measures. This escalation reflects a sophisticated strategy: beyond direct attacks on industrial sites, JNIM disrupts logistics chains through blockades and ambushes on convoys, compromising the exploitation of strategic resources such as gold, uranium and lithium. Such actions affect various foreign investors – Chinese, Western, Indian, Russian – regardless of their origin, despite the diplomatic shift towards non-Western partners (China, Russia, Turkey).

This repositioning has not made it possible to secure the economic sites where the new partners are active, exacerbating the persistent vulnerability of extractive and infrastructure projects. The economic impacts are multiple and interconnected. In the short term, operational disruptions lead to production stoppages, additional security costs and direct losses of resources. In the longer term, insecurity risks creating a major deterrent effect: foreign companies are reluctant to maintain or increase their investments in high-risk areas, with the risk of a drastic fall in foreign direct investment flows. At the same time, JNIM skilfully exploits local grievances by labelling foreign investors as ‘economic colonisers’ and accusing their projects of exploiting resources without benefiting the local population. This rhetoric, amplified by the terrorist group's propaganda, strengthens its community roots while delegitimising regimes and their new partners.

Beyond the human and material losses, the strategic consequences are serious: increased risk of insecurity spreading to coastal countries, threats to regional trade corridors, and the erosion of foreign investors' soft power. Faced with this hybrid threat, foreign companies and investors must necessarily adapt their strategies. Ultimately, the JNIM offensive does not target foreign interests per se, but uses them as leverage to strangle economies, weaken existing regimes and consolidate its territorial control. Without a coordinated and sustained response, this dynamic risks triggering massive disinvestment, regional economic contraction and increased instability, with lasting repercussions for stability in the Sahel and beyond.

See also the report on "JNIM Offensive : Between “Economic Jihad” and the Threat to Foreign Interests"