By Bakary SAMBE Phd, Regional Director of the Timbuktu Institute

In the Sahel, the various counter-terrorism strategies have so far failed to contain a phenomenon which, instead of receding, continues to threaten the entire region. Since the beginning of this fight, the military and security approach had been favored in view of the security emergencies that had surprised the bewildered states. One of the main errors of assessment on the part of the Sahelian states was that for a long time they had remained in a position of considering terrorism as a "distant", exogenous phenomenon, whereas it was gradually becoming a very real scourge with increasingly local manifestations. As soon as the Maghreb countries were affected in the 1990s, it was to be expected that the threat would extend to the Sahel countries. But a certain dominant geopolitics had conceived the Sahara Desert as an impassable barrier, whereas it has always been a zone of infinite interactions and circulation of people and goods, but also of conflicts and sources of violence. Thus, the Sahelian countries, caught unawares, first tested their individual response capacities, which proved to be so weak that they quickly resorted to the Nouakchott process and the establishment of the G5 Sahel. Despite the obvious transnationality of the phenomenon of violent extremism as well as the threats, there has been a late recognition of the importance of joint strategies. Moreover, it seems paradoxically that terrorist groups in the region are more capable of synergy than the states of the region and their international partners. These groups have been able to exploit the phenomenon of transnationality and territorial continuum better than states that have long remained on the pattern of classical warfare when it was more important to deal with asymmetry.

From epicenter spillovers to continuums of insecurity

The increasingly hybrid nature of the threat, aggravated by the outbreak of communal conflicts, has even pushed the states of the region to resort to self-defense groups to compensate for the failings of security governance and the shortcomings of national armies that are poorly equipped and unprepared, like those in the rest of the world, for unprecedented forms of insurrection, mobilizing socio-political and even identity-based demands.

In this context, which will be marked by the overflow of epicenters where the phenomenon is becoming increasingly difficult to contain, the shift in theaters of operation as strategic redeployment zones makes certain countries privileged strategic targets. Burkina Faso is part of this context, seen by terrorist groups as the last lock to be broken in order to start an easier advance towards coastal Africa. The countries bordering it are already feeling the effects of such an overflow. States such as Benin, Togo and even Ghana are already aware of the growing scale of terrorism that has already crossed their borders.

Even if the threat of mass radicalisation at the local level is limited for the time being, terrorist recruitment is on the increase with young Ghanaians having joined Daech as early as 2015. Recent armed conflicts in the region (Sierra Leone, Liberia) facilitate the circulation of arms in a context of porous borders and arsenals still intact in the hands of groups and gangs that have never been so mobile. More than 80 uncontrolled incursion points along the borders of Togo, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire from Ghana, make the access of terrorist groups to the sea a compelling reality today. Incidents of kidnapping of foreigners in 2019, in addition to the recurrence of arrests of armed individuals on Togolese territory from Burkina Faso, coincide with the dismantling of terrorist cells in that country. The connection between terrorist and criminal networks from the Sahelian corridors with the South American cartels raises the risk of increased insecurity.

End of denial and gradual and collective awareness

The authorities in Benin, Ghana and Togo have begun efforts to share capacity and exchange best practices despite the different levels of strategy development underway in each country. Indeed, although they are at different levels in the national strategy development process, the three countries share similar vulnerabilities and security concerns that justify a regional approach.

In a process covering Benin, Ghana and Togo, the regional implementation plan of an ongoing joint project attempts to include, in addition to entities from different states, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), women, youth and religious organizations.  It should be recalled that this inclusive process was approved in 2019 under the aegis of the UNDP's regional programme for the prevention of violent extremism. The latter aims, together with its country offices, to provide the three countries with the necessary resources and expertise to initiate and develop national action plans for the prevention of violent extremism.

Indeed, there are several objective reasons that support the idea that the challenges and threats faced by the three countries need to be addressed in a comprehensive, cross-border and transnational manner, such as the phenomenon of socio-cultural continuums and the fact that cross-border areas remain a proven source of instability in the region where violent extremist groups whose actions and modus operandi transcend national borders are active. Similarly, the fact that the theatre of operations of terrorist groups in the region is moving closer together seems to lead to an awareness that the cross-border dimension is a key element to be taken into account, despite the need to clearly specify the needs and challenges for the coastal countries.

• Avoiding the all-security package and imported solutions

The specification of needs will be the key to a paradigm shift, an experience that could be offered by the coastal country context. International partners must avoid transposing the solutions - which are unsuccessful - from the Sahel to coastal areas that do not have the same realities. Strategies must be differentiated and break away from the "security package". The same strategy with a strong security component cannot be applied in countries already affected by the phenomenon of massive violent extremism, such as Mali and Nigeria, or in states under security pressure, such as Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. Despite the initiatives taken in the framework of the Accra initiative, the coastal countries can still develop a preventive and prospective approach that would best suit their situation.

These coastal countries would even be the appropriate laboratory for a holistic preventive and prospective approach that prioritizes the strengthening of community cohesion within the framework of an assumed prevention policy while integrating the imperatives of human security. The announced success of recent joint military operations in the framework of the Accra Initiative may galvanise enthusiasm, but should not distract coastal countries from seizing the opportunity to differentiate between countering terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism.

• Avoiding the all-security package and imported solutions

The specification of needs will be the key to a paradigm shift, an experience that could be offered by the coastal country context. International partners must avoid transposing the solutions - which are unsuccessful - from the Sahel to coastal areas that do not have the same realities. Strategies must be differentiated and break away from the "security package". The same strategy with a strong security component cannot be applied in countries already affected by the phenomenon of massive violent extremism, such as Mali and Nigeria, or in states under security pressure, such as Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. Despite the initiatives taken in the framework of the Accra initiative, the coastal countries can still develop a preventive and prospective approach that would best suit their situation.

These coastal countries would even be the appropriate laboratory for a holistic preventive and prospective approach that prioritizes the strengthening of community cohesion within the framework of an assumed prevention policy while integrating the imperatives of human security. The announced success of recent joint military operations in the framework of the Accra Initiative may galvanise enthusiasm, but should not distract coastal countries from seizing the opportunity to differentiate between the fight against terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism.

• Developing contextualized strategies and updated threat review

There is now a clear will to complete the development of strategies against violent extremism in Togo, Benin and Ghana despite the disparities in the level of threat assessment. However, what is missing is the documentation of the deep-rooted and possible causes of the rise of terrorism through field studies, particularly through perception surveys, which are currently lacking. This raises the risk of reproducing existing strategies without specifying the real needs of the countries in question. An updated review of existing prevention-oriented strategies and policies (VEC and TC) will be necessary. Coastal countries must necessarily ensure that they conduct an updated threat analysis and move towards an early warning system. The support of partners such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has already embarked on a preventive approach, could help to improve harmonization and to carry out the reforms necessary to comply with international texts, particularly those relating to human rights.

Even though they are still relatively far from the epicenter of Sahelian jihadism, the coastal countries have, however, been experiencing socio-political and religious changes in recent years that should raise alarm. The security pressure in the far north of Côte d'Ivoire, on the borders between Burkina Faso, Benin and Ghana, is a clear sign that the threat is descending and that the areas of intervention of terrorist groups from the Sahel are expanding. In the latter region, where the failure of the all-security approach seems to have already been acknowledged, the fight against terrorism has not ceased to raise serious doubts about the very viability of states and their security systems in the face of new threats. Coastal countries should not indulge in strategic mimicry despite the security pressure and the hype surrounding joint military operations. There is a need to specify solutions and not to lose sight of the possibilities that the preventive approach can still offer, which must necessarily be coupled with the management of security emergencies. It is in this balance between preventive action and anticipation through human intelligence, which will be gained with the populations by circumscribing the threat, that the possible chances of avoiding the Sahel scenario lie. In these countries, which seem to be developing strategies that give a large place to a synergy of action at the military level, as in the framework of the Accra initiative, it would be important to learn from the mistakes of the Sahel, where counter-productive "solutions" have led to a disavowal of the security policies of states and the intervention of their international partners. The latter must also learn from the Sahelian failures and avoid preconceived solutions for coastal countries, which have put the states of the region in the difficult position of having to face public opinion that is increasingly critical of current modes of security cooperation. This conflict of perceptions, which is now perceptible between the West African populations on the one hand, and the states and their international partners on the other, is a sign that security governance is now at the heart of citizens' demands. Their best chances of escaping "sahelinisation" depend to a large extent on whether this socio-political change is taken into account and on the willingness of coastal states to go beyond the security packages of classic counter-terrorism.