Actualités

Actualités (1363)

 Timbuktu Institute - Week 3 September 2026

As the January 2027 presidential election approaches, Nigerian political competition is entering a phase in which alliances are becoming almost as decisive as candidacies. Beneath the surface of a now-established contest, power struggles are still being played out that could redraw the balance between parties and within the various coalitions themselves. The race is already officially open. On 12 September, Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) published the final list of candidates for the presidential election scheduled for 16 January 2027. Eighteen contenders appear on the list, including incumbent President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, as well as Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi, who came second and third respectively in the 2023 election. Former President Goodluck Jonathan’s candidacy, however, was not accepted.

The publication of this list now sets the official framework for the contest, without ending the negotiations under way for several months within the opposition. As none of the main candidates opposing Bola Tinubu has withdrawn, discussions on a joint candidacy have so far come to nothing. The fragmentation of candidacies thus remains one of the features of this new electoral sequence, even as the prospect of an opposition coalition continues to fuel negotiations. However, tensions are not limited to the parties seeking to challenge the ruling power. They also run through the presidential camp, where strategies for the various 2027 elections are not unanimously supported.

The presidential camp’s balance put to the test

A few months before the general elections, frictions are emerging over the strategy advocated by Nyesom Wike, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory and an ally of Bola Tinubu. Wike is calling for the formation of a “rainbow coalition” bringing together supporters from different parties to help re-elect the president. He also proposes that the APC (All Progressives Congress) support PDP candidates in certain states in the governorship elections scheduled for February 2027. This approach has drawn reservations from several APC governors. Tensions were heightened by Wike’s remarks, in which he notably suggested that some of them were too “lazy” to win an election. The former governor of Rivers State nonetheless maintains his support for Bola Tinubu and says the PDP will field its own candidates in the various elections. The proposal of such an electoral architecture thus illustrates the complexity of the alliances (federal and local) at work in the run-up to 2027. Relations between the APC and the PDP, as well as the internal balance within each of these parties, could weigh on the strategies deployed in the states.

A persistent security front

While political parties refine their strategies, the security forces continue to face a persistent armed threat in the north-east of the country. On 17 September, Nigerian forces of Operation Hadin Kai repelled two attackstargeting forward operating bases in Gajiram and Mairari, in Borno State. In Gajiram, the attackers were forced to withdraw after a response combining intelligence assets and air support. In Mairari, an attack by ISWAP fighters left four dead in their ranks. Nigerian forces recovered AK-47 rifles, ammunition, RPG rockets and a video camera, while several soldiers were wounded. The army then reinforced the positions attacked and continued clearance operations in the surrounding areas. The same period, however, saw another development. On 16 September, two JAS members, including a commander, surrendered to the security forces with three AK-47 rifles, ammunition and a motorbike. These surrenders come as the army continues its operations against armed groups active in the Lake Chad Basin. They reflect a situation marked both by persistent confrontations and by attempts at disengagement within the armed groups.

At the same time, the fight against criminal networks remains another important front for the Nigerian authorities. On 13 September, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) announced that it had seized more than 2.3 tonnes of illicit drugs during operations in several states. In Lagos, officers notably intercepted shipments of “Colorado” synthetic cannabis coming from the United Kingdom. Some were concealed in loudspeakers. In Kano, 669.4 kilograms of pregabalin capsules and diazepam tablets had been hidden in bread. Large quantities of cannabis, tramadol and other substances were also discovered in several states, leading to several arrests. The NDLEA is also continuing its awareness-raising activities against drug use as part of the WADA campaign. But recent operations also highlight the transnational dimension of some networks. On 15 September, the agency announced the dismantling of a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory in Ebonyi State and the arrest of a Mexican national, Arturo Carrera Loaiza, presented as a member of a transnational network.

Abuja seeks to turn its weight into capabilities

This drive to strengthen national capabilities is also found, in a very different register, on the international stage. At the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi, Nigeria called for greater investment, infrastructure and technology transfers with the group’s member countries. Abuja intends to target agriculture, energy, industry, critical minerals, health and digital technology in particular. The government also wishes to develop digital skills, artificial intelligence, fintech and cybersecurity, with the ambition of making better use of its youth and the size of its domestic market. President Bola Tinubu summed up this approach by declaring that “a nation that owns no technology risks renting its future”. Through this position, Abuja seeks to frame its cooperation with BRICS in a logic that goes beyond trade alone. The stated objective is to strengthen the country’s productive and technological capacities while attracting more investment. Nigeria is also advocating reform of global governance and wants cooperation within BRICS to move “from dialogue to action”. Abuja is thus calling for measurable results in terms of investment, jobs and productive capacity. The challenge now is to convert diplomatic and economic openings into infrastructure, skills and activities capable of sustainably supporting the national economy.

 

Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 3 Septembre 2026

Au Burkina Faso, le quatrième anniversaire de l’accession du capitaine Traoré à la magistrature suprême se prépare en grande pompe. Cette fois-ci, ce sera à l'occasion de la grande « Nuit de la Révolution progressiste populaire » prévue le 30 septembre prochain.

Quatre ans de pouvoir, entre célébration révolutionnaire, récit souverainiste et défis persistants

L’annonce a été faite par le gouvernement à travers son chef, Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo, qui présente l’événement comme un « moment de communion populaire » pour célébrer les acquis et réaffirmer l'attachement du pays à sa souveraineté. C’est également un intense moment de communication gouvernementale sur les résultats obtenus sur le terrain, notamment en matière de sécurité, de culture et de défense. Quand bien même l’État affirme contrôler plus de 74 % du territoire, des sources estiment que des groupes terroristes continuent de revendiquer des parties du pays, notamment au nord. Dans cette perspective, plusieurs questions se posent : les populations circulent-elles librement ? Ont-elles accès aux services sociaux ? La justice est-elle indépendante ? Les libertés sont-elles garanties ? Toutefois, cet événement sera l'occasion pour les souteneurs de IB de présenter les « succès » du régime dans plusieurs domaines. Selon le ministre de la Communication, « nous voulons que partout où il y a des Burkinabè, partout où il y a des Africains qui croient à l’idéal révolutionnaire porté par le camarade capitaine Ibrahim Traoré, les amis du Burkina Faso se rassemblent pour qu’en bons veilleurs et gardiens de la révolution, nous puissions prendre part à cette nuit qui se déroulera de 18 h à 2 h du matin ». Une manière pour les autorités d’étendre leur lutte contre l’« impérialisme » à d’autres Africains.

Les blindés « Nanga », entre souveraineté militaire et défi d’autonomie stratégique

Au même moment, les forces armées burkinabè ont réceptionné leur premier lot de véhicules blindés produits localement, appelés « Nanga ». Après la production de tenues locales, comme annoncé la semaine dernière, cet acte vise à réduire davantage la dépendance vis-à-vis de l’étranger dans un contexte de guerre. Quid de la maintenance et de la fourniture de ces équipements ? Dans tous les cas, c’est un grand défi à relever pour les autorités qui ont fait de la souveraineté leur cheval de bataille tout au long de leur mandat.

AES : les frontières comme espaces de gouvernance face aux défis sécuritaires

Par ailleurs, au sein de l’AES, les pays travaillent à mettre en place un cadre commun de coopération transfrontalière afin de mieux faire face à la menace terroriste. Ce cadre a en effet pour but d’améliorer la sécurité, la mobilité et les échanges entre les trois pays. Il s’agira de partager des renseignements, de surveiller ensemble les frontières communes, mais aussi et surtout de lutter contre la criminalité transfrontalière. Pour le ministre d’État chargé de l’Administration territoriale et de la Mobilité, Émile Zerbo, il s'agit d'une initiative de coordination entre les territoires frontaliers qui « permettra aux gouverneurs des régions frontalières de disposer désormais d’un espace formel d’échanges, de coordination et de mutualisation ». Ses homologues nigérien et malien, sur la même longueur d'onde, soulignent la nécessité de constituer des « espaces de vie et d’échanges » au regard des liens entre les peuples. Ces États semblent de plus en plus comprendre que les frontières sont des espaces de gouvernance face aux défis sécuritaires actuels. Toutefois, cette initiative gagnerait à voir la participation des autorités, des forces de défense et de sécurité, ainsi que des communautés.

 Timbuktu Institute - Week 3 September 2026

In Burkina Faso, the fourth anniversary of Captain Traoré’s accession to the highest office is being prepared with great pomp. This time, it will take the form of the grand “Night of the Popular Progressive Revolution” scheduled for 30 September.

Four years in power, between revolutionary celebration, sovereigntist narrative and persistent challenges

The announcement was made by the government through its head, Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo, who presents the event as a “moment of popular communion” to celebrate achievements and reaffirm the country’s attachment to its sovereignty. It is also an intense moment of government communication on the results achieved on the ground, particularly in terms of security, culture and defence. Even though the State claims to control more than 74% of the territory, sources believe that terrorist groups continue to lay claim to parts of the country, particularly in the north. In this context, several questions arise: can people move freely? Do they have access to social services? Is the judiciary independent? Are freedoms guaranteed? Nevertheless, the event will give IB’s supporters an opportunity to present the regime’s “successes” in several fields. According to the Minister of Communication, “we want that wherever there are Burkinabè, wherever there are Africans who believe in the revolutionary ideal championed by Comrade Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the friends of Burkina Faso gather so that, as good watchmen and guardians of the revolution, we can take part in this night, which will run from 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.”. A way for the authorities to extend their fight against “imperialism” to other Africans. 

The “Nanga” armoured vehicles, between military sovereignty and the challenge of strategic autonomy

At the same time, the Burkinabè armed forces took delivery of their first batch of locally produced armouredvehicles, called “Nanga”. Following the production of locally made uniforms, as announced last week, this step aims to further reduce dependence on foreign suppliers in a context of war. What about the maintenance and supply of this equipment? In any case, it is a major challenge for the authorities, who have made sovereignty their hobbyhorse throughout their mandate.

AES: borders as spaces of governance in the face of security challenges

Furthermore, within the AES, the countries are working to establish a common framework for cross-border cooperation to better address the terrorist threat. The framework is indeed intended to improve security, mobility and exchanges between the three countries. It will involve sharing intelligence, jointly monitoring common borders, and above all combating cross-border crime. For the Minister of State for Territorial Administration and Mobility, Émile Zerbo, this is a coordination initiative between border territories that “will now give governors of border regions a formal space for exchange, coordination and pooling”. His Nigerien and Malian counterparts, on the same wavelength, stress the need to create “spaces of life and exchange” in view of the ties between peoples. These States seem increasingly to understand that borders are spaces of governance in the face of current security challenges. However, the initiative would benefit from the involvement of the authorities, the defence and security forces, and communities.

 Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 3 Septembre 2026

Le placement sous mandat de dépôt de Justin Koné Katinan, vice-président du PPA-CI, continue d’occuper l’espace médiatique ivoirien. Pour rappel, l’affaire en question comporte deux volets et deux chefs d’inculpation : d’un côté, une plainte pour diffamation du RHDP pour, entre autres, diffamation, injures et diffusion de fausses nouvelles ; de l’autre, une procédure enclenchée par le parquet pour troubles à l’ordre public lors des élections de 2025. Si le parquet parle de la régularité des procédures, l’opposition et des organisations de la société civile évoquent une restriction pure et simple des libertés politiques. 

L’affaire Katinan au croisement des tensions politiques et des enjeux de libertés

Dans la même veine, le Parti communiste français a tenu à condamner avec la plus grande fermeté son arrestation et a profité de l’occasion pour exiger sa libération immédiate. Dans le communiqué du 17 septembre, on peut lire : « Utiliser la législation antiterroriste contre un dirigeant de l’opposition, à la suite de prises de position publiques, constitue une menace directe contre la liberté d’expression, le pluralisme politique et les droits démocratiques. » Ainsi, pour le PCF, la justice ne doit pas servir à servir les intérêts du parti au pouvoir. Dans ce contexte post-électoral assez tendu, ces divergences constituent une menace pour la stabilité politique du pays.

L’axe Conakry-Abidjan face aux défis sécuritaires transfrontaliers

Pendant ce temps, la visite du président guinéen à Abidjan replace la coopération sécuritaire au cœur des débats. En effet, lors de sa visite officielle en Côte d’Ivoire, Mamadi Doumbouya a mis l’accent sur la coopération économique, commerciale et sécuritaire entre les deux pays. Cette visite s'inscrit dans le cadre du renforcement de l’axe Conakry-Abidjan, alors que les défis communs sont multiples : orpaillage clandestin, criminalité organisée, dégradation de l’environnement, etc. Les deux pays considèrent le contrôle de ces réseaux comme un enjeu économique et sécuritaire. Pour le président guinéen, « je suis convaincu qu’il n’y a pas de développement sans paix ni stabilité. Or, notre espace géographique fait face à des défis de sécurité de toute nature. Nous sommes disposés à travailler avec vous en matière d’échange de renseignements, de lutte contre la criminalité transfrontalière et le terrorisme, ainsi que sur le corridor commercial et la coopération au sein des organisations régionales africaines… ». Doumbouya a également tenu à saluer la « qualité du contact direct et régulier » avec Ouattara, qu’il considère comme son grand frère. Il n’a pas manqué l’occasion d’inviter solennellement son homologue à la fête d’indépendance de la Guinée, le 2 octobre prochain.

La diversification des partenariats militaires face aux défis sécuritaires

Dans la même lancée, l’installation du nouveau cadre de coordination militaire entre Abidjan et Rabatconstitue une avancée vers une architecture militaire plus structurée. Créée en mai 2025 à Rabat, cette commission militaire mixte ambitionne de devenir un creuset d’échanges en matière de renseignement, de renforcement des capacités, de logistique et de santé, entre autres. Dans le cadre de ce partenariat, des forces de défense et de sécurité ivoiriennes continueront à être formées dans les écoles militaires marocaines. La Côte d’Ivoire poursuit ainsi sa stratégie de coopération sécuritaire fondée sur la diversification des partenaires afin de mieux faire face aux enjeux actuels, notamment la lutte contre le terrorisme qui frappe à ses frontières.

 

Timbuktu Institute - Week 3 September 2026

The remand in custody of Justin Koné Katinan, vice-president of the PPA-CI, continues to dominate the Ivorian media landscape. As a reminder, the case has two strands and two charges: on the one hand, a complaint by the RHDP for, among other things, defamation, insults and spreading false news; on the other, proceedings initiated by the public prosecutor for disturbing public order during the 2025 elections. While the prosecution speaks of the regularity of the proceedings, the opposition and civil society organisations speak of an outright restriction of political freedoms.

The Katinan case at the crossroads of political tensions and freedom issues

In the same vein, the French Communist Party made a point of condemning his arrest in the strongest terms and took the opportunity to demand his immediate release. Its statement of 17 September reads: “Using anti-terrorism legislation against an opposition leader, following public statements, constitutes a direct threat to freedom of expression, political pluralism and democratic rights.” For the PCF, then, justice must not be used to serve the interests of the ruling party. In this rather tense post-election context, these divergences pose a threat to the country’s political stability.

The Conakry-Abidjan axis in the face of cross-border security challenges

Meanwhile, the Guinean president’s visit to Abidjan has put security cooperation back at the heart of the debate. Indeed, during his official visit to Côte d’Ivoire, Mamadi Doumbouya emphasised economic, trade and security cooperation between the two countries. The visit is part of the strengthening of the Conakry-Abidjan axis, at a time when common challenges are numerous: illegal gold mining, organised crime, environmental degradation, etc. Both countries see the control of these networks as an economic and security issue. In the words of the Guinean president, “I am convinced that there is no development without peace and stability. Yet our geographical area faces security challenges of all kinds. We are ready to work with you on intelligence sharing, the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism, as well as on the trade corridor and cooperation within regional African organisations…”. Doumbouya also made a point of praising the “quality of direct and regular contact” with Ouattara, whom he regards as his elder brother. He did not miss the opportunity to formally invite his counterpart to Guinea’s independence day celebrations on 2 October.

Diversifying military partnerships in the face of security challenges

Along the same lines, the establishment of the new framework for military coordination between Abidjan and Rabat marks a step towards a more structured military architecture. Created in May 2025 in Rabat, this joint military commission aims to become a hub for exchanges on intelligence, capacity building, logistics and health, among other things. Under this partnership, Ivorian defence and security forces will continue to be trained in Moroccan military schools. Côte d’Ivoire is thus pursuing its security cooperation strategy based on diversifying partners in order to better address current challenges, particularly the fight against terrorism striking at its borders.