Timbuktu Institute - September 2024

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Studies on youth radicalization and violent extremism have multiplied in recent years, particularly in the Sahelian region with the resurgence of the terrorist phenomenon as a threat to peace and stability. Originally perceived as the antechamber to a shift towards terrorist violence, successive approaches have been enriched by the diversity of experiences in different countries, leading experts to analyze radicalization as the result of a process, factors or consequences that are political, economic, social, ideological, etc.,

This radicalization is thus described as manifesting itself in the use of violence as a means of affirmation, expression or vindication of the most diverse kinds. But the study of radicalization soon fell victim, on the one hand, to the popularity of a “perfect subject” for media sensationalism, surfing on the spectacular character of terrorist attacks that tended to spill over from the Sahelian epicenter into previously unsuspected zones such as the Gulf of Guinea. On the other hand, the diversity of experiences and the speed of change have led to a multiplication of approaches, often reflecting the preoccupations that experts project onto the phenomenon, which in most cases ends up no longer being studied in its own right. Finally, the specializations of analysts who used to focus on subjects such as governance, crime or urban violence have rubbed off on many studies, deliberately denying the phenomenon its ideological or intercommunity dimensions, etc., for example.

Thus, the predominance of criminological approaches to the point of inducing states in the region to adopt strictly security-oriented approaches has increased, with analyses focusing more often than not on actors in the “second circle”, such as traffickers, logistical assistance couriers and so on. Meanwhile, these studies neglect the actors of the first and third circles. The first circle is made up of ideological/community entrepreneurs whose role is fundamental in recruiting, inciting and instrumentalizing grievances. The third circle, often inaccessible to criminological studies, is that of actors predisposed to extremist violence, or who may ideologically prepare for it. Most often, they interview them in prison or in situations of “remorse”, where numerous biases distort the analysis of real or initial motivations.

What's more, the tools of the criminological approach are often ill-suited to the subtleties of extremist discourse, with its ideological charge and references requiring deciphering, even exegesis, often beyond the reach of experts lacking the key concepts needed to understand symbols, allusions and language codes.

It is often after the act has been committed that many analysts who deny the ideological dimension gain access to the subjects in question, either in prison or in a situation where the security environment, prison pressure or even criminal actors weigh heavily, thus accentuating the criminological bias despite documentation efforts.

This criminological bias, which has had its full effect on the approach to the phenomenon of radicalization in the Sahel, has not spared certain studies following the spillover of the epicenter of extremist violence to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Many of them suffer from the lack of renewal of conceptual tools, as well as the rush to “document” a multidimensional and often diffuse phenomenon in contexts where the gaze is oriented by realities elsewhere.

Moreover, in the face of security and political pressure to develop responses, many analysts must have overlooked the paradigmatic turning point of the accentuation of the communalization of extremist violence, concomitant with the first visible phases of the spillover of the epicenter of terrorism from the central Sahel to the coastal countries of West Africa.

Thus, in the case of certain coastal countries, political responses strongly inspired by conclusions drawn from the criminological approach seem not to have learned from the mistakes of the Sahel, naturally turning towards security-dominated solutions, sometimes even reducing the extremist phenomenon to a “simple” criminal problem. Whereas criminality is not in itself the root of evil, but rather one of its symptoms.

In Benin's case, several studies point to its geographical proximity to Sahelian countries, which are victims of insurgency by armed terrorist groups, porous borders, the weak presence of the State in certain regions, community conflicts, youth unemployment, corruption, injustice, social inequalities and many other factors. Despite the measures, efforts and mechanisms implemented by the State to counter this advance, the security situation is gradually deteriorating in the Alibori and Atacora departments. Since the first terrorist incident in 2019, the number of terrorist attacks on Beninese soil, particularly in the septentrion, has been on the rise, with a growing number of deaths, injuries and displaced persons.

Using a comprehensive approach based on the perceptions of local populations, Timbuktu Institute  - African Center for Peace Studies took advantage of several field missions in the departments of Donga, Alibori and Atacora to conduct qualitative interviews with 270 young people living in the various localities and communes. In addition to these individual interviews, a dozen focus groups were organized on site.

In order to avoid “one shot” interviews, we adopted an approach based on continuous observation over a long period of time. In order to mitigate against approaches based on a chronology of security incidents, or which confine such a complex issue to a criminological “straitjacket”, this study aims to probe factors and question local perceptions in a comprehensive approach. The testimonies and responses gathered throughout the survey, and on which the analyses in this report are based, are the result of extensive fieldwork over the period from March - May 2023 to June 2024, directed on site by Dr. Bakary Sambe.

This study, the first in a series on Benin, is intended to contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon, leading to conclusions and recommendations that can support the initiatives and solutions put in place by the State, its partners and above all local communities, who are at the heart of this reflection.

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