By Dr. Bakary Sambe, President of the Timbuktu Institute - African Center for Peace Studies

Relations between Mauritania and Senegal, rooted in geographical, cultural and historical proximity, have been strengthened by the development of hydrocarbons as a strategic lever, notably through the Grand Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project. The recent joint visit by Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani and Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye to the GTA platform on 22 May 2025 marks a decisive step in this partnership. This event, combined with energy issues and regional challenges, underlines the need to strengthen bilateral cooperation for common and sustainable development.
The Grand Tortue Ahmeyim field is an emblematic regional cooperation project. Discovered in 2015 by Kosmos Energy, it contains around 450 billion cubic metres of gas, exploited by BP, Kosmos, Société mauritanienne des hydrocarbures (SMH) and Petrosen.

Since the start of production in January 2025 and the first export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in April 2025, the GTA has propelled the two nations into the ranks of LNG exporting countries in Africa. With planned production of 2.5 million tonnes a year, the project promises significant revenues, shared equally (50-50) under the 2018 agreement. All observers note the two countries' commitment to managing this resource in a transparent and balanced manner. According to the joint press release, the latest meeting between the two heads of state marked "a major step forward in energy cooperation" between Mauritania and Senegal. The Mauritanian President also stressed the equitable nature of this partnership, underlining the shared desire to maximise the benefits for the populations of both countries.

The joint visit on 22 May 2025 is part of a series of high-level exchanges that demonstrate the two countries' desire to consolidate their relations. On 18 April 2024, the newly elected President Faye chose Mauritania for his first official visit abroad. Another meeting, on 11 November 2024 in Riyadh on the sidelines of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, also enabled the two leaders to reaffirm their commitment to intensifying coordination on regional and international issues, including the management of the ATM.

If Mauritania and Senegal are to maximise the benefits of gas exploitation and consolidate their partnership, it is vital that they deepen their cooperation. Transparent and crucial governance of the gas project is essential. The creation of a Senegal-Mauritania secretariat, mooted in 2025, could institutionalise coordination and strengthen cooperation. Given the stakes involved, both countries need to invest more in training and infrastructure to transform revenues into sustainable development, particularly through sectors such as petrochemicals and energy. Similarly, past tensions, such as those relating to fishing, call for more concerted management of shared resources to avoid potential conflicts. But there is no doubt that the historical and cultural dimension of this relationship is a guarantee of sustainability in addition to the shared economic stakes. Over and above hydrocarbons and shared economic interests, relations between Mauritania and Senegal are above all spiritual and cultural. These relations, which have survived all previous temporary crises, are constantly fortified by a common foundation that draws its sources from the depths of our shared history.

Par Dr. Bakary Sambe, Président du Timbuktu Institute – African Center for Peace Studies

Les relations entre la Mauritanie et le Sénégal, ancrées dans une proximité géographique, culturelle et historique, se sont consolidées avec l’essor des hydrocarbures comme levier stratégique, notamment à travers le projet gazier Grand Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA). La récente visite conjointe des présidents mauritanien Mohamed Ould Cheikh El Ghazouani et sénégalais Bassirou Diomaye Faye sur la plateforme GTA, le 22 mai 2025, marque une étape décisive dans ce partenariat. Cet événement, combiné aux enjeux énergétiques et aux défis régionaux, souligne la nécessité de renforcer la coopération bilatérale pour un développement commun et durable.
Le gisement Grand Tortue Ahmeyim est un projet emblématique de coopération régionale. Découvert en 2015 par Kosmos Energy, il contient environ 450 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz, exploités par BP, Kosmos, la Société mauritanienne des hydrocarbures (SMH) et Petrosen.

Depuis le démarrage de la production en janvier 2025 et la première exportation de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) en avril 2025, le GTA a propulsé les deux nations parmi les pays exportateurs de GNL en Afrique. Avec une production prévue de 2,5 millions de tonnes par an, ce projet promet des revenus significatifs, partagés équitablement (50-50) selon l’accord de 2018. Tous les observateurs notent l’engagement des deux pays à gérer cette ressource de manière transparente et équilibrée. Selon le communiqué conjoint, la dernière rencontre entre les deux chefs d’États a marqué « une étape majeure dans la coopération énergétique » entre la Mauritanie et le Sénégal. Le président mauritanien a, d’ailleurs, insisté sur le caractère équitable de ce partenariat, soulignant la volonté commune de maximiser les bénéfices pour les populations des deux pays. 

La visite conjointe du 22 mai 2025 s’inscrit dans une série d’échanges de haut niveau qui témoignent de la volonté des deux pays de consolider leurs relations. Dès le 18 avril 2024, le président Faye, fraîchement élu, avait choisi la Mauritanie pour sa première visite officielle à l’étranger. Une autre rencontre, le 11 novembre 2024 à Riyad en marge du sommet de l’Organisation de la coopération islamique (OCI), avait, aussi, permis aux deux dirigeants de réaffirmer leur engagement à intensifier la coordination sur les enjeux régionaux et internationaux, y compris la gestion du GTA.

Pour maximiser les bénéfices issus de l’exploitation du Gaz et consolider leur partenariat, la Mauritanie et le Sénégal doivent, impérativement, approfondir leur coopération. Il s’impose une gouvernance transparente  et crucial du projet gazier. La création d’un secrétariat sénégalo-mauritanien, évoquée en 2025, pourrait institutionnaliser la coordination et renforcer la coopération. Au regard des enjeux, les deux pays doivent davantage investir dans la formation et les infrastructures pour transformer les revenus en développement durable, notamment via des filières comme la pétrochimie ou l’énergie. De même, les tensions passées, comme celles liées à la pêche, exigent une gestion plus concertée des ressources partagées pour éviter d’éventuels conflits. Mais, il est sûr que la dimension historique et culturelle de cette relation constitue un gage de durabilité en plus des enjeux économiques partagés. Au-delà des hydrocarbures et des intérêts économiques communs, les relations entre la Mauritanie et le Sénégal sont avant tout spirituelles et culturelles. Ces relations qui ont pu survivre à toutes les crises précédentes passagères sont constamment fortifiées par le socle commun qui puise ses sources dans les profondeurs de l’histoire commune.

By Dr. Bakary Sambe

President, Timbuktu Institute – African Center for Peace Studies

At the end of April 2025, Timbuktu Institute published a report entitled “The JNIM Threat in the three-border area of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal”. This scientific publication, the first of its kind and following a number of field surveys in eastern Senegal carried out by researchers from this leading think tank on regional security issues, raised a great deal of debate about the issues involved. Media coverage of the report had so far focused on Senegal's vulnerability to the advance of terrorist groups from western Mali. In this article, Dr. Bakary Sambe, President of the Timbuktu Institute, looks back at the resilience factors he suggests Senegalese authorities and their partners strengthen in a volatile regional context full of risks.

The tri-border region of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal has emerged as a strategic hotspot for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a terrorist group seeking to expand its influence beyond Mali. While Senegal faces vulnerabilities such as porous borders, socio-economic challenges, and the spread of Salafism, the country possesses robust resilience factors that have so far limited JNIM’s infiltration. These include strong social cohesion, widespread religious moderation, and competent security forces. By reinforcing these strengths through targeted policies, Senegal can further fortify its defenses against JNIM’s expansion, as outlined in a recent Timbuktu Institute report.

Senegal’s Resilience Factors

• Social Cohesion as a Cultural Shield
  Senegal’s diverse ethnic and religious communities exhibit remarkable social cohesion, which acts as a bulwark against JNIM’s divisive tactics. According to a 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey, 75% of residents in the Kédougou region attribute Senegal’s social peace to its cultural traditions, with only 13% believing inter-community tensions could drive individuals toward violent extremism. Mixed marriages and mutual respect among groups like the Bassari, Bédik, and Peul create a cultural shield, recognized by UNESCO’s designation of parts of Kédougou as a World Heritage Site for its model of peaceful coexistence. Unlike in Mali and Burkina Faso, where JNIM has exploited tensions between herders and sedentary groups, Senegal’s harmonious inter-community relations make it difficult for the group to gain traction. 
• Widespread Religious Moderation
  Senegal’s adherence to moderate Islamic teachings, particularly those of Sufi brotherhoods, counters JNIM’s radical Salafist ideology. The majority of Senegalese, including those in border regions like Kédougou, Matam, and Tambacounda, follow community-focused religious practices that emphasize self-improvement over divisive ideologies. Only 4% of residents in these regions know someone who shares JNIM’s extremist views, and religious leaders are seen as key actors in preventing radicalization, second only to the government. While Sufi influence is less pronounced in eastern border areas, the absence of widespread radicalization and the collaborative efforts of religious leaders with government and community figures bolster resilience.
• Competent and Professional Security Forces
  Senegal’s security forces are a cornerstone of its resilience, distinguished by their professionalism, size, and counterinsurgency experience. Comparable in scale to Mali and Niger’s forces despite Senegal’s smaller population and territory, they benefit from specialized training and a strong reputation for non-interference in politics. Their experience in the Casamance conflict and UN peacekeeping missions equips them to counter threats like JNIM effectively. Positive civil-military relations further enhance their effectiveness, with 55% of eastern border residents willing to share information about extremist activities with security forces. Recent efforts, such as the establishment of a permanent base in Goudiry and joint patrols with Mali and Mauritania, demonstrate proactive engagement.

Strategies to Reinforce Resilience

To counter JNIM’s expansion, Senegal must build on these resilience factors through strategic measures that enhance security, community awareness, and socio-economic inclusion. The Timbuktu Institute report offers several recommendations to achieve this: 

• Increase Security Presence in Border Regions
  Strengthening the permanent presence of security forces along the Falémé River and key cross-border routes, such as those near Bakel and Saraya, is critical. While the Goudiry base is a step forward, temporary operations like Niokolo and Nawetan have not significantly improved local perceptions of security. Permanent bases would enable rapid deployment of specialized units to combat smuggling and illicit economies, which are JNIM’s primary funding sources. Enhanced presence would also foster better intelligence-gathering through stronger ties with local communities, who are willing to report suspicious activities. For instance, residents in Guémédié have expressed readiness to share information about potential infiltrations, an opportunity security forces can leverage. 
• Strengthen Cross-Border Cooperation
  Institutionalizing cooperation with Mali and Mauritania is essential to disrupt JNIM’s cross-border networks. The report highlights JNIM’s logistical bases in Mali’s Kayes region and unofficial crossings along the Falémé River, underscoring the need for coordinated efforts. Senegal should expand on recent initiatives, such as the February 2025 military cooperation agreements with Mali and joint river patrols with Mauritania, by creating binational and trinational task forces. These should integrate army, police, and intelligence capabilities to target JNIM’s supply points and transport networks. Establishing designated intelligence-sharing contacts and processes will ensure timely responses to suspicious movements, enhancing the tri-border region’s security. 
• Conduct Awareness Campaigns with Community Leaders
  Raising awareness about JNIM’s threat is crucial, as a third of residents in Kédougou, Matam, and Tambacounda are unaware of its potential impact, per the 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey. The government should partner with religious leaders, traditional chiefs, and local authorities to conduct campaigns that highlight JNIM’s violent tactics and intolerance, contrasting them with Senegal’s values of tolerance and cohesion. In areas where Sufi influence is limited, such as parts of Kédougou and Tambacounda, traditional chiefs and reformist actors can play a pivotal role. Training these leaders in communication strategies will amplify the government’s legitimacy and reach, fostering a collective community response to JNIM’s infiltration attempts.
• Strengthen Socio-Economic Integration Programs
  Addressing socio-economic vulnerabilities, particularly unemployment and marginalization, is vital to reducing JNIM’s appeal. The 2024 Timbuktu Institute survey identifies unemployment as the primary reason (85%) why individuals might join extremist groups in border regions. The government should expand programs like PUMA and PUDC to improve road infrastructure, reducing geographical isolation in Kédougou and Tambacounda. Vocational training in sustainable agriculture and micro-credit programs, such as those under the Delegation générale à l’Entreprenariat Rapide (DER), can empower youth and women, key demographics vulnerable to JNIM’s recruitment. Additionally, regulating the mining sector to ensure equitable access to resources will address grievances against foreign companies, reducing the risk of JNIM exploiting local discontent.

 Senegal’s resilience against JNIM’s expansion rests on its strong social cohesion, religious moderation, and professional security forces. By reinforcing these strengths through increased security presence, enhanced cross-border cooperation, community awareness campaigns, and socio-economic integration programs, Senegal can further limit JNIM’s ability to infiltrate its territory. These measures will not only protect national security but also preserve the country’s model of cultural and religious harmony, ensuring that JNIM’s divisive tactics find no foothold in Senegal’s border regions.

Timbuktu Institute

Sous le thème « Face aux extrêmes, guérir le monde par le dialogue des cultures et des religions », cet événement ambitionne de faire rayonner et surtout de vulgariser un modèle d’Islam de paix, incarné par l’école de Tivaouane (Sénégal) et les enseignements universels de Cheikh El Hadji Malick Sy, figure emblématique de la confrérie soufie Tidjaniyya en Afrique.

Ce 29 mai 2025, Paris accueillera la deuxième édition de la Conférence de Paris sur l’Islam Soufi et les Défis de la Mondialisation, organisée par la Dahira Sop Naby de France et la Cellule Zawiya Tidjaniyya du Sénégal. Dans un contexte mondial marqué par la montée des extrémismes et des replis identitaires, la conférence propose de s’inspirer de l’héritage spirituel et intellectuel de Cheikh El Hadji Malick Sy, qui, dès 1902, a fait de Tivaouane un foyer de dialogue interreligieux et interculturel. Sa pensée, ancrée dans la spiritualité soufie et enrichie par les valeurs humanistes africaines, offre une réponse concrète aux radicalismes. En promouvant un Islam de coexistence pacifique, il a su unir les communautés musulmanes, chrétiennes et autres dans une harmonie qui fait du Sénégal un modèle de stabilité. Comme le souligne la citation de Saadi Shirazi : « Les couleurs du jardin ne se disputent pas leur beauté, elles fleurissent ensemble sous le même soleil. »

Évènement annuel phare de la diaspora sénégalaise en France, la Conférence de Paris 2025 réunira 300 participants, incluant leaders religieux, chercheurs, décideurs politiques, artistes et acteurs de la société civile, pour explorer comment le dialogue peut apaiser les tensions et contrer les extrémismes. Les discussions s’articuleront autour de quatre axes : comprendre les causes de la radicalisation, expérimenter le dialogue comme remède, identifier le rôle des acteurs dans la construction de ponts, et surmonter les obstacles au dialogue, notamment en contexte occidental. Des conférenciers de renom, tels que les professeurs Joseph Maila, Mbaye Thiam, Mohamed-Chérif Ferjani,  Dr.Bakary Sambe, Abbé Louis Pasteur Faye, Jean-Pierre Bat, Gregory Vandamme, Adama Aly Pam, apporteront des perspectives scientifique, philosophique et religieuse avec les contributions de Serigne Abdoul Hamid Sy, Coordonnateur de la Cellule Zawiya Tijaniyya partenaire de Sope Naby France, dirigé par Seydi Bencheikh Faye, porteur de cette initiative. Les Sessions seront modérées par d’éminentes personnalités comme Abdoulaye Rokhaya Wane du Sénégal.

Les enseignements de Cheikh El Hadji Malick Sy, notamment sa vision d’un Islam universel et inclusif, seront au cœur des échanges. Dans son ouvrage Fâkihatu Tullâb, il décrit la diversité religieuse comme une simple « différence des goûts et des abreuvoirs » convergeant vers une source commune. Cette approche, qui transcende les divisions, inspire la conférence à promouvoir des solutions concrètes pour un vivre-ensemble harmonieux. Les résultats attendus incluent une « Déclaration de Paris pour un vivre-ensemble global », un catalogue de recommandations et la création d’un réseau international pour le dialogue interculturel.

L’événement, qui se tiendra en format hybride (présentiel le 29 mai et en ligne le 1er juin), s’appuiera sur des partenaires comme le Timbuktu Institute pour revisiter et vulgariser l’héritage de Cheikh El Hadji Malick Sy, personnalité soufie majeure en Afrique du début du 20^e siècle. Dans le contexte actuel qui lui donne toute sa pertinence, la Conférence de Paris 2025 se positionne, ainsi, comme un espace unique pour repenser la coexistence et bâtir un monde de paix à travers le dialogue des cultures et des religions.

الدكتور باكري سامب – مدير معهد تمبكتو لدراسات السلام

بقيادة الرئيس الجمعية الوطنية، قام وفد من البرلمانيين السنغاليين بزيارة رسمية إلى دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة في 19 مايو 2025، وتشكل هذه الزيارة خطوة أساسية في تعزيز العلاقات الثنائية بين البلدين حيث إن السنغال تبحث عن شركاء ومستثمرين لنهضتها، بينما تسعى الإمارات إلى ترسيخ وجودها في غرب أفريقيا. وركزت المناقشات التي جرت بين البرلمانيين السنغاليين وكبار المسؤولين الإماراتيين داخل المجلس الوطني الاتحادي على القطاعات الاستراتيجية، مثل الاقتصاد والطاقة والزراعة وتبادل الخبرات في مجال الإدارة الرشيدة والسياسات العامة، بهدف التوصل إلى إمكانية وضع استراتيجية تعاونية أعمق وأثمر للطرفين. إن النموذج الإماراتي يتميز بالتحديث السريع والاستقرار السياسي ويشكل مثالا يحتذى به وموضع استلهام للقادة. وتتصادف هذه الزيارة مع بداية تنفيذ رؤية السنغال 2050 التي تَهدِف إلى جذب المزيد من الاستثمارات الأجنبية وتعزيز المؤسسات. وتنظر الإمارات العربية المتحدة إلى السنغال كبوابة للتوغل إلى غرب أفريقيا وسوق متنامية ومتعددة الفرص.

وعلى الصعيد الاقتصادي، استثمرت دبي في العديد من القطاعات في السنغال، وخاصة في ميناء داكار وميناء ندايان من خلال شركاتها مثل موانئ دبي العالمية، مما عزز دورها كمركز لوجستي. ومن المحتمل أن تطلق مشاريع جديدة في مجالات البنية التحتية أو السياحة أو التقنيات الرقمية، وهي المجالات التي تتفوق فيها على العديد من الدول. وفي الحين نفسه، توفر السنغال قوة عاملة شابة، وسوقًا ديناميكية، وموقعًا جغرافيًا استراتيجيًا تفتح لها جميع الأبواب الاستثمار والفرص السانحة. وتشكل الطاقة مجالا آخر ذا أهمية استراتيجية، علما بأنه في ظل الاكتشافات الأخيرة للغاز والنفط في السنغال، فإن الخبرة الإماراتية في مجال الهيدروكربونات قد تسهل نقل التكنولوجيا. ويجدر بنا أن نضيف إلى ذلك أنه يشترك كلا البلدين في الاهتمام بالطاقة المتجددة، ويمكن لمثل مبادرة "مصدر" الإماراتية الرائدة في مجال الطاقة النظيفة، أن تدعم السنغال في تطوير مشاريع الطاقة الشمسية وطاقة الرياح، بما يتماشى مع طموحاتها في مجال التحول في مجال الطاقة. وتوفر الزراعة، التي تعد حيوية لتوفير فرص العمل والأمن الغذائي في السنغال، آفاقا جديدة أيضا.

نظرا إلى أن الإمارات تواجه تحديات المناخ وتستثمر في الزراعة المستدامة بالخارج، من الممكن أن يساهم تعاونها مع السنغال في تحديث تقنيات الري وتحسين سلاسل القيمة وتعزيز الصادرات السنغالية إلى أسواقها. ولا يخلو هذا التعاون من العوائق، لكن الاختلافات الثقافية وفي مجال الحكم تتطلب اتباع نهج متوازن. وسيتعين على السنغال أن تعمل على أن تفيد شعبها بثمرات هذه الشراكات، وتجنب الاعتماد المفرط على رأس المال الأجنبي. ومن ثم فإن شفافية الاتفاقيات وإشراك أصحاب المصلحة المحليين سيكونان حاسمين لتحقيق شراكة دائمة. إن التجربة الإماراتية في مكافحة التطرف العنيف وتعزيز قيم التسامح والحوار بين الأديان، إلى جانب النموذج السنغالي للتعايش السلمي، توفر فرصة للدول العربية والأفريقية للاستلهام منها في سياق دولي يتسم بالإرهاب وانعدام الأمن. وهذه وجهات النظر تتماشى تماما مع الخطة الوطنية التنموية للسلطات السنغالية الجديدة، بما يستفيد بها الدولتان الشقيقتان.

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The actions of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimîn (JNIM) in southwest Mali indicate that it is seeking to infiltrate Mauritania and Senegal. JNIM has exponentially increased its activities in Kayes, Mali's border region with Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal. These activities include complex attacks on security forces, coercion of civilians and criminal economy. JNIM's main objective is to push Malian security forces out of areas close to Bamako and delegitimize the government, thus laying the foundations for an extension of its area of operations. JNIM has already illegally infiltrated key economic sectors, such as logging and mining, which depend on trade with Mauritania and Senegal. JNIM's interests in these sectors enable it to establish cross-border networks. The group is aware that it can then use these networks to facilitate the movement of affiliated people and resources to Mauritania and Senegal. Although its immediate priority is to use Mauritanian and Senegalese territory to finance its actions and recruit, JNIM will probably try to gradually extend its territorial control in the future.

Senegal presents vulnerability factors that JNIM can exploit, including a porous border, a lack of awareness of security issues among the population, pressing socio-economic challenges and the spread of Salafism. Senegal's border with Mali is already heavily exploited by smugglers, and its geography makes it more difficult to secure. However, a significant proportion of the population in regions threatened by JNIM expansion do not see the group as an immediate threat. Unemployment remains high in these regions, and caste systems in the Bakel area perpetuate inequalities and other injustices by stigmatizing entire communities. Salafist ideologues have used these grievances to influence people’s religious beliefs, making them potentially more receptive to violent extremism. Ideologues offer a “liberation theology” contrasted with traditional Islam, whose actors do not sufficiently condemn the caste system and other inequalities. JNIM has already exploited similar vulnerabilities throughout the Sahel; Senegal should not be considered a sustainable exception without prevention and community resilience-building efforts.

At the same time, Senegal has resilience factors that have so far spared it, principally its social cohesion and its competent, professional security forces. Added to this are the mutual respect and spirit of peaceful cohabitation that characterize relations between different ethnic and religious groups. Their harmonious relations make it difficult for JNIM to exploit existing tensions to its own advantage, as it has been able to do elsewhere in the region. Moreover, the vast majority of Senegalese do not subscribe to the more radical ideologies shared by followers of groups like JNIM. They prefer moderate teachings of Islam, particularly those of Sufi brotherhood leaders, who reinforce social cohesion and oppose radicalization and violent extremism. Although the brotherhoods are not as influential in the eastern border regions, these regions have not, to date, seen any notable rise extremism. In addition, Senegal has professional security forces who have established healthy and relatively peaceful relations with the local population. This mitigates another grievance that JNIM has exploited in the Sahel, namely the opposition between border populations and security forces. From this point of view, Senegal has a solid base of resilience to prevent JNIM from expanding and establishing itself in the long term.

Based on these facts, the Senegalese government could improve security in the most vulnerable parts of the country by building community resilience. It needs to strengthen the presence of its permanent security forces in border regions, as well as its cooperation with Mali and Mauritania. It should also conduct awareness- raising campaigns among local leaders - religious and traditional - and increase programs aimed at alleviating socio-economic difficulties and vulnerabilities. These holistic policies will integrate security, cultural and socio-economic aspects to limit the possibility of JNIM infiltration.

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