By Bakary SAMBE Phd, Regional Director of the Timbuktu Institute

In the Sahel, the various counter-terrorism strategies have so far failed to contain a phenomenon which, instead of receding, continues to threaten the entire region. Since the beginning of this fight, the military and security approach had been favored in view of the security emergencies that had surprised the bewildered states. One of the main errors of assessment on the part of the Sahelian states was that for a long time they had remained in a position of considering terrorism as a "distant", exogenous phenomenon, whereas it was gradually becoming a very real scourge with increasingly local manifestations. As soon as the Maghreb countries were affected in the 1990s, it was to be expected that the threat would extend to the Sahel countries. But a certain dominant geopolitics had conceived the Sahara Desert as an impassable barrier, whereas it has always been a zone of infinite interactions and circulation of people and goods, but also of conflicts and sources of violence. Thus, the Sahelian countries, caught unawares, first tested their individual response capacities, which proved to be so weak that they quickly resorted to the Nouakchott process and the establishment of the G5 Sahel. Despite the obvious transnationality of the phenomenon of violent extremism as well as the threats, there has been a late recognition of the importance of joint strategies. Moreover, it seems paradoxically that terrorist groups in the region are more capable of synergy than the states of the region and their international partners. These groups have been able to exploit the phenomenon of transnationality and territorial continuum better than states that have long remained on the pattern of classical warfare when it was more important to deal with asymmetry.

From epicenter spillovers to continuums of insecurity

The increasingly hybrid nature of the threat, aggravated by the outbreak of communal conflicts, has even pushed the states of the region to resort to self-defense groups to compensate for the failings of security governance and the shortcomings of national armies that are poorly equipped and unprepared, like those in the rest of the world, for unprecedented forms of insurrection, mobilizing socio-political and even identity-based demands.

In this context, which will be marked by the overflow of epicenters where the phenomenon is becoming increasingly difficult to contain, the shift in theaters of operation as strategic redeployment zones makes certain countries privileged strategic targets. Burkina Faso is part of this context, seen by terrorist groups as the last lock to be broken in order to start an easier advance towards coastal Africa. The countries bordering it are already feeling the effects of such an overflow. States such as Benin, Togo and even Ghana are already aware of the growing scale of terrorism that has already crossed their borders.

Even if the threat of mass radicalisation at the local level is limited for the time being, terrorist recruitment is on the increase with young Ghanaians having joined Daech as early as 2015. Recent armed conflicts in the region (Sierra Leone, Liberia) facilitate the circulation of arms in a context of porous borders and arsenals still intact in the hands of groups and gangs that have never been so mobile. More than 80 uncontrolled incursion points along the borders of Togo, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire from Ghana, make the access of terrorist groups to the sea a compelling reality today. Incidents of kidnapping of foreigners in 2019, in addition to the recurrence of arrests of armed individuals on Togolese territory from Burkina Faso, coincide with the dismantling of terrorist cells in that country. The connection between terrorist and criminal networks from the Sahelian corridors with the South American cartels raises the risk of increased insecurity.

End of denial and gradual and collective awareness

The authorities in Benin, Ghana and Togo have begun efforts to share capacity and exchange best practices despite the different levels of strategy development underway in each country. Indeed, although they are at different levels in the national strategy development process, the three countries share similar vulnerabilities and security concerns that justify a regional approach.

In a process covering Benin, Ghana and Togo, the regional implementation plan of an ongoing joint project attempts to include, in addition to entities from different states, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), women, youth and religious organizations.  It should be recalled that this inclusive process was approved in 2019 under the aegis of the UNDP's regional programme for the prevention of violent extremism. The latter aims, together with its country offices, to provide the three countries with the necessary resources and expertise to initiate and develop national action plans for the prevention of violent extremism.

Indeed, there are several objective reasons that support the idea that the challenges and threats faced by the three countries need to be addressed in a comprehensive, cross-border and transnational manner, such as the phenomenon of socio-cultural continuums and the fact that cross-border areas remain a proven source of instability in the region where violent extremist groups whose actions and modus operandi transcend national borders are active. Similarly, the fact that the theatre of operations of terrorist groups in the region is moving closer together seems to lead to an awareness that the cross-border dimension is a key element to be taken into account, despite the need to clearly specify the needs and challenges for the coastal countries.

• Avoiding the all-security package and imported solutions

The specification of needs will be the key to a paradigm shift, an experience that could be offered by the coastal country context. International partners must avoid transposing the solutions - which are unsuccessful - from the Sahel to coastal areas that do not have the same realities. Strategies must be differentiated and break away from the "security package". The same strategy with a strong security component cannot be applied in countries already affected by the phenomenon of massive violent extremism, such as Mali and Nigeria, or in states under security pressure, such as Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. Despite the initiatives taken in the framework of the Accra initiative, the coastal countries can still develop a preventive and prospective approach that would best suit their situation.

These coastal countries would even be the appropriate laboratory for a holistic preventive and prospective approach that prioritizes the strengthening of community cohesion within the framework of an assumed prevention policy while integrating the imperatives of human security. The announced success of recent joint military operations in the framework of the Accra Initiative may galvanise enthusiasm, but should not distract coastal countries from seizing the opportunity to differentiate between countering terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism.

• Avoiding the all-security package and imported solutions

The specification of needs will be the key to a paradigm shift, an experience that could be offered by the coastal country context. International partners must avoid transposing the solutions - which are unsuccessful - from the Sahel to coastal areas that do not have the same realities. Strategies must be differentiated and break away from the "security package". The same strategy with a strong security component cannot be applied in countries already affected by the phenomenon of massive violent extremism, such as Mali and Nigeria, or in states under security pressure, such as Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. Despite the initiatives taken in the framework of the Accra initiative, the coastal countries can still develop a preventive and prospective approach that would best suit their situation.

These coastal countries would even be the appropriate laboratory for a holistic preventive and prospective approach that prioritizes the strengthening of community cohesion within the framework of an assumed prevention policy while integrating the imperatives of human security. The announced success of recent joint military operations in the framework of the Accra Initiative may galvanise enthusiasm, but should not distract coastal countries from seizing the opportunity to differentiate between the fight against terrorism and the prevention of violent extremism.

• Developing contextualized strategies and updated threat review

There is now a clear will to complete the development of strategies against violent extremism in Togo, Benin and Ghana despite the disparities in the level of threat assessment. However, what is missing is the documentation of the deep-rooted and possible causes of the rise of terrorism through field studies, particularly through perception surveys, which are currently lacking. This raises the risk of reproducing existing strategies without specifying the real needs of the countries in question. An updated review of existing prevention-oriented strategies and policies (VEC and TC) will be necessary. Coastal countries must necessarily ensure that they conduct an updated threat analysis and move towards an early warning system. The support of partners such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has already embarked on a preventive approach, could help to improve harmonization and to carry out the reforms necessary to comply with international texts, particularly those relating to human rights.

Even though they are still relatively far from the epicenter of Sahelian jihadism, the coastal countries have, however, been experiencing socio-political and religious changes in recent years that should raise alarm. The security pressure in the far north of Côte d'Ivoire, on the borders between Burkina Faso, Benin and Ghana, is a clear sign that the threat is descending and that the areas of intervention of terrorist groups from the Sahel are expanding. In the latter region, where the failure of the all-security approach seems to have already been acknowledged, the fight against terrorism has not ceased to raise serious doubts about the very viability of states and their security systems in the face of new threats. Coastal countries should not indulge in strategic mimicry despite the security pressure and the hype surrounding joint military operations. There is a need to specify solutions and not to lose sight of the possibilities that the preventive approach can still offer, which must necessarily be coupled with the management of security emergencies. It is in this balance between preventive action and anticipation through human intelligence, which will be gained with the populations by circumscribing the threat, that the possible chances of avoiding the Sahel scenario lie. In these countries, which seem to be developing strategies that give a large place to a synergy of action at the military level, as in the framework of the Accra initiative, it would be important to learn from the mistakes of the Sahel, where counter-productive "solutions" have led to a disavowal of the security policies of states and the intervention of their international partners. The latter must also learn from the Sahelian failures and avoid preconceived solutions for coastal countries, which have put the states of the region in the difficult position of having to face public opinion that is increasingly critical of current modes of security cooperation. This conflict of perceptions, which is now perceptible between the West African populations on the one hand, and the states and their international partners on the other, is a sign that security governance is now at the heart of citizens' demands. Their best chances of escaping "sahelinisation" depend to a large extent on whether this socio-political change is taken into account and on the willingness of coastal states to go beyond the security packages of classic counter-terrorism.

Dr. Bakary Sambe, director of the Timbuktu Institute (Bamako-Dakar-Niamey), talked to “L’Opinion”, a few days ago, about the genesis of the recent putsches in the Sahel countries and the new dynamics of protest in the region.

A Burkinabe lieutenant-colonel, Emmanuel Zoungrana, was arrested on 10 January for an alleged coup attempt. How do you explain the return of coups in West Africa?

The Burkinabe military complains that they are ill-equipped to deal with the jihadists they are fighting on the ground. The security situation has deteriorated in recent years. They have suffered many losses in the border areas. The state is so bankrupt that the authorities are delegating part of the national defense to self-defense militias, the Koglweogo. This is an admission of impotence. There is a risk that the officers are no longer in tune with the political leadership and are tempted to take responsibility. This leads to a paradoxical situation where coups are sometimes seen as a democratic breath of fresh air due to the rejection of local powers, a certain abandonment of democratic ideals by the international community and regional organizations considered illegitimate.

Faced with the risk of coups and the desire of juntas to perpetuate their reign in power, West African leaders adopted on Sunday very harsh sanctions against the Malian authorities. Are they justified?

This is not the time to take shots at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which, despite its shortcomings, remains a resource in terms of mediation and conflict management. The positions of this regional organization deserve to be supported in Mali. Sanctions are a necessary evil to help this country find its democratic trajectory so that it does not live under the regime of successive juntas. West African leaders waited until their eighth summit since August 2020, after several warnings, to sanction the transitional authorities, who cannot say they were caught off guard. They also provided for exemptions for the supply of food, pharmaceuticals and fuel so as not to penalize the population.

"There is now a myth of an 'Islamic awakening' or an 'Islamic conscience'. This leads to the establishment of these unprecedented alliances in youth circles, between Salafist movements and ex-militants of the nationalist left".

Do the protest movements in the Sahel not give rise to unholy alliances between leftists and supporters of political Islam, which coup officers seek to exploit?

Secular civil societies have weakened. They are less and less supported by their Western partners. The latter are in a logic of diplomatic pragmatism in order not to lose ground to the growing influence of other powers such as China, Russia and Turkey. Western states therefore tend to align themselves with the policies of the powers that be, sacrificing the fundamental principles and values that bind them to civil societies. Religious leaders take advantage of this and influence a rather idle youth in need of guidance. We can also observe the emergence of new alliances since the Arab Spring, between civil society actors and former leftists or neo-leftists who seek, through revolutionary processes, to gain access to power by making a pact with currents crossed by political Islam.

What is the role of social networks in the emergence of these new protests?

Western powers such as France are tending to gradually disconnect from real society, which is itself very connected to social networks that are in the throes of an informational influence war. Social movements use these relays to mobilize their supporters in an atmosphere marked by an Islamo-nationalism that is not challenged by left-wing currents that seek to find a new lease of life in protest. If the new powers of influence support this groundswell, a cold war could be reinstated, with the main danger being the loss of democratic gains.

How do you explain the attraction of young people to the Salafist movement?

It can be motivated by interest, social assistance or community prestige. We therefore need to think about Salafism from the point of view of local realities, and not subordinate the understanding of such a socio-religious phenomenon to a Western context. As the state no longer wishes to provide for educational needs, a genuine Arabic-speaking and Islamic elite has emerged from these institutions. This elite is challenging the hegemony of the dominant French-speaking executives in the administrative structures. They are considered responsible for the failure of governance since independence. This radicalism, considered as modernity out of spite, seduces entire sections of the educated youth. It is no longer a question of poverty or illiteracy. There is now a myth of an 'Islamic awakening' or 'Islamic consciousness' that permeates all spheres. This leads to the establishment of these unprecedented alliances in youth circles, between Salafist movements and ex-militants of the nationalist left, who see in this Islam an effective form of protest against the West or neo-liberalism.

"The French discourse on Islam discredits the defenders of secularism in the Sahel, and the fight against Western interference remains mobilising"

Do you see a danger for the post-independent Sahelian states?

It is not by simple doctrinaire adherence that the youngest and most educated adopt Salafism, but through new needs for religious expression, which orient young people more and more towards a rationalised and reformist Islam. Such a situation leads to a form of elitism of religious fundamentalism. These movements are thus taking over from the state, which has failed to provide social guidance for young people. This aggregation of facts could be a source of unrest in the medium term in urban and rural areas, and also of a social divide. This will give rise to "nation states" with the resurgence of a national feeling and a harmonised socialisation around an educational system totally controlled by Islamist networks. We therefore fear a clash of extremes in Mali, Togo and Benin, between fundamentalist Islam and evangelist Christian currents.

Is France, which has inspired the constitutions of the Sahelian states and their political life, not losing the battle for the influence of the social model?

France and the European countries have not taken sufficient account of our social models and their structures. The problem of the European gap in relation to the new socio-religious realities must be resolved. The socio-educational and humanitarian actions supported by the Arab countries are appreciated by the populations who consider them more useful and effective. The French discourse on Islam discredits the defenders of secularism in the Sahel, and the fight against Western interference remains mobilising. The growing demand of Islamic actors for a better representation of Islam and its values in political systems cannot be ignored any longer. Listening to the field is a prerequisite for overcoming conflicts of perception. It is therefore necessary to take into account the religious reality on the political level and not to lock oneself into a secularism of combat but rather to promote a secularism of consensus.

Are the secular constitutions inherited from the former colonizer still appropriate?

We are in constitutionally secular states that must govern the religious at a time when the security dimension requires the full attention of the authorities because of the radicalisation of part of the youth. It is necessary to adapt constitutions, which can be revised, to local realities in order to understand the religious factor in all its dimensions. For example, the countries of the Sahel suffer from a dual education system, with the official French-speaking school on the one hand, and the multiplication of Arab and Islamic schools on the other in an overlapping of educational offers, which threatens the fragile social cohesion in the still unfinished process of state building.

Specialist in radicalism

Founder of the Observatory of Radicalisms and Religious Conflicts in Africa, Bakary Sambe is a lecturer at the Gaston Berger University (Saint-Louis -Senegal). He is the author of numerous books including Islam and Diplomacy, Morocco's African Policy (2010), Boko Haram, du problème nigérian à la menace régionale (2015), Contestations islamisées. Senegal between influence diplomacy and political Islam (2018).