La Météo Sahel revient pour les mois d’avril et mai sur l’actualité sécuritaire, sociale et politique. Pour ce nouveau numéro, neuf pays de l’espace sahélien et de l’Afrique de l’ouest sont couverts par le Timbuktu Institute. La situation actuelle dans la sous-région est dominée par la multiplication des attaques terroristes notées ces dernières semaines, provoquant de nombreuses pertes en vies humaines, blessés et déplacés. En même temps, les crises politiques viennent se greffer dans le lot Toutefois, les dirigeants continuent de mener des initiatives pour lutter contre le djihadisme malgré une actualité politique chargée avec des perspectives lourdes de risques.

Télécharger la Météo Sahel du Timbuktu Institute

Recently, Timbuktu Institute (The African Center for Peace Studies) in collaboration with Institut Français de Dakar held a civic conversation for young and vulnerable groups on the theme, ''YOUTH AND THE MEDIA : BETWEEN COMMITMENT AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY. The forum which was held in the village of Kaninlai in the West Coast Regions brought together students and teachers from St. Antony's Basic Cycle school, members of the media and a cross section of the local populace resident in Kanilai and other villages in the catchment area.   

The forum sensitizes students to social media’s negative and positive academic impacts. Social media can benefit students’ education in terms of research, but it can also negatively affect them by distracting them, disrupting their day-to-day activities, spreading rumors, unrealistic views of other people’s lives but also to some extent, it could lead to vulnerable groups fallen prey to extremist and radical groups operating in the sub-region.

Adji Awa Samb, Head of Cooperation and Regional Projects at Timbuktu Institute, said it is necessary to sensitize students because they are vulnerable and have no knowledge of cyber security. She told the forum that unregulated internet usage could be dangerous for young people because scammers do not distinguish between young and old. “I am delighted to have you all here. This shows that you are interested in the topic. Do not allow yourself to be distracted by social activities. Stay away from it as much as possible, but if you cannot, please use it wisely. You are all young and have a future to build. Take your education seriously, study hard and do research and always be open to your parents and teachers for discussions on issues that affect you and your education”, she opined.

Momodou Lamin Jaiteh, Kaba Communication’s manager, calls for constructive internet use. He urged the students to be aware of misinformation and disinformation and its dangers to society. He emphasized on the different role of traditional media and the new media (social media). He said in the new media, everyone is a journalist whereas in the traditional media, there are rules and regulations know as gate keepers. “In a democracy, you need the information to make informed choices, but you should not allow yourself to spread false news”, he added.

Gallow Ceesay, a Teacher at St Anthony’s Basic Cycle School, said the interface could have been better than now, saying social media consumes students’ time.

He warned students to be aware of dirty websites, scammers, and imposters on the internet while encouraging them to always scrutinize information before sharing and desist from sharing misinformation and disinformation. “Always compare the information with your teachers and be adaptive and conscious of analyzing posts”, he advised them.

Ousman Kujabi, Village Development Committee Chairman of Kanilai, also advised the students to use the internet wisely as it can improve their quest for knowledge. He said young people need to be counseled, thus calling on parents to monitor their children’s online activities.

Alpha Jallow, the Communication and Media Consultant for Timbuktu Institute, said their engagement with the students on youth access to the internet is because some of them can be brainwashed by individuals or organizations who might be working outside The Gambia by manipulating them in exchange for something.«We believe if we start sensitizing them now on these issues, there is a possibility that they will not fall as victims.”

One participant intimated to me that this kind of sensitization campaign on the usage of social media will go a long way in helping youths and other vulnerable groups to harness more knowledge and also differentiate what is 'Good news and Fake news'

The Regional Director of Timbuktu Institute, the African Center for Peace studies Dr. Bakary Sambe who have not attended the forum in Gambia due to other engagements, expressed delight and thanked all the participants for a very successful event. He however promised to organize more events in The Gambia in the near future.

The seminar concluded with interactive discussions with students as well as contributions from stakeholders.

Timbuktu Institute

On Thursday June 16, Timbuktu Institute presented a regional study on "Islam and Islamism in West Africa", in partnership with the Abidjan-based Académie Internationale de Lutte contre le Terrorisme (AILCT).

While such a subject may seem daunting to some, the study is in line with the need to move away from a security vision focused on the immediate and on emergency management, and to reflect on the long term. The first aim of the study was to distinguish between a religion that is often wrongly stigmatized and the "manipulation of religious symbols for political and ideological motives by a tiny minority seeking to justify their violent discourse, which the majority of Muslims reject and even fall victim to", explains Dr. Bakary Sambe, who coordinated the study with Dr. Lassina Diarra.

It is true that terrorism has become a regional security threat in recent decades. It often operates through radicalization "from below", diverting the attention of decision-makers and experts from its method of penetration and conquest from above.

Yet the objective remains the same: the destruction of the state entity through terrorist violence, or its gradual destructuring by undermining, through delegitimization, the democratic and republican foundations of the region's fragile states. In the case of West Africa, these initially evolved through the use of extremist ideologies stemming from political Islam, embodied by Salafism or Wahhabism, and other social pathologies. Until recently, the prevailing perception of sub-Saharan Islam as free from the influences of the Arab-Muslim world had led to a blurring of its specific features to the point of isolating it from developments affecting other societies.

In the same way that the spread of terrorism in North Africa had not sufficiently alerted us to the need to prevent the epicenter from spilling over into the Sahel, West African states had long maintained a dichotomy between the sub-Saharan and Maghreb spaces, neglecting the weight of interactions between increasingly transnational religious spaces and actors. Long locked into the "Algerian" paradigm of an ideological kinship between jihadism and religion, decision-makers showed little interest in the political expression of the instrumentalization of religion in the context of projects aimed, among other things, at challenging the republican form of the modern state in this part of the continent.

Manipulation of religious symbols and Islamo-nationalism

This study has attempted to show that, beyond its violent expression in terrorism, which is the focus of attention today, political Islam ultimately sets itself the same objectives: to control society, to destructure the State, through a slow but well-considered method of undermining its foundations and legitimacy. The long years of state disengagement since structural adjustment have fostered the rise of religious organizations, which have gradually replaced the state, eventually competing with it in key sectors such as education, social work and youth policy. States are faced with imposed dualities in regal domains, suffering from a deficit often filled by Islamist movements. Political Islam, with its Salafist and, to a lesser extent, traditional currents, is becoming a socio-political issue in the sense that it relies on the manipulation of religious symbols and forms of contestation of state policy, especially with the clear retreat of left-wing ideologies. Today, Islamism has taken over urban centers, rural areas and even university campuses, feeding on the instrumentalization of religion as an effective lever for mobilization, as well as contesting "Western hegemony" to the point of allying itself with former revolutionary tendencies that have become nationalist.

Challenging the socio-political order

To gain a better understanding of this evolution, the study retraces the itinerary of Islamism, its currents, its expansion strategies and, above all, its conquest of elites, including political elites, using the case of West African countries to show how the region's states are struggling to grasp this dynamic, which is less visible than the terrorist phenomenon. Research has also focused on strategies for challenging the socio-political order, without neglecting the explanatory variable of the ideological make-up of West African terrorist groups, which many experts on extremism attempt to question, often simply because of a lack of analytical grids.

In considering new regional trends and prospects for Islamism in West Africa, much attention has been paid to the emergence of socialization spaces in competition with public power, which can lead to a rise in religious conflict or the instrumentalization of denominational allegiances, such as the feared clash between radical Islam and certain evangelical currents. The same applies to the link between the growing power of conquering Salafist tendencies and the risk of ethnic-religious tensions in certain countries, as well as to trends towards a gradual "normalization" of Salafism, far from the perception that "Western" analysts may have of it.

Strategy to delegitimize West African states:

Salafist currents are increasingly able to shed their "imported" character, despite the action of the Gulf States, and are establishing themselves more and more as an "endogenous" reality that is also part of the politically buoyant issue of challenging the West and defending "societal values". Added to this is the increasingly pronounced demand for greater representation of religious elites and values in the management of the state and public affairs, promoting a certain "Islamic morality" which, from their point of view, could come to the rescue of secularized governance deemed out of touch with local realities. An ongoing process of delegitimization of the state that should attract greater attention and research interest. 

This awareness of the need for a paradigm shift is particularly important in a regional context marked by a certain fragility of institutions and social equilibria, where all states face the complex challenges of having to build national resilience in an increasingly unstable regional environment.

For Bakary Sambe, Regional Director of the Timbuktu institute, this demand for departure "without delay" is in line with the communication of the transitional authorities since they came to power: "The transitional authorities have been following the same logic since they came to power. It's an important part of their communication to always show that there are actors and organizations that are against Mali's interests. After France, during operation Barkhane, it was ECOWAS's turn. I think the main thrust of this communication is to find "enemies of Mali" every time.

According to this observer of the Malian political scene for over twenty years, "This populist discourse works very well with the population in the midst of an economic and security crisis. So, after France, ECOWAS and then the Ivorian soldiers, it's Minusma's turn. It's a binary schema that always sets Mali against the others.

The political context may even have a lot to do with this stance, which comes as no surprise to some observers: "What's more, we're currently in a crucial period where the Constitution is being debated, as well as future elections and the referendum on Sunday June 18. So the authorities needed to address the issue in an incisive way. The aim is to flatter Malian pride and brandish sovereignty," recalls Bakary Sambe.

A political communication strategy on the part of Bamako ?

For him, "the authorities are at a very advanced stage of the transition process, so it was necessary to tackle the real issues, such as the long-promised institutional reforms. That's why it's so opportune for them to wave the red rag of the departure of the Minusma, a mission that has become an easy target. Moreover, the use of the word "departure without delay" was well chosen, to send a message to the population whose pride they want to whip, even if it seems almost impossible to see such troops leave the country so quickly".

Despite the facade of unanimity, under the influence of social networks, the regional director of the Timbuktu Institute even explains that there are two opposing visions in Mali on the question of security cooperation, "there has always been a clear difference in discourse between, on the one hand, Bamako, its young urbanites, present on social networks, and on the other, the people who experience insecurity on a daily basis, such as in Ménaka, Gao or Timbuktu. The perception of cooperation is totally different, but in the end, the most audible discourse is that of the people who are least concerned by insecurity, but who flood the social networks".

Sambe believes that there is a "deliberate confusion" aimed at "masking the failure on the security front". For him, "the recent events in Moura were an illustration of the failure in terms of security", he continues: "It's often forgotten, but the two priority missions of the Minusma are to support the implementation of the peace agreement and the transition, and then to support the restoration and stabilization of the center of the country. So it wasn't a mandate to fight terrorism in the traditional way, but rather to consolidate peace. To make the link with failure on the security front is therefore a fine subterfuge intended for local and popular consumption".

Why the fixation on MINUSMA ?

"In reality, MINUSMA is a symbol in the discourse. It's a symbol of a foreign body, an external actor, which doesn't give the transitional authorities a free hand to guarantee security. This is the logic presented to the population. We saw the same thing with Barkhane, despite all its faults", explains Dr. Bakary Sambe.

But the researcher makes no secret of his skepticism about the sustainability of peacekeeping missions if they persist in their current form: "The longer we go on, the more peacebuilding missions lose their credibility. They therefore become the ideal target for criticism in terms of inefficiency. The format of these missions clearly needs to be reviewed. Over time, they have shown their limitations everywhere".

For Bakary Sambe, however, there remains the risk of a deterioration in security conditions in Mali and even in the region: "Today, when Mali is struggling to secure even the outskirts of Bamako - as demonstrated by the attack on Kati, the strategic heart of the regime - and even if the Minusma had a minor role to play in this respect, this required departure would constitute a real threat for the region. I'm not sure that those demanding such a departure are capable of securing the vast expanses of Mali bordering other countries under security pressure" 

After MINUSMA, what about Wagner ?

"I don't think Wagner will be able to play this stabilizing role," warns the researcher. "We've seen their blunders and exactions against civilian populations. The problem in Mali, especially in the center, is a communal one. Neither the FAMa nor Wagner will be able to solve it if they persist in their current strategy, which plays into the hands of terrorist groups posing as protectors of ostracized communities. The famous rise in power of the FAMAs, with the support of Wagner, has been against the communities and has had little effect on the ability of terrorist groups to cause harm".

And Sambe insists on the need for a change of strategy on the part of Bamako and its partners. According to him, "the Malian state needs to engage in dialogue with all the children of Mali, as it has a legitimate right to do, to stop stigmatizing certain communities and to initiate reconciliation. But we seem to be so far off the mark," he concludes.

Timbuktu Institute

NB: (Some extracts are from the interview with TV5 Monde)

Timbuktu Institute

Pour Bakary Sambe, Directeur régional du Timbuktu institute, cette demande de départ « sans délai » s’inscrit dans la logique de la communication des autorités de la transition depuis leur arrivée au pouvoir : « les autorités de la transition sont dans la même logique depuis leur arrivée au pouvoir. C’est un marqueur assez important de leur communication de toujours montrer qu’il y a des acteurs et des organisations qui seraient contre les intérêts du Mali. Après la France, pendant l’opération Barkhane, ce fut le tour de la CEDEAO. Je pense que l’axe majeur de cette communication est finalement de trouver, à chaque fois, des « ennemis du Mali ».

Selon cet observateur de la scène politique malienne depuis plus d’une vingtaine d’années, « Ce discours populiste fonctionne très bien au sein de la population en pleine crise économique et sécuritaire. Donc, après la France, la CEDEAO, ensuite les soldats ivoiriens c’est le tour de la Minusma. C’est un schéma binaire qui veut, toujours, qu’il y ait le Mali qu’on oppose aux autres.

Le contexte politique serait même pour beaucoup dans cette prise de position qui n’a pas surpris certains observateurs : « En plus, nous sommes actuellement dans une période cruciale où se discute la Constitution, les futures échéances électorales, le référendum du dimanche 18 juin. Les autorités avaient donc besoin d’aborder la question de façon incisive. Le but est de flatter la fierté malienne et de brandir le souverainisme », rappelle Bakary Sambe.

Une sstratégie de communication politique de la part de Bamako ?

Pour lui, « les autorités étant dans un contexte très avancé du processus de transition, il fallait donc affronter les vraies questions, telles que les réformes institutionnelles promises de longue date. C’est pour cela qu’il est très opportun de leur part d’agiter le chiffon rouge du départ de la Minusma, une mission devenue une cible facile. D’ailleurs, l’utilisation de « départ sans délai » a été bien choisie, pour envoyer un message à la population dont on veut fouetter l’orgueil, même s’il paraît quasi impossible de voir de tels effectifs quitter le pays aussi rapidement. »

Malgré l’unanimité de façade, sous l’effet des réseaux sociaux, le directeur régional du Timbuktu Institute explique même qu’il y aurait deux visions qui s’opposent au Mali sur la question de la coopération sécuritaire, « il y a toujours eu une nette différence de discours entre, d’un côté, Bamako, ses citadins jeunes, présents sur les réseaux sociaux, et de l’autre, les gens qui vivent l’insécurité au quotidien comme à Ménaka, à Gao ou encore à Tombouctou. La perception de la coopération est totalement différente, mais finalement, le discours le plus audible est celui des personnes qui sont le moins concernées par l’insécurité mais inondant les réseaux sociaux ».

Sambe pense qu’il y a « une confusion volontaire » voulant « masquer l’échec sur le plan sécuritaire ». Pour lui, « les récents événements de Moura ont été l’illustration de l’échec en termes de sécurité. On l’oublie très souvent, mais les deux missions prioritaires de la Minusma c’est l’appui à la mise en pratique de l’accord de paix et la réalisation de la transition, puis l’appui au rétablissement et la stabilisation dans le centre du pays. Ça n’était donc pas un mandat qui visait à combattre le terrorisme de façon classique, mais plutôt une consolidation de la paix. Faire le lien avec l’échec sur le plan sécuritaire est donc une belle subterfuge destinée à la consommation locale et populaire »

Pourquoi la fixation sur la MINUSMA ?

« En réalité, la Minusma est un symbole dans le discours. Le symbole d’un corps étranger, de l’acteur extérieur, qui ne laisse pas les coudées franches aux autorités de la transition, pour garantir la sécurité. C’est cette logique qui est présentée à la population. On a vu la même chose avec Barkhane malgré toutes ses tares », explique Dr. Bakary Sambe

Mais le chercheur ne cache pas son scepticisme sur la durabilité des missions de maintien de la paix si elles persistent dans leur forme actuelle : « Plus on avance dans la durée, plus les missions de consolidation de la paix perdent de leur crédibilité. Elles deviennent donc la cible idéale de critique en termes de non efficience. Il faut clairement revoir le format de ces missions. Dans la durée, elles ont, partout, montré leurs limites »

Il persiste, cependant, pour Bakary Sambe, le risque d’une détérioration des conditions sécuritaires au Mali et même dans la région : « Aujourd’hui, quand le Mali peine même à sécuriser les alentours de Bamako - comme l’a montré l’attaque de Kati, cœur stratégique du régime- et même si la Minusma avait un rôle mineur en la matière, ce départ exigé constituerait une menace réelle pour la région. Je ne suis pas sûr de la capacité de ceux qui demandent un tel départ à pouvoir sécuriser les vastes étendues du Mali, frontalières d’autres pays sous pression sécuritaire »

Après la MINUSMA, quid de Wagner ?

« Je ne crois pas que Wagner pourra jouer ce rôle de stabilisateur », avertit le chercheur. « On a vu leurs bavures et exactions contre les populations civiles. Le problème du Mali, surtout au Centre, est d’ordre communautaire. Ni les FAMAs, ni Wagner ne pourront le régler s’ils persistent dans la stratégie actuelle qui fait le jeu des groupes terroristes se présentant comme protecteurs des communautés ostracisées. La fameuse montée en puissance des FAMAs avec l'appui de Wagner s'est faite contre les communautés et a peu affecté la capacité de nuisance des groupes terroristes ».

Et Sambe d’insister sur la nécessité de changement de stratégie de la part de Bamako et de ses partenaires. Selon lui, « l’Etat  malien a besoin de dialoguer avec tous les enfants du Mali comme il en réclamait légitimement le droit, de cesser la stigmatisation de certaines communautés et amorcer la réconciliation. Mais on semble si loin du compte », conclut-il. 

Timbuktu Institute

NB : (certains extraits sont issus de l’interview avec TV5 Monde)

In the Timbuktu Institute's weekly column in partnership with Medi1Tv on the socio-political situation in Guinea-Bissau, Dr Bakary Sambe answers questions from Sana Yassari.

Dr. Bakary Sambe, Guinea-Bissau has just held legislative elections, which left all observers and the country's immediate neighbours in a state of anticipation. But in the end, the elections went well. Is this a surprise for a country that has experienced instability in the past?

Elections are generally fair, free and transparent in Guinea-Bissau, and have been since the opening up of democracy in 1994. It is true that post-election periods have always been marred by upheavals and a few incidents. The PAI Terra Ranka Alliance, made up of the PAIGC and 18 other opposition political parties, won an absolute majority in the legislative elections held on 4 June, with 54 seats in a 102-seat parliament. Under Guinea-Bissau's constitution, the PAI Terra Ranka Alliance must therefore, in principle, appoint a Prime Minister who will form a new government. As for President Cissoko Embalo, he has already acknowledged his defeat and promised to cohabit with any Prime Minister from the parliamentary opposition, which now has a majority.  The coming months will tell us how the executive will follow up these good political intentions.

But, Dr Sambe, after the election episode, the question remains of the durability of the PAI Terra Ranka Alliance, and above all its ability to overcome the many obstacles in its path, given the country's political inclinations. Given your knowledge of the context in Guinea Bissau, where the Timbuktu Institute is carrying out peace-building activities, do you think it will be easier this time?

It's true that the people of Guinea-Bissau are wondering how this alliance is going to govern, despite the many political and security challenges we know about. Political parties and civil society have already been warned that no one can lead Guinea-Bissau without including the PRS (Social Renewal Party) and perhaps, who knows? the military. So it remains to be seen whether Domingos Simoes Pereira of the PAIGC will succeed in overcoming the political and institutional crisis that Guinea-Bissau has been facing for a long time. In many respects, it seems to me, this is a very difficult gamble to win. One of the most obvious examples of what some observers consider to be a leadership crisis in which Amilcar Cabral's country is mired was recently in 2020, during the second round of the presidential elections, with all the ups and downs that occurred during this difficult stage in Guinea-Bissau's political life.

Bakary Sambe, you said in one of the local media that everything is urgent in this country. But what do you think are the biggest challenges facing the new alliance that will now govern alongside President Embalo?

Among the heavy tasks awaiting the new government, we must not lose sight of good neighbourly relations with the countries of the sub-region, in particular Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Another no less important issue is sub-regional integration with ECOWAS. We know that the leader of the PAIGC, Simoes Pereira, and the leader of the Terra Ranka Alliance will have to make efforts to forge closer ties with the ECOWAS Commission. For the PAIGC, there will also be the challenge of reconciliation with Guinea Bissau's immediate neighbours, as well as with ECOWAS, which will be a key ally in the search for funding to implement projects to restructure and demobilise the army, for example, modernise the administration, and rehabilitate the education and health sectors.  In other words, there is no shortage of urgent matters to deal with, and many challenges lie ahead in the medium and long term.

Source : Timbuktu Institute