Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) conducted a major air operation in the Yanfolila district,neutralising around 50 terrorists. This surgical strike, made possible by accurate intelligence, destroyed a major logistics base and recovered large quantities of weapons and ammunition. This action is part of a drive by the Malian army to regain the initiative in areas formerly considered sanctuaries for armed groups.

Two days after the initial strike, reports confirm the effectiveness of the intervention in the Bougouni region, highlighting that this operation is one of the most significant in recent months in the south of the country. Beyond the human losses inflicted on terrorist groups, the focus is on the destruction of their mobility capabilities through the elimination of dozens of motorcycles and vehicles. This victory strengthens the confidence of local populations in the Malian air force's ability to secure rural areas.

Diplomacy: Partnerships with China and Iran

On the international stage, Mali is stepping up its policy of diversifying its strategic partners through new initiatives with Beijing and Tehran. These diplomatic exchanges aim to consolidate cooperation in key areas such as defence, infrastructure and the economy, illustrating Bamako's desire to break free from traditional Western influences. This rapprochement with the powers of the ‘Global South’ is seen as an essential lever for ensuring the country's national sovereignty and technological development.

Opening up access via the Senegal River

The project to turn the Senegal River into a permanent waterway to the Atlantic Ocean represents a major hope for the Malian economy, which has traditionally been constrained by its lack of a coastline. This initiative aims to transform the river into a genuine logistics corridor, offering a sovereign alternative to the ports of neighbouring countries. Ultimately, this project should reduce freight transport costs and stimulate regional trade, positioning Mali as a strategic river hub in West Africa.

Successful new strikes in the north and securing of the Zantiébougou area in the centre

The Malian army has announced the success of two additional air operations, this time targeting terrorist positions in the northern and central regions. These preventive strikes destroyed armed groups that were planning attacks on convoys and civilian populations, confirming the FAMa's ability to monitor and strike simultaneously on several fronts. This aerial responsiveness is presented as the cornerstone of Mali's new defence doctrine to protect the integrity of its territory.

In addition to the air strikes, ground search operations were successfully carried out in the Zantiébougou area, resulting in the neutralisation of several armed elements. These ground operations aim to dislodge the remnants of terrorist groups attempting to disrupt traffic on strategic roads in the south. The objective is to guarantee the free movement of people and goods, while sending a strong message about the permanent presence of the state in these localities.

Tribute to the Russian model for the Sahel

The Malian Minister of Defence officially praised the commitment of the Russian ‘defenders of the motherland’, holding them up as a model of courage and patriotism for the forces of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This speech highlights the deep roots of military cooperation between Bamako and Moscow, which is seen as a reliable and effective partnership in the face of security challenges. This statement reaffirms Mali's ideological choice to draw inspiration from Russian resilience to forge its own national destiny and ensure stability in the region.

Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

For his first visit to Africa, Pope Leo XIV will travel to Cameroon. While the country's authorities are preparing a warm welcome for the pontiff, the Pope's visit, scheduled for 15 to 18 April, already appears to be a potential flashpoint for political tensions. This is because the socio-political situation that has prevailed since the disputed presidential election in October 2025 is still far from calm. In this case, part of the clergy and the opposition believe that Yaoundé intends to use the papal visit to legitimise its power in the run-up to the next legislative elections. It is in this context that Jesuit Father Ludovic Lado sent a public letter to the Pope asking him to change his agenda. But without success. ‘The main thing is that the Pope is aware of what is happening in the country, including the assassination [of opposition figure] Anicet Ekane (...) I will respect the Pope's decision to visit Cameroon, even if I do not agree with it. He is my superior,’ he resolved.

Similarly, the diaspora movement ‘Project C’, which supports opposition leader Issa Tchioma Bakary, was keen to alert the Pope. ‘You are invited to Cameroon, not to serve the truth of Christ, but to validate a lie written in the blood of those who dared to believe that their votes would count,’ the movement asserts in an open letter. Furthermore, a petition signed by writer Calixthe Beyala and posted online on 25 January condemns a ‘dictatorial regime’ and urges the Pope ‘not to visit Cameroon’. While it is doubtful that this protest will succeed in changing the papal agenda, it does highlight the toxic and volatile nature of the socio-political situation in a country where the legitimacy of power continues to be subject to criticism.

Anicet Ekane, a death that cannot be ignored

The case of opposition leader Anicet Ekane, who died in custody on 1 December 2025 following the post-election crisis, is further evidence, if any were needed, of the depth of socio-political tensions. While the Ministry of Defence published the autopsy findings on 24 February, concluding that the death was ‘natural’ and linked to ‘serious medical conditions’, the deceased's relatives rejected this conclusion. According to his son, who was contacted by Jeune Afrique, the autopsy was conducted ‘in an unhealthy context’ where the request for ‘the presence of an independent third party to ensure a minimum of objectivity was systematically refused’.

Furthermore, it is in this overall context of political turmoil that another challenge facing the Cameroonian authorities arises: drug trafficking. In this regard, nearly 2.5 tonnes of narcotics (including 1,057 kg of cocaine and 1,442 kg of tramadol) seized four days earlier at Douala International Airport were destroyed on 24 February by the Littoral Regional Commission. Despite their apparent disparity, these two events seem to paint a picture of a country grappling with a multitude of challenges (political, judicial and security-related) whose management is testing the state's ability to maintain its institutional credibility.

Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 4 - Février 2026  

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Pour sa première visite africaine, le pape Léon XIV se rendra au Cameroun. Alors que les autorités du pays préparent un bel accueil au souverain pontife, la visite du Pape prévue du 15 au 18 avril semble déjà s’avérer comme une possible caisse de résonance des tensions politiques. Ceci, du fait que la situation socio-politique prévalant depuis la présidentielle contestée d'octobre 2025 est encore loin d’être apaisée. En l’espèce, une partie du clergé et de l’opposition estime que  Yaoundé entend instrumentaliser la visite papale pour légitimer son pouvoir, dans le sillage des prochaines législatives. C’est dans ce contexte que le père jésuite Ludovic Lado a adressé une lettre publique au Pape pour lui demander de modifier son agenda. Mais sans succès. « L’essentiel est que le pape est au courant de ce qui se passe dans le pays, y compris de l’assassinat [de l’opposant] Anicet Ekane (…) Je respecterai la décision du pape de visiter le Cameroun, même si je ne la partage pas. C’est mon supérieur hiérarchique », s’est-il résolu. 

De même, le mouvement de la diaspora « Project C » soutien de l’opposant Issa Tchioma Bakary a tenu à alerter le Pape. « Vous êtes invité au Cameroun, non pas pour servir la vérité du Christ, mais pour valider un mensonge écrit dans le sang de ceux qui ont osé croire que leurs votes compteraient », assène le mouvement dans une lettre ouverte. Plus encore, une pétition – signée par l’écrivaine Calixthe Beyala - mis en ligne le 25 janvier, fustige un « régime dictatorial » et exhorte le Pape « à ne pas se rendre au Cameroun ». Si l’on pourrait douter que cette contestation parvienne à infléchir l’agenda papal, il reste qu’elle remet en lumière le caractère délétère et volatile de la situation socio-politique dans un pays, où la légitimité du pouvoir continue d’être sujet à critiques.

Anicet Ekane, une disparition qui ne passe pas

L'affaire de l’opposant Anicet Ekane, mort en détention le 1er décembre 2025 suite à la crise post-électorale témoigne, si besoin en était, de la profondeur des tensions socio-politiques. Alors que le ministère de la Défense a publié le 24 février les conclusions de cette autopsie concluant à une « mort naturelle » liée à de « graves pathologies », les proches du défunt y ont opposé rejet. Selon son fils joint par Jeune Afrique, l’autopsie a été conduite « dans un contexte malsain » où la requête de « la présence d’un tiers indépendant afin de garantir un minimum d’objectivité nous a été systématiquement refusée ».

En outre, c’est dans ce contexte global de turbulences politiques que se présente un autre défi auquel les autorités camerounaises sont confrontées : le narcotrafic. A cet égard, près de 2,5 tonnes de stupéfiants (dont 1057 kg de cocaïne et 1442 kg de tramadol) saisis quatre jours plus tôt à l'aéroport international de Douala, ont été détruits le 24 février par la commission régionale du Littoral. En dépit de leur apparente disparité, ces deux séquences semblent dresser le portrait d’un pays aux prises avec une pluralité de défis (politiques, judiciaires et sécuritaires) dont la gestion met à l'épreuve la capacité de l'État à maintenir à la fois sa crédibilité institutionnelle.

Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

In the north of the country, although the security situation appears to have calmed down somewhat, it remains a cause for concern in many respects. Apart from the sensitive area known as the ‘Triple Point’ with Niger and Burkina Faso, the border area with Niger and Nigeria also remains critical. According to a study by the NGO ACLED, in 2025 this area emerged as a major new jihadist hotspot, with an 86% increase in attacks and a 262% increase in deaths in one year. Indeed, JNIM and Islamic State appear to have consolidated their presence there, particularly in the departments of Alibori and Borgou.

Similarly, the third department, Atacora, is not immune to this turmoil. In the early hours of 24 February, the Kouandé police station was the target of an armed attack. Unidentified assailants from the Guilmaro district opened fire on the infrastructure before setting fire to the annex building of the Republican Police, stealing two motorcycles and destroying three. In the aftermath, defence and security forces quickly deployed a search operation around the locality. No official report has been released at this time. This overview reveals a northern region that remains under pressure. Indeed, there is no longer any doubt that the jihadist hydra is infecting the north of the country, gradually transforming a localised threat into a structural security challenge for the state. Furthermore, the overlapping pockets of vulnerability are shaping an arc of instability, the management of which does not seem to be getting any easier with time.

Strengthening community resilience

It is undoubtedly with this major challenge in mind that the Beninese authorities are working, beyond the security aspect, to put in place resilience mechanisms, which is, in the current socio-political context on the eve of the presidential election. The Ministry of the Interior and Public Security has therefore deployed a mission to the departments of Atacora and Donga to strengthen conflict prevention mechanisms. On 24 February, an awareness-raising session on the co-production of security during the election period was held at the Natitingou prefecture. To this end, discussions were held with local authorities, security forces, community leaders and political actors with the aim of raising awareness among the population, combating hate speech and maintaining a framework for mediation. This institutional drive also serves as a reminder of the authorities' awareness that the legitimacy of the upcoming elections could also depend on the state's ability to guarantee a peaceful and secure environment in the most vulnerable areas of the country.

At the same time, the authorities are continuing to pursue legal proceedings in relation to the failed coup of 7 December 2025. In a new development, on 27 February, the National Centre for Digital Investigations published a wanted notice for nine individuals linked to the coup attempt. They are Colonel Pascal Tigri (alleged mastermind of the coup), Castro Sambieni, Ousmane Samary, Bernard Sanhouekoua, Moussa Noma Rafiou, Demanmon Dassoudo, Issa Soumanou, Laurier Setondji and Yacoubou Moudachirou Osseni. In this context, the Beninese state's uncompromising stance attests to its determination to shed light on this event. In this sense, it is true that this process will remain incomplete as long as Colonel Tigri continues to evade justice in his country.

Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 4 - Février 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Au nord du pays, même si la situation sécuritaire semble faire montre d’une relative accalmie, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’elle soit préoccupante à bien des égards. Hormis le point névralgique de la zone dit du « Point Triple » avec le Niger et le Burkina Faso, la zone frontalière avec le Niger et le Nigeria reste, elle aussi, critique. Selon une étude de l’ONG ACLED, cette zone s’est imposée en 2025 comme un nouveau foyer djihadiste majeur, avec une hausse de 86% des attaques et de 262% du nombre de morts en un an. En effet, le JNIM et l’Etat Islamique semblent y avoir consolidé leur installation, notamment dans les départements de l'Alibori et du Borgou. 

De même, le troisième département, l’Atacora, n’est pas du reste de cette tourmente. Au petit matin du 24 février, le commissariat de Kouandé a été la cible d'une attaque armée. Des assaillants non identifiés en provenance de l’arrondissement de Guilmaro ont ouvert le feu sur l'infrastructure avant d'incendier le bâtiment annexe de la Police républicaine, volant deux motos et en détruisant trois. Dans la foulée, les forces de défense et de sécurité ont rapidement déployé un dispositif de ratissage autour de la localité. Pour l’heure, aucun bilan officiel n’a été communiqué. Ce panorama révèle une région septentrionale qui reste sous pression. De fait, il ne fait plus doute que l’hydre djihadiste gangrène le nord du pays, transformant progressivement une menace localisée en défi sécuritaire structurel pour l'État. En outre, la superposition des foyers de vulnérabilité dessine les contours d’un arc d’instabilité dont l’enjeu de gestion ne semble pas s’amenuiser au fil du temps.

Consolider la résilience des communautés

C’est sans doute conscient de cet enjeu de taille que les autorités béninoises s’emploient, au-delà du volet sécuritaire, à  mettre en place des mécanismes de résilience, qui puis est, dans le présent contexte socio-politique à la veille de la présidentielle. Ainsi, le ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité publique a déployé une mission dans les départements de l'Atacora et de la Donga afin de renforcer les mécanismes de prévention des conflits. Le 24 février s’est tenue à la préfecture de Natitingou, une séance de sensibilisation sur la coproduction de la sécurité en période électorale. A cet effet, des échanges ont été menés avec les autorités locales, les forces de sécurité, les leaders communautaires et les acteurs politiques avec pour objectifs la sensibilisation des populations, la lutte contre les discours de haine et le maintien d'un cadre de médiation. Cet entrain institutionnel vient par ailleurs rappeler la conscience des autorités de ce que la légitimité du scrutin à venir pourrait aussi se jouer dans la capacité de l'État à garantir un environnement sécuritaire apaisé dans les zones les plus vulnérables du territoire.

En parallèle, les autorités continuent de s’investir dans le traitement judiciaire du coup d’Etat manqué du 7 décembre 2025. Nouvelle séquence : le Centre National d'Investigations Numériques a publié le 27 février, un avis de recherchecontre neuf individus liés à la tentative de putsch. Il s’agit du colonel Pascal Tigri (présumé cerveau du putsch), Castro Sambieni, Ousmane Samary, Bernard Sanhouekoua, Moussa Noma Rafiou, Demanmon Dassoudo, Issa Soumanou, Laurier Setondji et Yacoubou Moudachirou Osseni. Dans cette logique, l’intransigeance affichée par l’Etat béninois atteste de sa détermination à faire toute la lumière sur cet évènement. En ce sens, il est vrai que ce processus demeurera inachevé tant que le colonel Tigri continuera d’échapper à la justice de son pays.

Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

From the outset, Chad has kept a close eye on the Sudanese conflict. Faced with a humanitarian crisis due to the influx of refugees at its eastern border, N'Djamena has strived to contain the repercussions. However, the situation now appears to be deteriorating. On 23 February, Chad announced the closure of its border with Sudan until further notice. According to a statement from the Minister of Communication, this decision was justified by ‘repeated incursions and violations committed by the forces in conflict in Sudan on Chadian territory’. N'Djamena insists that it wants to prevent ‘any risk of the conflict spreading’ and ‘reserves the right to respond to any aggression or violation of the inviolability of its territory and borders.’

A few days earlier, on 21 February, the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced the capture of Al-Tina, a strategic area in North Darfur on the Chadian border, following the fall of El-Fasher at the end of October 2025, which was followed by massacres, rapes and mass abductions, according to the UN. In addition, last month, seven Chadian soldiers lost their lives in an altercation with RSF paramilitaries. The border closure therefore seems to reflect N'Djamena's exasperation and the exhaustion of a policy of restraint in the face of a conflict whose escalation is worrying the Chadian authorities. This is all the more so given that, on the one hand, there seems to be no solution in sight to this civil war and, on the other hand, its potential centrifugal effects cannot be completely ruled out, considering Chad's role in regional stability.

Border unrest

Clearly, securing Chad's borders appears to be one of the most pressing structural challenges facing Chad today. After its border with Sudan, N'Djamena is now on alert at its border with Libya. During a joint operation carried out on the night of 20 February in a desert area in the far north of the country, the Libyan-Chadian joint force conducted a major security operation. At the end of the operation, a large stockpile of heavy weapons, including surface-to-air missiles and large quantities of ammunition, was seized. In the wake of this, the Chadian and Libyan parties formalised their security cooperation by setting up a joint operations room to coordinate patrols, controls and demining in southern Libya, an area marked by porous borders and the circulation of weapons.

Furthermore, the first fruits of reconciliation between N'Djamena and Paris already seem to be bearing fruit. On 25 February, the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Chadian government signed a €15 million financing agreement to support two key areas: the modernisation of transport infrastructure and the strengthening of the cotton industry. While this financial support is undoubtedly welcome in terms of N'Djamena's goal of developing its macroeconomic growth, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that France's renewed financial commitment is part of a broader strategy that goes beyond development alone, given that France is taking measured steps in its plan for a hypothetical return to the Sahel.

Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 4 - Février 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Dès son entame, le Tchad n’a pas cessé de veiller au grain au sujet du conflit soudanais. Face à la crise humanitaire due à l’afflux de réfugiés à sa frontière Est, N’Djamena s’est efforcé d’en endiguer les répercussions. Toutefois, les choses semblent désormais se déliter. Le 23 février, le Tchad a annoncé la fermeture de sa frontière avec le Soudan jusqu'à nouvel ordre. Selon le communiqué du ministre de la communication, cette décision se justifie par des « incursions répétées et aux violations commises par les forces en conflit au Soudan sur le territoire tchadien ». N’Djamena assure vouloir prévenir « tout risque d’expansion du conflit » et « se réserve le droit de riposter contre toute agression ou violation de l’intangibilité de son territoire et de ses frontières ». 

Quelques jours auparavant, le 21 février, les Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) soudanaises annonçaient la prise d’Al-Tina, zone stratégique du Darfour-Nord à la frontière tchadienne, après la chute d’El-Fasher fin octobre 2025, qui fut suivie de massacres, viols et enlèvements massifs selon l’ONU. De plus, le mois dernier, sept soldats tchadiens perdaient la vie dans une altercation avec des paramilitaires FSR. Dès lors, cette fermeture frontalière semble traduire une exaspération de N’Djamena et l’épuisement d’une diplomatie de la retenue face à un conflit dont le débordement inquiète les autorités tchadiennes. Ceci d’autant plus que d’une part, aucune issue de solution ne semble se profiler dans cette guerre civile et d’autre part, ses potentiels effets centrifuges ne peuvent être totalement écartés considérant la place du Tchad dans la stabilité régionale. 

Troubles aux frontières

Manifestement, il apparaît que la sécurisation des frontières tchadiennes s'impose comme l'un des défis structurels les plus pressants auxquels le Tchad est aujourd'hui confronté. Après sa frontière soudanaise, c’est maintenant à celle libyenne que N'Djamena est d’astreinte. En effet, lors d’une opération conjointe menée dans la nuit du 20 février dans une zone désertique à l’extrême nord du pays, la force conjointe libyo-tchadienne a effectué une importante opération sécuritaire. Au terme de celle-ci, un important stock d'armes lourdes, dont des missiles sol-air et de grandes quantités de munitions a été saisi. Dans la foulée, les parties tchadienne et libyenne ont formalisé leur coopération sécuritaire en mettant en place une salle d'opérations commune destinée à coordonner patrouilles, contrôles et déminage en l’occurrence dans l’espace méridional libyen marqué par la porosité des frontières et la circulation d’armes.

Par ailleurs, les premiers fruits de la réconciliation entre N’Djamena et Paris semblent déjà tomber. Le 25 février, l'Agence française de Développement (AFD) et le gouvernement tchadien ont signé une convention de financement de 15 millions d'euros destinée à soutenir deux domaines clés : la modernisation des infrastructures de transport et le renforcement de la filière cotonnière. Certes, cet appui financier est sans doute le bienvenu dans l’objectif de N’Djamena de développer sa croissance macro-économique, cependant, il ne serait pas téméraire d’avancer que ce réengagement financier  de la France s’inscrive dans une logique qui dépasse le seul cadre du développement, eu égard à un contexte où la France avance à pas mesurés dans son projet d’un hypothétique retour au Sahel. 

Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

From the implementation of the emergency programme for the Savanes region in Togo to Ghana's maritime arbitration initiative and the logistical repositioning of the autonomous port of Lomé to benefit Niger, West Africa is undergoing a profound strategic reconfiguration. These dynamics, which combine conflict prevention, legal security for maritime resources and the redefinition of Sahelian trade corridors, reflect a converging desire for stabilisation through economic, diplomatic and structural instruments, in a regional context marked by insecurity and restructuring outside the ECOWAS area.

PURS 2026–2027: an integrated stabilisation strategy for the Savanes region in the face of insecurity and forced displacement

The 2026-2027 plan of the Emergency Programme for the Savanes Region (PURS), with a budget of 18 billion CFA francs, targets more than 430,000 vulnerable people. The approach focuses on social inclusion and the sustainable integration of displaced persons into host communities. This strategy is part of a structural prevention approach based on socio-economic development as a lever for stabilisation. According to the UN resident coordinator, ‘together, with determination and solidarity, we can ensure that every displaced person, every refugee and every member of the host communities can live in safety, dignity and hope.’ The programme aims to reduce the risk of gender-based violence and security threats, improve reception conditions for displaced households hosted by already vulnerable families, and address structural deficiencies in water, hygiene and sanitation. This programme is being implemented in an area that has been plagued by growing insecurity for several years, with its share of victims and displaced persons.

Maritime dispute between Ghana and Togo: arbitration as a strategic stabilisation tool

Ghana has chosen to resort to international arbitration to settle its maritime dispute with Togo, while Lomé has officially taken note of this initiative. This dispute, which concerns the delimitation of maritime areas and the exploitation of offshore resources, is part of a judicial strategy aimed at preventing any escalation of diplomatic tensions. The ultimate goal is to consolidate and preserve the historic relations of cooperation and good neighbourliness between the two countries. The settlement of this dispute is essential for the economic and diplomatic interests of both countries, as it determines control over maritime resources and clarifies jurisdictional powers at sea. This ongoing dispute stems from the absence of a formally recognised maritime boundary between the two countries. This decision follows eight years of unsuccessful talks, with discussions between the two countries failing to produce a compromise acceptable to both parties.

The Autonomous Port of Lomé, Togo's logistical hub in the Sahelian

At the same time, the Autonomous Port of Lomé is working to secure the transport of 20,000 tonnes of fertiliser to Niger, enabling Togo to consolidate its position as a strategic logistics hub in the new regional context marked by the restructuring of trade with Sahelian states outside the ECOWAS area. The announcement was made on 25 February 2026 by the Togolese Minister for Maritime Economy, following a working meeting with Mahaman Elhadj Ousmane, Nigerien Minister of Agriculture. This initiative is part of the strengthening of economic relations between Togo and Niger, which have intensified since Niger's withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States. Against a backdrop of tensions with Benin, marked in particular by the closure of land borders, Niamey is now relying more heavily on the Togolese port platform to transport its goods to its trading partners.