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Timbuktu Institute – Week 3 – February 2026
Imam Mahmoud Dicko, a central figure in Malian socio-political life, now finds himself at the heart of an ‘ambiguous adventure’ marked by his transition from being an indispensable power broker to a vocal opponent in exile. After playing a decisive role in the fall of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in 2020, he gradually distanced himself from the military rulers, denouncing their failure to respect the transition timetable. Now a refugee in Algeria, Dicko is seeking to redefine his roleby positioning himself as a mediator for peace, while joining opposition coalitions abroad, such as the Coalition of Forces for the Republic (CFR). His rhetoric, which skilfully blends religious rigour, populism and criticism of the elites, continues to divide opinion: his supporters see him as an indispensable moral bulwark against an authoritarian junta, while his detractors are concerned about his theocratic influence and ultra-conservative positions, which they believe threaten the secular nature of the state. Despite the dissolution of his movement (CMAS) by the authorities in Bamako, the imam remains a key figure whose ability to mobilise support, even from a distance, continues to pose a major challenge to the colonels in power.
FAMa operation in Ségou: Terrorists neutralised and equipment seized
According to a statement issued by the army general staff on Monday 16 February 2026, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) carried out a major search operation on the previous Sunday in the Nampala area (Ségou region). The intervention, which targeted the areas around the villages of Toulé and Akoub, resulted in the neutralisation of several terrorists. In addition to the human toll, the army seized a significant amount of equipment, including weapons, ammunition and communications equipment. Through this operation, the military hierarchy reaffirms its determination to track down armed groups throughout the national territory to ensure the safety of the population.
The AES launches its roadmap for its second year
On 17 February 2026, the Malian government officially examined the roadmap for Year II of the Confederation of Sahel States (AES), which aims to consolidate the achievements of the first year and operationalise the commitments made by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This step follows the recent ratification of four major protocols on defence, diplomacy, development and the creation of a confederal parliament. Under the rotating presidency of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the confederation intends to transform these legal texts into concrete actions to meet the urgent needs of the population in terms of security, free movement and infrastructure. The authorities reaffirm the irreversible nature of this regional integration process, born out of the break with ECOWAS and the desire of the three states to build a sovereign and secure space.
Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 3 - Février 2026
L’imam Mahmoud Dicko, figure centrale de la vie socio-politique malienne, se trouve aujourd'hui au cœur d'une « aventure ambiguë » marquée par son passage du statut de pivot incontournable du pouvoir à celui d'opposant frontal en exil. Après avoir joué un rôle déterminant dans la chute d'Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta en 2020, il s'est progressivement distancé des militaires au pouvoir, dénonçant le non-respect du calendrier de transition. Désormais réfugié en Algérie, Dicko cherche à redéfinir son rôle en se positionnant comme un médiateur pour la paix, tout en intégrant des coalitions d'opposition à l'étranger, comme la Coalition des Forces pour la République (CFR). Son discours, qui mêle habilement rigueur religieuse, populisme et critique des élites, continue de diviser : ses partisans y voient un rempart moral indispensable face à une junte autoritaire, tandis que ses détracteurs s'inquiètent de son influence théocratique et de ses positions ultra-conservatrices qui menacent la laïcité de l'État. Malgré la dissolution de son mouvement (la CMAS) par les autorités de Bamako, l'imam reste une figure incontournable dont la capacité de mobilisation, même à distance, demeure un défi majeur pour les colonels au pouvoir.
Opération des FAMa à Ségou : Terroristes neutralisés et matériel saisi
Selon un communiqué de l'état-major général des armées du lundi 16 février 2026, les Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) ont mené une importante opération de ratissage le dimanche précédent dans le secteur de Nampala (région de Ségou). L'intervention, qui a ciblé les zones des villages de Toulé et d'Akoub, s'est soldée par la neutralisation de plusieurs terroristes. En plus du bilan humain, l'armée a saisi une quantité significative d'équipements, incluant des armes, des munitions ainsi que du matériel de communication. À travers cette opération, la hiérarchie militaire réaffirme sa détermination à traquer les groupes armés sur l'ensemble du territoire national pour assurer la sécurité des populations.
L’AES lance la feuille de route de sa deuxième année
Le gouvernement malien a officiellement examiné, ce 17 février 2026, la feuille de route de l'An II de la Confédération des États du Sahel (AES), visant à consolider les acquis de la première année et à opérationnaliser les engagements pris par le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger. Cette étape fait suite à la ratification récente de quatre protocoles majeurs portant sur la défense, la diplomatie, le développement et la création d'un parlement confédéral. Sous la présidence tournante du capitaine Ibrahim Traoré, la confédération entend transformer ces textes juridiques en actions concrètes pour répondre aux besoins urgents des populations en matière de sécurité, de libre circulation et d'infrastructures. Les autorités réaffirment le caractère irréversible de ce processus d'intégration régionale, né de la rupture avec la CEDEAO et de la volonté des trois États de bâtir un espace souverain et sécurisé.
Timbuktu Institute - Week 3 - February 2026
At the end of January, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby's visit to the Élysée Palace formalised the resumption of diplomatic relations between France and Chad, one year after French forces withdrew from the country. While both sides laconically welcomed a ‘revitalised partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests’, the meeting also provided an opportunity to lay the foundations for a new form of military cooperation. According to Le Monde, the cooperation projects underpinning this reconciliation include ‘a discreet military component’. Under the new arrangements, Paris could provide intelligence support and training to Chadian forces without deploying large numbers of soldiers, as was previously the case. This new formula seems to be adapted to the new realities of the sub-region, where the geopolitical situation remains fluid and complex. Chad, a strategic country in the Sahel belt, now faces worrying instability on its eastern border, marked by the conflict in neighbouring Sudan. From a broader perspective, Paris appears to be making a discreet but effective return to the sub-region via N'Djamena, which is likely to raise questions among observers of a sub-region whose geopolitical situation remains fluid and complex.
North under surveillance
The vast and rugged north of Chad remains the scene of persistent security concerns. In the province of Borkou, on the road linking Faya to Kouba Oulanga, an ambush attributed to suspected road bandits on the night of 17 to 18 February resulted in the death of a travel agency driver. The army was dispatched to the scene and intervened to repel the attackers. Unofficial reports indicate that four officers were killed, while three attackers were neutralised and another captured. Aware of these security challenges, the Chadian authorities are striving to address them. It was in this context that officials from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Chadian Ministry of Public Security and Immigration held a strategic meeting on 16 February on the fight against narcotics. Following the meeting, the US agency presented the Chadian ministry with the ‘Drug Identification Bible,’ a strategic document on the treatment and prevention of illicit drugs. N'Djamena hopes to consolidate its cooperation with the United States while improving its ability to identify criminal networks through an integrated approach to preventing crime and consolidating both national and regional stability.
Lake Chad Basin: a constant equation
In the Lake Chad Basin, the issue of human mobility lies at the intersection of security, environmental and socio-economic challenges. Faced with these interrelated issues, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) signed a memorandum of understanding in N'Djamena on 19 February 2026 to strengthen their cooperation in community stabilisation efforts in the Lake Chad Basin region. This agreement institutionalises an existing partnership. But this time, it aligns with the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience Strategy (SR-SRR 2.0) adopted in 2025. Given the complexity of the challenges, this example of institutional cooperation highlights the need for a coordinated approach at the sub-regional level, which continues to share vulnerability.
Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 3 - Février 2026
Fin janvier, la visite du Président tchadien Mahamat Idriss Déby à l’Élysée officialisait la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre la France et le Tchad, un an après le retrait des forces françaises du pays. Si les deux parties se sont félicités assez laconiquement d’un « partenariat revitalisé, fondé sur le respect mutuel et des intérêts partagés », cette rencontre aurait été aussi l’occasion d’établir les bases d’une coopération militaire réinventée. Ainsi, d’après Le Monde, les projets de coopération qui sous-tendent cette réconciliation comprennent « un discret volet militaire ». En effet, selon des nouvelles modalités, Paris pourrait fournir un appui en renseignement et dispenser des formations aux forces tchadiennes sans pour autant effectuer un déploiement massif de soldats, comme ce fut jadis le cas. Cette nouvelle formule semble s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités de la sous-région dont la situation géopolitique reste mouvante et complexe. Le Tchad, pays stratégique dans la ceinture sahélienne, doit maintenant faire face à une instabilité préoccupante à sa frontière Est, marquée par le conflit du Soudan voisin. Dans une perspective plus globale, Paris semble opérer un retour discret mais effectif dans la sous-région par le biais de N’Djamena ; devrait susciter l’interrogation des observateurs d’une sous-région dont la situation géopolitique demeure mouvante et complexe.
Septentrion sous surveillance
Le nord du Tchad, vaste et âpre, reste le théâtre d’inquiétudes sécuritaires persistantes. Dans la province du Borkou sur l’axe reliant Faya à Kouba Oulanga, une embuscade attribuée à des coupeurs de route présumés, dans la nuit du 17 au 18 février, a causé la mort d’un chauffeur d’une agence de voyage. Dépêchée sur place, l’armée est intervenue pour repousser les assaillants. Un bilan non officiel fait état de quatre officiers décédés d’une part ainsi que trois assaillants neutralisés et un autre capturé, d’autre part. Conscientes de ces défis sécuritaires, les autorités tchadiennes s’évertuent à y faire face. C’est dans ce sillage que des responsables de la Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) des États‑Unis et le Ministère tchadien de la Sécurité publique et de l’Immigration ont tenu le 16 février, une réunion stratégique sur la lutte contre les stupéfiants. Au sortir de cette rencontre, l’organisme américain a remis au ministère tchadien « la Bible d’identification des Drogues », un document stratégique sur le traitement et la prévention des drogues illicites. Ainsi, N’Djamena espère consolider sa coopération avec les Etats-Unis tout en améliorant ses capacités d’identification des réseaux criminels par une approche intégrée pour prévenir la criminalité et consolider la stabilité tant nationale que régionale.
Bassin du Lac du Tchad :une constante équation
Dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad, la problématique de la mobilité humaine se retrouve à l’intersection des défis sécuritaires, environnementaux et socio-économiques. Face à ces enjeux interdépendants, l’Organisation internationale pour les Migrations (OIM) et la Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (CBLT) ont signé un protocole d’accord à N’Djaména le 19 février 2026 pour renforcer leur coopération dans les efforts de stabilisation communautaire dans la région du Bassin du Lac Tchad. Cet accord institutionnalise un partenariat déjà existant. Mais cette fois-ci, il s’aligne sur la Stratégie Régionale de Stabilisation, de Relèvement et de Résilience (SR‑SRR 2.0) adoptée en 2025. Au vu de l’enchevêtrement des défis, cet exemple de coopération institutionnelle rappelle la nécessité d’une approche coordonnée à l’échelle d’une sous-région qui ne cesse d’avoir la vulnérabilité en partage.
Timbuktu Institute – Week 2 – February 2026
As a reminder, Mali has been facing persistent security instability since 2012, marked by the advance of armed groups in several regions of the country, requiring increased vigilance on the part of the authorities and defence forces.
The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have conducted several large-scale military operations west of Ségou, leading to the neutralisation of more than 30 armed combatants, according to a statement from the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
These offensives targeted a first group spotted as it attempted to land on the left bank of the Niger River. A dozen assailants were intercepted. A second intervention then neutralised another group travelling by motorbike in the same area.
The Chief of Staff announced the continuation of these operations to combat the terrorist threat throughout Mali.
JNIM: divide and rule?
JNIM is active on all fronts with one main goal: to destabilise the country on all levels. The pressure is intensifying, the country's activities are slowing down day by day, and this phenomenon is paralysing the population and severely affecting the local economy.
Strategic areas such as Kayes are being targeted because of their large gold reserves.
Road insecurity is a near-daily occurrence.
The roads have become particularly dangerous due to repeated attacks on supply convoys. Tankers have been set on fire and several drivers have been killed, including in a recent attack in the Kayes region that destroyed dozens of vehicles and left at least 15 people dead. A surviving driver testified to the extreme risk involved, describing fuel transport as ‘paid for with blood’ and reporting that many of his colleagues had disappeared. By November, 27 drivers had already been killed.
Massive shortages and a weakened economy
The encircled cities are experiencing severe food and fuel shortages, leading to soaring prices and a general slowdown in trade. Several roads remain impassable, exacerbating the isolation of the population. This crisis has also prompted the government to suspend classes in some schools and universities due to a lack of fuel to keep services running normally.
Roads to Senegal paralysed after terrorist attack on convoy
At the end of January 2026, a convoy of tanker trucks carrying fuel was attacked by armed terrorist groups in western Mali, on the strategic route linking the country to the Senegalese border. The attack, attributed to the jihadist group JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), left at least 15 lorry drivers dead, and dozens of vehicles were burned or destroyed on the spot.
This ambush is part of a broader context of gradual blockage of trade routes and a jihadist offensive aimed at disrupting Mali's supply of fuel and essential goods, exacerbating a crisis that has already been ongoing for several months.
Strike and paralysis of trade corridors
In response, the National Union of Drivers and Truck Drivers of Mali (Synacor) has called a strike on the main road corridor to Senegal. The truck drivers are demanding the repatriation of the bodies of their colleagues who were killed before they will return to work.
This paralysis of strategic routes has significant economic and logistical consequences. The transport of goods between Mali and its neighbours has been halted or severely reduced, with the risk of disrupting regional supply chains. The road blockades are also slowing down trade and increasing the cost of transporting goods.
Security and economic context
The attack comes amid growing insecurity, with JNIM using blockades and sabotage of main roads to stifle the Malian economy. Since 2025, this jihadist group has stepped up attacks on fuel convoys from coastal countries, seeking to exploit Mali's dependence on these supply routes.
Timbuktu Institute – Week 2 – February 2026
This week, Côte d'Ivoire was re-elected to the African Union Peace and Security Council for the 2026-2028 term during the 48th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Addis Ababa. This re-election reinforces Abidjan's position as a key player in continental security matters. In a regional context marked by the rise of military regimes in the Sahel, Ivorian diplomacy is reinforcing its image as a stable institutional hub and a privileged partner in African crisis management mechanisms. This reappointment strengthens Abidjan's ability to influence sensitive issues such as political transitions, sanctions regimes and African crisis prevention mechanisms. It also reinforces its strategic position as a balancing force between instability in the Sahel and relative stability in the Gulf of Guinea, thus affirming its role as a security interface in West Africa.
Abidjan-Bamako axis: towards a gradual normalisation of relations?
At the same time, the presidential pardon granted by Alassane Ouattara to Mamadou Hawa Gassama, a member of Mali's National Transition Council, sends a strong diplomatic signal. Convicted of ‘insulting the head of state’, Gassama was released after seven months in detention. This gesture could ease persistent tensions between the two countries, inherited in particular from the crisis stemming from the arrest of 49 Ivorian soldiers in Mali in 2022. He had described the Ivorian president as an ‘enemy of Mali’ and claimed to have evidence of Ouattara's involvement in an attempt to destabilise Mali. His lawyer welcomed the move in a public statement. The decision reflects a pragmatic approach to bilateral relations, combining judicial firmness with political openness.
Digital rumours and national cohesion: the information challenge in Côte d'Ivoire
At the same time, the official denial of the alleged arrest of Adama Bictogo, businessman and former President of the National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire, highlights the growing scale of disinformation campaigns in West Africa, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire. The referral to the Platform for Combating Cybercrime demonstrates the authorities' willingness to prosecute the authors of digital rumours. According to the office of the former President of the National Assembly, ‘these malicious rumours are also likely to disrupt public order and tarnish the image of our country’. It is therefore necessary to analyse the dangers that such actions pose to national cohesion. Stability is no longer solely a matter of traditional security, but also of the information space. The regulation of information is becoming a strategic issue in the run-up to future political deadlines. Abidjan must continue to capitalise on its continental roots while strengthening vigilance against the threats of disinformation that could undermine the country's unity.
Plus...
Timbuktu Institute – Semaine 2 - Février 2026
Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel
Cette semaine, la Côte d’Ivoire a été réélue au Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine pour le mandat 2026-2028, lors de la 48ème session ordinaire du Conseil exécutif à Addis-Abeba. Cette réélection renforce en effet le positionnement d’Abidjan comme acteur central des arbitrages sécuritaires continentaux. Dans un contexte régional marqué par la montée en puissance des régimes militaires au Sahel, la diplomatie ivoirienne renforce son image de pôle institutionnel stable et de partenaire privilégié des mécanismes africains de gestion des crises. Cette reconduction renforce la capacité d'Abidjan à influencer les dossiers sensibles, tels que les transitions politiques, les régimes de sanctions et les mécanismes africains de prévention des crises. Elle renforce également son positionnement stratégique en tant qu'acteur d'équilibre entre l'instabilité sahélienne et la stabilité relative du golfe de Guinée, affirmant ainsi son rôle d'interface sécuritaire en Afrique de l'Ouest.
Axe Abidjan-Bamako : vers une normalisation progressive des relations ?
Parallèlement, la grâce présidentielle accordée par Alassane Ouattara à Mamadou Hawa Gassama, membre du Conseil national de transition malien, envoie un signal diplomatique fort. Condamné pour « offense au chef de l’État », Gassama a été libéré après sept mois de détention. Ce geste pourrait atténuer une tension persistante entre les deux pays, héritée notamment de la crise découlant des 49 soldats ivoiriens arrêtés au Mali en 2022. Il avait qualifié le président ivoirien d'« ennemi du Mali » et affirmé détenir des preuves de l'implication de Ouattara dans une tentative de déstabilisation du Mali. Son avocat a salué cette mesure dans un communiqué rendu public. Cette décision témoigne d'une gestion pragmatique des relations bilatérales, alliant fermeté judiciaire et ouverture politique.
Rumeurs numériques et cohésion nationale : l’enjeu informationnel en Côte d’Ivoire
Parallèlement, le démenti officiel concernant l'arrestation supposée d'Adama Bictogo, homme d’affaires et ancien Président de l’Assemblée nationale de la Côte d’ivoire, met en lumière l'ampleur croissante des campagnes de désinformation en Afrique de l'Ouest, notamment en Côte d'Ivoire. La saisine de la Plateforme de lutte contre la cybercriminalité témoigne de la volonté des autorités de poursuivre en justice les auteurs de rumeurs numériques. Selon le cabinet de l’ancien Président de l’Assemblée nationale, « ces rumeurs malveillantes sont également de nature à semer le trouble dans l'ordre public et à entacher l'image de notre pays ». Il convient dès lors d'analyser les dangers que représentent de tels agissements pour la cohésion nationale. Ainsi, la stabilité ne se joue plus uniquement sur le terrain sécuritaire classique, mais aussi dans l’espace informationnel. La régulation de l’information devient un enjeu stratégique à l’approche des échéances politiques futures. Abidjan doit continuer à capitaliser sur son ancrage continental tout en renforçant la vigilance face aux menaces de désinformation qui pourraient saper la dynamique unitaire du pays.
Timbuktu Institute – Week 2 – February 2026
For several weeks now, rumours of a possible further postponement of the parliamentary and municipal elections have been circulating. Supported by senior members of the ruling party, the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (RDPC), this wish may well become a reality. In any case, this is one possible interpretation of the remarks made by President Paul Biya during his traditional speech on Youth Day on 10 February. The Head of State announced a ‘slight adjustment’ to the electoral calendar ‘in view of certain pressing constraints’. Although these elections were expected to take place last year, they were initially postponed until 2026. It was in this context that the electorate was scheduled to be convened this February.
Furthermore, the vague and evasive nature of the reasons given by the Head of State does little to allay concerns. With Biya still to appoint a government more than two months after his re-election, this new decision keeps Cameroon in a worrying institutional situation. The postponement and adjustment of the timetable raise many questions about the country's governance, particularly the ability of institutions to organise credible and inclusive elections in a context where criticism of the legitimacy of the electoral process remains strong.
Separatist leader Lucas C. Ayaba accused of war crimes
Arrested and imprisoned in Norway in September 2024, Ambazonian separatist leader Lucas Cho Ayaba, head of the Ambazonian Defence Forces, is now suspected by the Norwegian judiciary of war crimes, his lawyer and the police announced on 9 February. The police criminal investigation service (Kripos) suspects him of playing a ‘central role in the ongoing armed conflict in Cameroon’. His lawyer immediately stated that Lucas C. Ayaba ‘rejects the accusations of incitement to commit crimes against humanity and incitement to war crimes’. The separatist was initially accused of incitement to commit crimes against humanity in Cameroon. As the Ambazonian insurgency continues in north-eastern Cameroon, claiming thousands of victims and displaced persons, this judicial offensive based on accusations of serious crimes appears to be part of a broader strategy aimed at neutralising armed networks and their supporters.
Furthermore, the Governor of the Eastern Region, Grégoire Mvongo, received Canada's High Commissioner to Cameroon, Marie-Claude Harvey, during an official audience on 12 February, confirming the persistent challenges in this part of Cameroon. During the discussions, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the region's development through concrete projects aimed at improving the living conditions of local populations, particularly in light of the challenges related to access to basic social services. The governor, for his part, reiterated the region's significant needs, emphasising the importance of sustainable support to strengthen the socio-economic development of the East. Ultimately, Cameroon's most pressing challenges continue to emerge at the shifting intersection of political tensions, institutional uncertainty, and security and development challenges in the east of the country.