Interview by Henriette Niang Kandé

In a context where Sahelian jihadism, now deeply entrenched within the JNIM, continues its westward advance and directly threatens Senegambia, Dr Bakary Sambe, president of the Timbuktu Institute and renowned specialist in religious and security dynamics in West Africa, sounds the alarm in this interview. Rejecting the naive belief that Senegal is “naturally” resilient, he calls on West African elites, particularly those in Senegal, to finally learn from Mali's failures: counterproductive outsourcing of security to foreign powers, abandonment of peripheral areas creating vacuums exploited by armed groups, and underestimation of cross-border contagion. Beyond a purely military approach, he advocates for a comprehensive human security strategy combining massive inclusive investments (PUMA), strengthening endogenous community mediation, religious counter-narratives, and social intelligence. Faced with the current impotence of ECOWAS and the paradoxes of the AES's sovereignist narrative, which has failed to stem the security crisis, he proposes a hybrid and preventive regional strategy, from ad hoc task forces to parallel diplomacy led by religious leaders and respected figures, in order to restore a ‘continuum of regional resilience’ before the collapse of one neighbour becomes contagious. This is an uncompromising interview that presents the collective survival of West Africa as an absolute emergency.

In light of the history of jihadist movements in the region, what lessons should West African elites, particularly those in Senegal, learn from historical precedents to prevent Senegal from becoming exposed to the same vulnerabilities in the face of the advance of jihadist groups in Mali?

Just as we need to strengthen border security and combat territorial marginalisation, we must also prevent the effects of non-inclusive governance from creating social boundaries on the outskirts of our urban areas, thereby exacerbating socio-economic vulnerabilities. This is the whole point of the human security approach, which makes the issues as important in Sinthiou Djaliguel as they are in Yeumbeul. As for the history of jihadist movements in the Sahel, from their emergence in 2012 to the current process of endogenisation of the JNIM (combatants mainly from Mali and West Africa, locally anchored through agreements with community networks), it teaches us worrying lessons that West African elites seem to be ignoring at their peril. The first lesson is that despite the relevance of cooperation, effectively outsourcing security to foreign powers is not only ineffective in the long term, but counterproductive, multiplying grievances and even groups rather than eradicating them. Mali is a prime example of this – calling on France in 2013 (Serval/Barkhane), then breaking with Russia (Wagner/Africa Corps) – without ever restoring stability, while encouraging the emergence of self-defence groups such as the Ganda K. A second lesson is that the abandonment and marginalisation of the peripheries by the central state always creates a vacuum exploited by jihadists or other criminal actors to establish themselves through ‘soft tactics’ – local recruitment, presentation as an alternative to a state that fails to provide basic services (security, justice). The precedents of Farabougou, Mali, taken in August 2025 with the imposition of zakat, the banning of music, etc., show how JNIM is gaining support by discrediting the current transitional regime. For Senegal, this requires preventive reinforcement of the eastern border areas (similar to Kayes). As President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has emphasised, this should be done through the PUMA programme, with inclusive and massive investment, the promotion of local endogenous mediation mechanisms to combat social divisions (conflicts between farmers and herders, slavery by descent), and countering extremist religious discourse in an area through which preachers from across the region pass. The third lesson is that ignoring cross-border dynamics and the logic of continuums naturally accelerates contagion in the immediate neighbourhood. The expansion of Katiba Macina towards western and southern Mali poses a risk to the whole of Senegambia. Dakar should further integrate social intelligence, politically responsible preventive initiatives, and cooperation with Bamako on economic corridors and beyond, while mitigating the risks of becoming trapped in a fight against terrorism that sometimes conceals complex inter-community tensions.

ECOWAS is going through an internal crisis but could play a decisive role. How could this organisation intervene effectively in the Malian crisis despite its fragility, and what type of regional strategy would be most appropriate in your opinion?

ECOWAS has come a long way. And I continue to believe that the accusations of inaction often levelled against it should be put into perspective, given that for more than a decade, the region's international partners had relegated it to the background and stripped it of its security mandate in favour of the G5 Sahel, which itself did not receive enough support to function and achieve its strategic objectives. Meanwhile, the regional security architecture was faltering, creating an imbalance that the sub-regional organisation had to endure. Despite its internal crisis – withdrawal of countries from the Alliance of Sahel States, failed sanctions, rivalries between certain member countries – ECOWAS has institutional legitimacy and tools that have so far been underused for effective and non-invasive intervention. Today, it will be necessary to circumvent political deadlocks through an ad hoc, neutral task force, co-chaired, if necessary, by countries such as Senegal, given its historical and cultural ties with Mali, Ghana, which could have the ear of the current AES regimes, and Togo. An AES area that has become a zone of insecurity and instability at the heart of the region will leave none of our countries unscathed. It will also be necessary to promote bilateral initiatives that can work. Despite their reservations, Benin and Niger are now forced to cooperate in the areas of intelligence sharing and securing vital corridors. This is precisely the case for Senegal and Mali, for whom securing the Bamako-Dakar corridor is a vital economic necessity. International partners should support such initiatives. Regardless of the strained diplomatic relations between certain countries in the region, a regional strategy that is both hybrid and preventive is now essential. This is where cooperation is essential, if only for targeted sanctions on jihadist financial flows (ransoms, illicit gold from mines) to dry up JNIM's resources, but also for the establishment of a regional fund for the inclusive development of Mali's peripheries and border areas. Any strategy that aims to be effective should move away from an exclusively military approach and incorporate community/economic components, prioritising regional stability over national egos. International cooperation, if only for the efficient sharing of intelligence, the fight against terrorist financing and illicit financial flows, remains a collective security imperative.

For a long time, the jihadist issue has been approached primarily from a military perspective. Why is this approach now insufficient, and what aspects (community, political, economic, religious) should be included in a new comprehensive approach?

As a necessity, military action can certainly contribute to the destruction of terrorist targets, but these targets will inevitably regenerate if the structural causes that gave rise to them have not been eliminated. The military-only approach is therefore insufficient because it treats jihadism as a purely kinetic threat, ignoring its deep endogenous roots and community ties: JNIM fighters are now Malian and West African, rooted in the group's ranks through the exploitation of local grievances, as analysed in our latest reports on the group's activities in western Mali. However, even tactical victories sometimes fuel recruitment without eradicating the cause, turning each operation into propaganda for the ostracism of certain communities. This is why a comprehensive approach must be prioritised, one that integrates community aspects – strengthening endogenous mediation – village chiefs, neutral families in Kayes – to heal divisions such as the effects of slavery by descent and conflicts between farmers and herders, which are constantly exploited by JNIM. Political action must not be left behind either, through inclusive dialogue with local actors to restore state legitimacy, avoiding foreign subcontracting without neglecting economic aspects through inclusive investment in mines (gold/lithium), redistributing profits to counter victim narratives. Without this, regardless of its intensity, military action would remain a temporary band-aid on a structural haemorrhage. Despite efforts to secure the borders, our armies must also accept that the war against JNIM will not be conventional; it will be latent and asymmetrical and will require social intelligence adapted to the nature of the threat and anticipation as part of a proactive prevention strategy that breaks with the naivety of a “naturally” resilient Senegal in order to project itself into a continuous future that does not neglect any aspect of a multidimensional jihadist phenomenon. Even if endogenous resilience seems to be a given, it must be consolidated because it is naturally and constantly tested by developments in the regional and international situation.

The AES promotes a sovereignist narrative but is struggling to contain the advance of jihadists. How have the recent strategic choices made by the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger contributed to worsening or easing the security situation? How much room for manoeuvre do they have left?

The AES's sovereignist narrative is full of paradoxes. While it advocates a break with the West, it also recommends alliances with Russia and even Turkey, two countries that also have their own strategic interests and are currently facing accusations of economic predation from the populations we interviewed in recent studies. The difficulty for France in the Sahel was having to constantly manage both the emergency and history at the same time, but also to bring about a paradigm shift that was long overdue. It seems to be learning its lessons. However, this AES narrative, sometimes fuelled by a certain populism, has exacerbated the situation by prioritising the perpetuation of anti-imperialist rhetoric over real security effectiveness. Sovereignty has unfortunately become a term, a slogan that pays little attention to the conditions that make it possible. Today, in the AES countries, the result is clear: the three countries of the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) alone account for 50% of terrorism-related deaths on the continent, and few of them effectively control more than 50% of their territory, according to the most optimistic estimates. The mercenaries of Africa Corps, heirs to Wagner's methods, have failed to protect economic sites in Kayes or elsewhere (attacks on Chinese facilities in 2025), exposing the failure of security promises in the aftermath of coups, gradually delegitimising regimes and accelerating the economic suffocation practised by JNIM. In Burkina Faso and Niger, we seem to be witnessing similar dispersals, multiplying fronts without strategic gains. Room for manoeuvre is shrinking as the security stranglehold tightens. Today, we are seeing pragmatic choices, with little accountability, towards local negotiations with jihadists, with community agreements on ‘zakat’ to defuse grievances. That is why regional solidarity should not be hampered by diplomatic whims that will be short-lived in the long term. Without this, internal collapse will be inevitable and its domino effect will be devastating for the entire region. Even if negotiation is not an option to be ruled out, it will now come too late, with the balance of power unfavourable to the States.

Internal political divisions in the sub-region weaken the capacity to respond. What types of consultation, confidence-building or parallel diplomacy mechanisms could be put in place to overcome these rivalries and develop a credible collective response? 

To overcome the antagonisms between AES and ECOWAS, various mechanisms should be used: parallel diplomacy, necessarily non-institutional, via African figures who are widely respected and influential in what are now two political spheres. However, the role of cross-border religious leaders in confidential dialogues supported by trusted platforms should not be overlooked, nor should inclusive economic pilot projects in peripheral and cross-border areas. The Timbuktu Institute facilitated a regional seminar initiated at the time by UNOWAS – which remains a consensual framework – bringing together religious and traditional leaders from across the Sahel and West Africa in Dakar. These initiatives must be revitalised, taking into account the dynamics and constraints. This is an urgent matter, as called for by the former Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General, Adama Dieng, who now serves as the African Union's Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide and is monitoring the risk of atrocities in the region if nothing is done. We cannot continue to allow West African divisions (AES vs ECOWAS, national rivalries) to further fragment the regional security architecture, intelligence and vital economic corridors, enabling JNIM to exploit blockades and extend its tentacles. For a credible and sustainable response, it is now necessary, as called for by the Timbuktu Institute, to deploy a ‘continuum of regional resilience’ in the hope that these mechanisms can generate mutual gains (security of corridors, enhanced legitimacy of states and governance); This could dry up JNIM's sources of funding and recruitment, and preserve regional peace and stability. But all this requires a clear political choice on the part of West African leaders and a conciliatory stance, if only for the sake of regional survival.