Timbuktu Institute - Week 4 - February 2026

Between opening up to new non-Western partners, strengthening cross-border cooperation with Ghana and accelerating the institutionalisation of the AES, Burkina Faso is confirming a three-pronged strategic dynamic. These diplomatic and security developments, concentrated around the end of February 2026, reflect a deliberate realignment of alliances, a pragmatic regionalisation of the response to the jihadist threat, and a desire for doctrinal structuring at the confederal level.

Burkina Faso–Iran: a diplomatic shift in the service of assertive security sovereignty

This week, Burkina Faso was marked by the historic visit of General Célestin Simporé to Tehran on 23 February 2026. This visit marks a notable diplomatic shift and the continuation of the diversification of partnerships that began with France's departure a few years ago. Received by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian and Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, the Burkinabe minister engaged in a strategic dialogue focused on security cooperation. The Iranian President took the opportunity to affirm that ‘Iran is keen to use its vast capabilities to improve its relations with African countries, which is a strategic priority of its foreign policy.’ This visit illustrates the pursuit of a sovereignist and pragmatic diplomacy, focused on securing the territory and strategic autonomy, but which is gradually redefining Burkina Faso's place in the game of international alliances. This is a continuation of their strategy of diversifying military equipment suppliers, with access to ‘non-Western’ technological and logistical cooperation.

Ouagadougou–Accra: towards a pragmatic regionalisation of the security response

Meanwhile, on 20 February, Burkina Faso signed seven bilateral agreements with Ghana on transport, security, cross-border management and the fight against drug trafficking. This cooperation comes at a time of increased border vulnerability, as evidenced by the death of Ghanaian traders in a jihadist attack claimed by JNIM, as reported in previous issues of Météo Sahel. According to Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré, Burkina Faso's Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘our peoples expect more from us than just statements’. They expect infrastructure, economic opportunities, enhanced security, easier mobility and smoother trade. The joint commission must be the driving force behind ambitious, structured, realistic and results-oriented cooperation. These remarks reflect the strategic awareness of Burkina Faso and Ghana that the threat posed by JNIM is not limited to national borders and requires a coordinated response that integrates security, border governance and the fight against transnational trafficking. These agreements between the two countries reflect a logic of regionalisation of the security response, in which cross-border cooperation becomes an indispensable strategic lever in the face of the spread of jihadist risk and the growing interconnection of criminal and terrorist threats in the Sahel region. Thus, security cooperation with Accra represents an attempt at horizontal stabilisation aimed at combating this conflict.

Ouagadougou: towards the strategic institutionalisation of Year II of the AES

Work on the roadmap for the second year of the AES was launched in Ouagadougou on 24 and 25 February 2026. The aim is to structure a common doctrine on defence, diplomacy and development. This major step marks an important milestone in the institutionalisation of the confederal project between the three countries, which aims to go beyond ad hoc cooperation to formalise an integrated doctrine on defence, diplomacy and development. According to Bassolma Bazié, President of the AES National Commission for Burkina Faso, ‘it is necessary to meet to assess the content and see what types of elements can be put together in terms of draft roadmaps to be sent first to the confederal ministerial team, which will be able to assess them and in turn forward them to Their Excellencies for final adoption’. This approach demonstrates a desire for bottom-up structuring, revealing an attempt at institutional consolidation and strategic coordination in the face of security challenges and regional geopolitical realignments.

Timbuktu Institute - Semaine 4 - Février 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Entre ouverture à de nouveaux partenaires extra-occidentaux, renforcement de la coopération transfrontalière avec le Ghana et institutionnalisation accélérée de l'AES, le Burkina Faso confirme une triple dynamique stratégique. Ces séquences diplomatiques et sécuritaires, concentrées autour de la fin du mois de février 2026, traduisent une recomposition assumée des alliances, une régionalisation pragmatique de la réponse à la menace djihadiste et une volonté de structuration doctrinale à l'échelle confédérale.

Burkina Faso–Iran : une inflexion diplomatique au service d’une souveraineté sécuritaire assumée

Cette semaine, le Burkina Faso a été marqué par la visite historique du général Célestin Simporé à Téhéran, le 23 février 2026. Cette visite marque en effet une inflexion diplomatique notable et la poursuite de la diversification des partenariats engagés depuis le départ de la France il y a quelques années. Reçu par le Président iranien, Massoud Pezeshkian, et par le Ministre de la Défense, Aziz Nasirzadeh, le Ministre burkinabè a engagé un dialogue stratégique axé sur la coopération sécuritaire. Le Président iranien a profité de l'occasion pour affirmer que « l'Iran est désireux d'utiliser ses vastes capacités pour améliorer ses relations avec les pays africains, ce qui constitue une priorité stratégique de sa politique étrangère ». Cette visite illustre la poursuite d'une diplomatie souverainiste et pragmatique, axée sur la sécurisation du territoire et l'autonomie stratégique, mais qui redéfinit progressivement la place du Burkina Faso dans les jeux d'alliances internationaux. Il s'agit d'une continuité dans leur stratégie de diversification des fournisseurs d'équipements militaires, avec un accès à une coopération technologique et logistique « non occidentale ».

Ouagadougou–Accra : vers une régionalisation pragmatique de la réponse sécuritaire

Pendant ce temps, le Burkina Faso a signé, le 20 février dernier, sept accords bilatéraux avec le Ghana concernant le transport, la sécurité, la gestion transfrontalière et la lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants. Cette coopération s'inscrit dans un contexte de vulnérabilité frontalière accrue, comme en témoigne la mort de commerçants ghanéens lors d'une attaque djihadiste revendiquée par le JNIM, évoquée dans les précédents numéros de Météo Sahel. Selon Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Burkina Faso, « nos peuples attendent de nous plus que des déclarations ». Ils attendent des infrastructures, des opportunités économiques, une sécurité renforcée, une mobilité facilitée et des échanges commerciaux fluidifiés. La commission mixte doit être le moteur d'une coopération ambitieuse, structurée, réaliste et axée sur les résultats. » Ces propos témoignent de la prise de conscience stratégique du Burkina Faso et du Ghana selon laquelle la menace du JNIM ne se limite pas aux frontières nationales et exige une réponse coordonnée intégrant la sécurité, la gouvernance frontalière et la lutte contre les trafics transnationaux. Ces accords entre les deux pays traduisent une logique de régionalisation de la réponse sécuritaire, dans laquelle la coopération transfrontalière devient un levier stratégique indispensable face à la diffusion du risque djihadiste et à l'interconnexion croissante des menaces criminelles et terroristes dans l'espace sahélien. Ainsi, la coopération sécuritaire avec Accra représente une tentative de stabilisation horizontale visant à lutter contre ce conflit.

Ouagadougou : vers l’institutionnalisation stratégique de l’An II de l’AES

Les travaux de la feuille de route de la deuxième année de l’AES ont été lancés à Ouagadougou les 24 et 25 février 2026. L’objectif est de structurer une doctrine commune en matière de défense, de diplomatie et de développement. Cet acte majeur marque en effet une étape importante dans l'institutionnalisation du projet confédéral entre les trois pays, visant à dépasser la coopération conjoncturelle pour formaliser une doctrine intégrée en matière de défense, de diplomatie et de développement. Selon Bassolma Bazié, président de la Commission nationale AES pour le Burkina, « il est nécessaire de se retrouver pour apprécier le contenu et voir quels types d'éléments on peut mettre ensemble en termes de projets de feuilles de route à transmettre d'abord à l'équipe ministérielle confédérale, qui pourra les apprécier et les transmettre à leur tour à leurs Excellences pour adoption définitive ». Cette démarche témoigne d'une volonté de structuration ascendante, révélatrice d'une tentative de consolidation institutionnelle et de coordination stratégique face aux défis sécuritaires et aux recompositions géopolitiques régionales.

Timbuktu Institute – March 2026

Nigeria has turned to foreign intervention to navigate their escalating security crisis. At the end of 2025, the US military bombed northern Nigeria in coordination with the Nigerian government, targeting jihadist terrorist groups in the region. Shortly after, in February 2026 it was confirmed that the US government would be sending troops to Nigeria to train and support the Nigerian military with jihadist violence in the north. These actions come after a period of tension between the U.S government and Nigeria. The Trump administration claimed the Nigerian government was ignoring and potentially allowing the mass killings of Nigerian Christians, which Nigerian President Tinubu strongly denied. Trump’s engagement with Nigeria is seemingly driven by religion, as his administration and political supporters are using a narrative of Christian persecution by Muslim actors, to justify military intervention.

Nigeria’s Security Situation

Nigeria’s current security problems are multifaceted with no singular narrative.  For nearly 15 years, the northeast of the country has been impacted by terrorist violence from jihadist militant groups. Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP) and Boko Haram have been terrorizing communities in this region with violent attacks. In the northwest, organized armed groups locally called bandits, carry out kidnappings for ransom. These types of attacks have become increasingly common, with these bandit groups kidnapping individuals but also cattle, and raiding villages. Then, resource competition, exacerbated by climate change, has escalated tensions between herding and farming communities in the middle belt region of the country. This has resulted in violent clashes, exposing ethnic and religious tensions. While in the south, separatist agitation persists. The Nigerian government struggles to control these situations.

During this complex domestic security situation, the US government under the new leadership of President Trump began to question the Nigerian government about violence against Christians in the country. In late 2025, President Trump accused the Nigerian government of ignoring or even allowing widespread killings of Christians. He threatened diplomatic and military actions if the situation was not addressed. Nigerian President Bobi Ahmed Tinubu denied the accusations that Nigeria allows Christians to be killed, emphasizing that terrorism impacts all Nigerians. Then on December 25, President Trump announced a successful military strike in northern Nigeria. The US military struckseveral sites in the northwestern state Sokoto targeting jihadist militant groups. According to the US military, a military vessel in the Gulf of Guinea fired around a dozen Tomahawk missiles, striking approximately four locations. Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar stated it was a joint military operation with the United States. 

From Religious Advocacy to Military Action

There has been growing concern from US right wing religious groups and politicians about violence towards Christians in Nigeria. While there are well-documented incidents of violence perpetrated against Christian Nigerians, violence in Nigeria is widespread and impacts all communities. In March 2025, the United States Congress held a hearingtitled “Conflict and Persecution in Nigeria: The Case for a CPC Designation”. Members of Congress called on President Trump to designate Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern (CPC). This designation is given by the US State Department for countries considered to engage in violations of religious freedoms. Once a country has this designation, the US government can take diplomatic action against the government, with severe actions such as withholding aid or economic sanctions. The situation escalated when in October, a letter was written to President Trump from 30 different Christian organizations about the persecution of Christians in Nigeria, and to officially designate Nigeria a country of particular concern. On 31 October, President Trump re-instated Nigeria to the CPC list, threatening military action if the Nigerian government did not attempt to stop the killing of Christians by Islamist terrorists. Then in early December, a delegation of US Congress members visited Abuja on a fact-finding mission where they heard from government officials, victims of violence, and religious leaders and organizations from Benue state in the middle belt region. The military strikes were carried out a few weeks after the visit. Despite new military cooperation between the US and Nigeria, a bill was introduced in US Congress in February 2026 that threatens visa bans and asset freezes on specific Nigerians accused of religious freedom abuses. 

Targets of the Missile Strike

The US military confirmed that the missile strikes were successful in targeting training camps for an ISIS affiliated group in Sokoto state. There are no reported casualties at this time, but residents of nearby villages reported seeing fighters fleeing on motorbikes. Local reports say the strikes hit training camps of the Lakurawa group, who are a Islamic group the Nigerian government designated a terrorist organization in January 2025. Lakurawa arrived in Nigeria in 2017, after being invited by local communities for protection from bandit groups. They are situated in a remote area of Sokoto state near the border of Niger and are believed to have come from Mali and Niger and are not Nigerian. Despite initially arriving with intentions to provide protection for vulnerable communities in an isolated part of the country, they now rule over the area with fear, imposing strict interpretations of Islam.  Both US and Nigerian officials assert Lakurawa is affiliated to Islamic State (IS) groups in the Sahel but their connection to IS is disputed by researchers. Lakurawa operates in northwest Nigeria, while most Islamic terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are in northeastern Nigeria.

It is unclear on why the US military targeted Lakurawa with the missile strikes. The Trump administration stated their intervention was an attempt to protect Christians in Nigeria. Sokoto state, where the strikes were sent, is a majority Muslim area like most of Northern Nigeria, and more specifically the communities impacted by Lakurawa are Muslim. It is surprising that larger Islamist terrorist groups such as Boko Haram or ISWAP were not targeted, which are in the northeast. In the months before the strikes, US politicians specifically discussed violence against Christians in clashes between herder and farming communities in the middle belt region. When members of the US Congress visited Abuja in early December, they specifically met with people from Benue state in the middle belt, a conflict happening in a different part of the country than where the missile strikes were launched.

Looking Forward

In the White House’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), US engagement with Africa should recognize Islamist terrorist activity without long-term American presence or commitments. The US’s recent engagement with Nigeria under Trump is addressing violence from jihadist groups but is increasing the US’s military presence. After the air strikes in December, the US military sent 100 US soldiers northeastern Nigeria to assist and train local forces. Despite the NSS policy on Africa, the right-wing Christian movement to protect Christian Nigerians has motivated the Trump administration make military commitments to the Nigerian government.

Prepared with Saveena Suri, Research Intern, Peace & Security

بقلم: الدكتور بكاري سامب رئيس ومؤسس معهد تمبكتو – المركز الأفريقي لدراسات السلام

في شهر أبريل من عام 2025، ومن منصة منتدى الأمن العالمي في الدوحة، أطلقتُ نداءً استشرافياً نابعاً من قراءة دقيقة للتحولات الجيوسياسية المتسارعة، حيث أكدتُ حينها أن استقرار منطقة الساحل الأفريقي قد يتطلب بروز وسيط استثنائي يجمع بين القوة الناعمة، والفهم العميق للهوية، والقدرة المثبتة على اختراق الجمود الدبلوماسي. واليوم، ومع تزايد تعقيد المشهد في دول الساحل، يبدو أن دولة قطر بإمكانها أن تكون الطرف المؤهل بامتياز لملء هذا الفراغ ولعب دور المحرك الأساسي لقطار السلام في المنطقة

إن السياسة الخارجية القطرية، التي لم تكن يوماً طرفاً في النزاعات بل “غرفة مفتوحة” للحوار، من شأنها أن توفر منصة مثالية للفرقاء في الساحل حين تُوصد كافة الأبواب. فنجاحات الدوحة التاريخية، سواء في الملف الأفغاني أو في الوساطة بين جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية ورواندا، يمكن أن تشكل نموذجاً ملهماً وقابلاً للتطبيق في سياقنا الأفريقي. هذا النجاح لا يرتكز على الإرادة السياسية فحسب، بل على منظومة متكاملة من “الدبلوماسية المعرفية”؛ إذ من المتوقع أن يساهم توظيف أدوات مثل الأكاديمية الدولية للدراسات الأمنية ومركز دراسات النزاع والعمل الإنساني في تقديم مقاربات علمية رصينة تربط بين استدامة السلام وبين العمل الإغاثي والتنموي، مما قد يمنح أي وساطة قطرية مستقبلاً عمقاً تحليلياً يفتقر إليه الكثير من الفاعلين التقليديين

وما قد يجعل التدخل القطري المُرتجى في أزمات الساحل (مالي، النيجر، بوركينا فاسو) ذا أهمية بالغة، هو امتلاك الدوحة لـ “شرعية مزدوجة”؛ فهي من جهة تستطيع توظيف شرعيتها الروحية والثقافية كدولة مسلمة لبناء جسور ثقة مع شعوب وقادة المنطقة بعيداً عن حواجز الارتياب التاريخية. ومن جهة أخرى، فإن بمقدورها استثمار شرعية الإنجاز والتراكم المعرفي كوسط نزيه لديه القدرة على تحويل الصراعات المسلحة إلى مسارات سياسية، مدعومة بدبلوماسية تأثير تجمع بين الروافع الاقتصادية والإعلامية

إن ندائي في الدوحة كان مبنياً على رؤية مفادها أن منطقة الساحل ربما تجد في “نموذج الدوحة” المخرج المنشود من دوامة الأزمات، خاصة إذا ما تم التكامل بين الحنكة الدبلوماسية وأدوات الدعم التنموي كصندوق قطر للتنمية. إن انخراط قطر في هذا الملف قد لا يكون مجرد خيار ديبلوماسي، بل ضرورة استراتيجية واستثماراً في الاستقرار الإقليمي؛ فمن شأن تفعيل هذه الأدوات الأكاديمية والسياسية في أفريقيا جنوب الصحراء أن يفتح آفاقاً لبناء جسر آمن يعبر بالمنطقة من ضفة النزاعات المزمنة إلى فضاءات الاستقرار المستدام