Timbuktu Institute January 2026

Relations between Benin and Niger are once again strained. While relations between the two neighboring countries have deteriorated steadily since General Abdourahmane Tiani came to power in 2023 following the overthrow of former President Mohamed Bazoum, the discord seemed to have calmed down somewhat in recent months. That is, until the beginning of this year, when the two countries mutually expelled diplomats. After Cotonou expelled two officials—a police officer and a Nigerien civil servant—from the Nigerien embassy on January, Niamey retaliated by declaring the Beninese chargé d'affaires persona non grata. The Beninese authorities have not officially commented on this decision. As a reminder, Cotonou recalled its ambassador in February 2025. This new friction between the two countries comes in the wake of the failed coup in Benin, where the government had also condemned the involvement of "nostalgic Beninese politicians" and foreign supporters. For his part, General Tiani has continued to accuse Benin of harboring a French base with the aim of destabilizing Niger.

The start of the election season

This year, Beninese citizens will be called to the polls for legislative, municipal, and presidential elections. On January 11, the legislative and municipal elections took place. Members of Parliament will now be elected for a seven-year term—instead of five years previously—since the revision of the Constitution in November 2025. Five parties are vying for the 109 seats: the Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR), the Bloc républicain (BR) and Moele Bénin. Then there is the opposition party Les Démocrates (LD) of former president Boni Yayi and the Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE), a so-called "moderate" opposition party. However, only the URP, the BR, and the FCBE are participating in the municipal elections. The LD's candidate lists were deemed inadmissible by the Constitutional Court, meaning that the party will also not be participating in the presidential election, following its disqualification for lack of sponsorship.

Le torchon brûle à nouveau entre le Bénin et le Niger. Alors que les relations entre les deux pays voisins se sont dégradées crescendo depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir du général Abdourahmane Tiani en 2023, suite au renversement de l’ex-président Mohamed Bazoum, la discorde avait semblé faire montre d’une relative accalmie au cours de ces derniers mois. Ceci jusqu’au début de l’année où les deux pays ont mutuellement expulsé des diplomates. Après que Cotonou ait expulsé le 1^er janvier deux fonctionnaires – un agent de police et un fonctionnaire des services nigériens - de l’ambassade nigérienne, Niamey a rendu la pareille en déclarant persona non grata le chargé d'affaires béninois. Les autorités béninoises n’ont pas officiellement communiqué sur cette décision. Pour rappel, Cotonou avait rappelé son ambassadeur en février 2025. Cette nouvelle friction entre les deux pays intervient dans le sillage du putsch manqué au Bénin, où le gouvernement avait, par ailleurs, fustigé l’implication de « politiciens béninois nostalgiques » et de soutiens étrangers. De son côté, le général Tiani n’a pas arrêté d’accuser le Bénin d’abriter une base française dans le but de déstabiliser le Niger.

Ouverture du chapitre électoral

Cette année, les Béninois seront appelés aux urnes pour les élections législatives, communales et la présidentielle. Le 11 janvier, les scrutins pour les législatives et communales ont eu lieu. Les députés seront désormais élus pour un mandat de 7 ans – au lieu de 5 ans précédemment – depuis la révision de la Constitution de novembre 2025. Cinq partis sont en lice pour les 109 sièges : l’Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UPR), le Bloc républicain (BR) et Moele Bénin. Puis, on note le parti d’opposition Les Démocrates (LD) de l’ex-président Boni Yayi et les Forces Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE), parti d’opposition dite « modérée ». Par contre, pour les communales, seuls l’URP, le BR et le FCBE participent. Les listes de candidature de LD ont été jugées irrecevables par la Cour constitutionnelle, sachant que le parti ne sera également pas de la partie à la présidentielle, suite à une disqualification pour défauts de parrainage.

Source : Météo Sahel Janvier 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

En ce début d'année, l'actualité au Togo a été marquée par la libération de Steeve Rouyar, de nationalité française, après huit mois de prison. Il est rentré chez lui le 1er janvier dernier, après avoir été accusé d'atteinte à la sûreté de l'État lors d'une grande manifestation à Lomé contre la hausse du prix de l'électricité, l'arrestation de voix critiques et la nouvelle Constitution supprimant la limitation des mandats présidentiels. Cette libération intervient alors que 1 511 détenus ont été graciés par les autorités togolaises. Le Quai d’Orsay, de son côté, n’a pas souhaité se prononcer sur le fond de l’affaire, la qualifiant d’« affaire judiciaire individuelle ». Dans le même temps, Kpatcha Gnassingbé, demi-frère de l’actuel président du Conseil et ancien ministre de la Défense, a également été libéré de prison après 16 années de détention pour atteinte à la sûreté de l’État.

Ces détenus graciés s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’un processus d'apaisement social et de désengorgement des établissements pénitentiaires au Togo, et non dans celui de l'impunité, selon les autorités étatiques. Selon le président du Conseil, Faure Gnassingbé, « il ne s'agit ni d'impunité, ni de faiblesse face à des crimes graves. Il s'agit plutôt d'éviter que des erreurs ou des moments d'égarement ne deviennent des destins brisés. Il s'agit surtout de permettre à notre pays de regarder vers l'avenir ». Lors de son adresse traditionnelle à la nation en fin d’année, il a fixé trois priorités principales : « Protéger, rassembler, transformer ». Il a également profité de l’occasion pour revenir sur les réformes de la Ve République, qui visent à refonder durablement la gouvernance politique et institutionnelle du pays.

Timbuktu Institute January 2026

At the beginning of this year, the news in Togo was marked by the release of Steeve Rouyar, a French national, after eight months in prison. He returned home on January 1, after being accused of threatening state security during a large demonstration in Lomé against rising electricity prices, the arrest of critics, and the new constitution removing presidential term limits. This release comes as 1,511 prisoners have been pardoned by the Togolese authorities. The French Foreign Ministry, for its part, declined to comment on the merits of the case, describing it as an "individual legal matter." At the same time, Kpatcha Gnassingbé, half-brother of the current president of the Council and former defense minister, was also released from prison after 16 years of detention for undermining state security.

According to state authorities, these pardoned prisoners are part of a process of social appeasement and prison decongestion in Togo, and not a process of impunity. According to the President of the Council, Faure Gnassingbé, "this is neither impunity nor weakness in the face of serious crimes. Rather, it is about preventing mistakes or moments of misjudgment from becoming broken destinies. Above all, it is about allowing our country to look to the future." In his traditional end-of-year address to the nation, he set out three main priorities: "Protect, unite, transform." He also took the opportunity to revisit the reforms of the Fifth Republic, which aim to sustainably rebuild the country's political and institutional governance.

Source : Sahel weather January 2026

Download the full Sahel weather report

Source : Météo Sahel Janvier 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Lors de son discours du Nouvel An, le Président ivoirien a appelé à « la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité, au renforcement de la cohésion nationale et à la poursuite résolue de notre marche vers le développement, dans un esprit de solidarité active envers les couches les plus vulnérables ». Ainsi, le Chef de l’État, réélu pour un quatrième mandat, réaffirme son engagement à poursuivre la construction du pays et invite les Ivoiriens à ce qu'il appelle le « nouveau contrat social » qui les lie. Dans un contexte régional instable, il a profité de ce moment solennel pour annoncer que la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme serait intensifiée, afin que le pays demeure un modèle de transparence et de bonne gouvernance en Afrique. Lors de sa prestation de serment en décembre dernier, il avait dressé un tableau sombre de l'environnement régional, assez fragile. Selon lui, « les menaces terroristes persistent, se transforment, se numérisent. Le cyberterrorisme, en particulier, nous impose une vigilance de chaque instant. » La Côte d'Ivoire est confrontée, comme la plupart des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest, à des défis politico-sécuritaires de plus en plus complexes et exigeants.

Cette semaine a été marquée par la période post-électorale en Côte d’Ivoire, avec des législatives qui se sont soldées par une victoire écrasante du RHDP. Selon les résultats provisoires, le parti au pouvoir est largement en tête avec 197 sièges sur les 255 en jeu. Le contentieux électoral a ensuite été ouvert jusqu’au 5 janvier pour permettre aux formations politiques de déposer des recours en cas de désaccord. Le communiqué précise que « conformément à l'article 101 du code électoral, le Conseil constitutionnel informe les candidats qu'ils disposent d'un délai de cinq jours à compter de cette proclamation pour présenter leurs réclamations ou observations en dix exemplaires originaux ». Pour rappel, des informations font état de l'arrestation de 15 jeunes dans la région de Tonkpi, qui ont été acheminés vers le procureur de la République. Une procédure judiciaire a ensuite été ouverte pour détention de cartes d'électeurs ; onze d'entre eux ont été relaxés et les quatre autres comparaîtront devant le tribunal le 6 janvier. De son côté, l'opposition continue de mener le combat pour le renforcement de la démocratie et contre les dérives du pouvoir. Réunis le 3 janvier dernier dans leur siège, les membres du Parti des peuples africains-Côte d'Ivoire (Ppa-Ci) ont réaffirmé leur volonté de poursuivre la lutte contre le quatrième mandat et pour la libération des prisonniers d'opinion. Ils envisagent également de réorganiser leur parti afin de se préparer au mieux pour les prochaines échéances électorales.

Pendant ce temps, l’actualité politique ivoirienne a connu un rebondissement qui a fait couler beaucoup d’encre. Il s'agit de la démission du gouvernement, survenue après les deux grandes élections qui se sont déroulées en Côte d'Ivoire et qui ont vu la victoire éclatante du parti au pouvoir. Mercredi 7 janvier, le Premier ministre, Robert Beugré Mambé, a démissionné avec l’ensemble de son gouvernement, qui assurera l’intérim jusqu’au prochain remaniement. Après deux ans à la tête de la primature, Robert quitte le gouvernement.

Timbuktu Institute January 2026

In his New Year's speech, the Ivorian president called for "the consolidation of peace and security, the strengthening of national cohesion, and the resolute pursuit of our march toward development, in a spirit of active solidarity with the most vulnerable segments of society." The head of state, re-elected for a fourth term, thus reaffirmed his commitment to continuing to build the country and invited Ivorians to embrace what he called the "new social contract" that binds them together. In an unstable regional context, he took advantage of this solemn moment to announce that the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing would be intensified, so that the country remains a model of transparency and good governance in Africa. During his swearing-in ceremony last December, he painted a bleak picture of the fragile regional environment. According to him, "terrorist threats persist, transform, and become digital. Cyberterrorism, in particular, requires us to be vigilant at all times." Like most West African countries, Côte d'Ivoire faces increasingly complex and demanding political and security challenges.

This week was marked by the post-election period in Côte d'Ivoire, with legislative elections that resulted in a landslide victory for the RHDP. According to provisional results, the ruling party is well ahead with 197 of the 255 seats at stake. The electoral dispute was then opened until January 5 to allow political parties to file appeals in case of disagreement. The statement specifies that "in accordance with Article 101 of the Electoral Code, the Constitutional Council informs candidates that they have five days from the date of this announcement to submit their complaints or observations in ten original copies." As a reminder, reports indicate that 15 young people were arrested in the Tonkpi region and brought before the public prosecutor. Legal proceedings were then initiated for possession of voter cards; eleven of them were released and the other four will appear in court on January 6. For its part, the opposition continues to fight for the strengthening of democracy and against abuses of power. Meeting on January 3 at their headquarters, members of the African People's Party-Côte d'Ivoire (Ppa-Ci) reaffirmed their determination to continue the fight against a fourth term and for the release of prisoners of conscience. They also plan to reorganize their party in order to be better prepared for the upcoming elections.

Meanwhile, there has been a major development in Ivorian politics that has attracted a lot of attention. This is the resignation of the government, which came after two major elections in Côte d'Ivoire that saw a resounding victory for the ruling party. On Wednesday, January 7, Prime Minister Robert Beugré Mambé resigned along with his entire government, which will remain in office until the next reshuffle. After two years at the head of the prime minister's office, Robert is leaving the government.

Source : Sahel weather January 2026

Download the full Sahel weather report

الدكتور باكاري سامب، رئيس ومؤسس معهد تمبكتو – المركز الأفريقي لدراسات السلام، دكار – السنغال

لم تعد الرياضة في المملكة المغربية مجرد أهداف تُسجل في الملاعب، بل تحولت إلى أداة ديبلوماسية ناعمة تعكس رؤية استراتيجية بعيدة المدى. إن احتضان المغرب لكأس أمم أفريقيا ليس مجرد حدث عابر، بل هو التجسيد الحي لمفهوم “المغرب الأفريقي” الذي نظّر له الباحث “باكاري سامبي” في مؤلفه الأخير لعام 2024. هذا المفهوم الذي يتجاوز الانتماء الجغرافي ليصل إلى عقيدة سياسية واقتصادية متكاملة
الخيار الأفريقي الذي لا رجعة فيه

لقد رسم صاحب الجلالة الملك محمد السادس معالم طريق واضحة منذ سنوات، توجت بما أسماه جلالته “الخيار الأفريقي لا رجعة فيه”. هذا التوجه لم يكن شعاراً، بل تُرجم إلى شراكات “رابح-رابح”، واستثمارات ضخمة، وحضور ديبلوماسي قوي جعل من الرباط رقماً صعباً في المعادلة القارية. اليوم، تبرز كأس أمم أفريقيا كمنصة لاستعراض هذا النفوذ المتنامي، حيث تحول المغرب إلى “ملتقى طرق” للديبلوماسية الرياضية، معززاً علاقاته مع أشقائه في القارة عبر جسور الثقة والتعاون

من كان 2025 إلى حلم مونديال 2030

إن النجاح المرتقب في تنظيم العرس الأفريقي ليس غاية في حد ذاته، بل هو رسالة طمأنة للعالم حول قدرات القارة السمراء. المغرب، عبر بنيته التحتية العالمية (المطارات، الملاعب، والقطار فائق السرعة)، يقدم الدليل القاطع على أن أفريقيا قادرة على رفع التحديات الكبرى. هذا النجاح التنظيمي هو التمهيد الطبيعي والمنطقي للتحدي الأكبر: التنظيم المشترك لكأس العالم 2030

لقد أثبت المغرب أن الطموح الذي يقوده جلالة الملك لا يحدُّه سقف، وأن المملكة هي “النموذج” الذي يحتذى به في تحويل الرؤية الملكية إلى واقع ملموس، واضعاً القارة بأكملها تحت أضواء التميز العالمي

المغرب كقوة جسر (Bridge Power)
تتجلى عبقرية الرؤية المغربية في تكريس مكانة المملكة كـ “قوة جسر” (Bridge Power) فهي تترسخ في هويتها الأفريقية الأصيلة، وفي الوقت ذاته تفتح ذراعيها لأوروبا وبقية العالم. إن تنظيم المغرب لهذه المحافل الكبرى يكرس صورته كصلة وصل استراتيجية بين القارات، ومحركاً للتنمية المشتركة

إنها “الأفريقانية الواعية والمتحملة لمسؤولياتها” التي تجعل من المغرب فخوراً بانتمائه، طموحاً في ريادته، ومنفتحاً على محيطه الدولي. لقد تحول الحدث الرياضي بفضل القيادة الملكية الرشيدة إلى إعادة تأكيد على أن المغرب ليس فقط في أفريقيا، بل إن أفريقيا في قلب المغرب، وأن مستقبل القارة يُكتب اليوم بأيدٍ مغربية تؤمن بقدرات الإنسان الأفريقي

 Timbuktu Institute January 2026

In Burkina Faso, the news reported a major security alert on the night of January 3 to 4 in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. According to the authorities, this was an attempted coup against the transitional president. Several soldiers were arrested and population movements were observed in both cities. Calls for rallies were issued by supporters of the regime to counter this attempted coup. Once again, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, exiled in Togo, is cited as one of the masterminds behind this affair. In any case, the alleged accomplices cited in this affair have presented him as the main instigator from his place of exile. According to them, he was behind this plan, which targeted the transitional authorities and involved the mobilization of resources transiting through Abidjan.

When questioned by the military authorities, Captain Prosper Couldiaty, who was arrested during this large-scale operation targeting the institutions of the Republic, did not deny the facts. He admitted to receiving five million CFA francs to take part in this attempted coup. He also implicated the former lieutenant colonel who had recently contacted him and, during his testimony, asked for clemency from the President of Burkina Faso, Captain Ibrahima Traoré, the Burkinabe people, and his military superiors. According to the Burkinabe government, the situation is under control. In his address to the nation, Captain Traoré emphasized that he would continue to strengthen the army's forces in order to intensify the fight against terrorists. According to him, "several operations have taken place in the theater of operations. We note in particular a daring operation launched two months ago, called 'Lalmasga', which means 'wall of ice' in English."

Source : Sahel weather January 2026

Download the full Sahel weather report

Source : Météo Sahel Janvier 2026 

Télécharger l'intégralité de la Météo Sahel

Au Burkina Faso, l’actualité a fait état d’une importante alerte sécuritaire dans la nuit du 3 au 4 janvier, à Ouagadougou et à Bobo-Dioulasso. Il s'agirait en effet, d’après les autorités, d'une tentative de coup d'État contre le Président de la transition. Plusieurs militaires ont été arrêtés et des déplacements de population ont été observés dans les deux villes. Des appels au rassemblement ont été lancés par les soutiens du régime pour faire face à cette tentative de putsch. Une fois de plus, le lieutenant-colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, exilé au Togo, est cité comme faisant partie des cerveaux de cette affaire. En tout état de cause, les présumés complices cités dans cette affaire l’ont présenté comme l’instigateur principal depuis son lieu d’exil. Selon eux, il serait à l'origine de ce plan qui visait les autorités de la transition et qui prévoyait la mobilisation de ressources transitant par Abidjan.

Interrogé par les autorités militaires, le capitaine Prosper Couldiaty, interpellé lors de cette vaste opération visant des institutions de la République, n'a pas nié les faits. Il a reconnu avoir reçu la somme de cinq millions de francs CFA pour prendre part à cette tentative de coup de force. Il a également impliqué l’ex-lieutenant-colonel qui l’aurait contacté récemment, et a sollicité la clémence du Président du Faso, le capitaine Ibrahima Traoré, de la population burkinabè et de sa hiérarchie militaire au cours de sa déposition. Selon le gouvernement burkinabè, la situation est sous contrôle. Dans son allocution à la nation, le capitaine Traoré a tenu à rappeler qu’il poursuivrait sans relâche le renforcement des effectifs de l’armée afin d'intensifier la lutte contre les terroristes. Selon lui, « plusieurs opérations ont eu lieu sur le théâtre des opérations. Nous retenons principalement une opération audacieuse lancée il y a deux mois, baptisée “Lalmasga”, ce qui signifie “mur de glace” en français. »

Timbuktu Institute – January 2026

In a context where debates on migration in West Africa are often dominated by a reductive security-based approach, which equates migration flows with mere vectors of cross-border threats, it is imperative to deconstruct this unilateral view. This dominant interpretation of migration could obscure the positive and structuring contributions of migrants to local development and resilience.

Indeed, this security-focused perspective, often influenced by international agendas, masks the transformative impact of remittances from the diaspora in Europe, particularly in the departments of Bakel and Goudiry in eastern Senegal. These financial transfers play a significant role in reducing vulnerabilities by supporting community investments in education, health, agriculture and basic infrastructure, thereby strengthening local resilience to various threats, including violent extremism. By placing migration at the heart of a dynamic of inclusive development and social cohesion, this action research initiative invites us to rethink migration policies beyond repressive approaches, in order to harness their potential to prevent the risk of ideological infiltration in these fragile border areas.

The departments of Goudiry and Bakel, located in eastern Senegal in the Tambacounda region, represent a strategic and vulnerable crossroads in West Africa. Bordering directly on the Kayes region of Mali, these areas are exposed to growing security threats, illustrated by recent attacks such as those perpetrated in July 2025 in Diboli by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a group affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Sahel. Located less than two kilometres from the Senegalese border, this incursion into the locality highlights the porosity of the borders, facilitating cross-border trafficking in arms, drugs and gold from illegal gold mining.

Areas exposed to the effects of cross-border activity with Mali

Although Senegal has remained relatively resilient to violent extremism – thanks to its historical social cohesion and prevailing religious moderation – these border regions are at risk of ideological infiltration if local vulnerabilities are not addressed and mitigated. Factors such as socio-religious tensions (linked to marginalisation due to castes and traditional community divisions, descent-based slavery and the influence of foreign preachers) weaken local religious models. They could also be exploited, as observed in other Sahelian contexts, by extremist groups that have exploited social grievances to extend their influence beyond the original epicentres of violence.

Environmentally and socio-economically, these departments face a hostile climate characterised by water and wind erosion of the soil, accelerated degradation of fauna and flora, and a glaring lack of communication routes between isolated localities, despite efforts to provide infrastructure through several programmes. High adult illiteracy rates, combined with a lack of basic community infrastructure—schools, health centres, water systems—and necessary equipment, exacerbate the precarious situation. In this context, the interventions of grassroots community organisations, projects and programmes remain limited, while means of communication remain limited, particularly in the south-eastern areas not fully covered by telephone networks.

Paradoxically, these regions are full of potential: fertile and abundant arable land, resources for firewood and timber, water for irrigation and fishing, gold mines and gatherable products, a rich and diverse livestock population, a dynamic network of associations, historical sites and a social fabric that is still relatively strong.

The history and impact of emigration in these regions

Emigration and the income it generates have played a crucial role in the socio-economic evolution and transformation of the departments of Goudiry and Bakel. This emigration, which is viewed in a positive and constructive light in these areas, has evolved in distinct phases since the 1970s. Initially seasonal, with an exodus to the peanut-growing regions of the interior or to fishing areas, it was aimed at securing income to help young men prepare for marriage. It then shifted towards Central Africa (Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, etc.) and then West Africa, particularly the mining areas of various countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mali.

From 1974 onwards, a severe cycle of droughts led to mass immigration to Europe, motivated by the search for financial resources to support families who had remained in the country. Before that, veterans and ‘navigators’, workers employed by the merchant navy and international industrial fishing, had paved the way, followed later by more massive migratory flows to Europe, mainly to France.

‘Migrant builders’: a whole section of community resilience

In these departments in eastern Senegal, the achievements resulting from these migrations are tangible and multifaceted. From the earliest stages, migrants invested in social and community infrastructure: building mosques, schools and health posts, purchasing livestock to rebuild herds decimated during years of drought, and supporting agricultural production through improvements and equipment. This encouraged the emergence of village and inter-village associations, as well as investment in education and water systems.

In the 1980s, the network of associations, which had grown denser since the diasporas in Europe, was consolidated with the return of migrants with community and individual projects, who had increasingly benefited from training and a certain level of education, leading to greater awareness of development issues. Local housing was gradually modernised, houses were purchased in urban centres, and the living environment was improved through various facilities. Supply stores, grain banks and community financing of agricultural campaigns strengthened food security.

The 1990s saw a certain diversification in the investment of migrant income with the acquisition of household equipment (refrigerators, telephones, electrification), the development of local and interurban transport and trade, thus promoting the opening up of villages, and the creation of associations under the 1901 law from France. From 1994 onwards, the ‘Migration – Citizenship – Development’ cooperation axis developed with the GRDR became established, with, among other things, the political involvement of migrants in local elections, mayors and rural councillors. The development of North-South partnerships through twinning with French local authorities and decentralised cooperation has given rise to a clear dynamic of local development supported by returning migrants and diasporas from the eastern regions of Senegal.

A tangible impact, a need for sustainability

The overall impact can be seen in terms of increased food security through access to production factors, improved living conditions, easier access to education, rural water supply and health, as well as diversification of health services. Easier access to means of communication has had a positive impact on openness to partnerships with local authorities in the North. There has been a gradual strengthening of inter-village relations with countries and regions through migrant associations and networks. Testimonials attest to the impact of these local development initiatives on reducing women's workload, for example, but also on increasing access to decision-making bodies.

The Timbuktu Institute's Action Research Initiative

In response to these dynamics, the Timbuktu Institute, in partnership with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, is launching an action research initiative entitled "Strengthening resilience to crises in the Goudiry and Bakel areas: The role of remittances from the European diaspora and mitigation of vulnerabilities to counter violent extremism ." This initiative aims to analyse the important role of remittances from the region's diaspora in European countries – mainly France – in mitigating vulnerabilities and strengthening resilience.

Although these funds improve livelihoods, particularly by financing education, family farming and small businesses through community projects, poor channelling could involve them in illicit networks, exacerbating risks.

Key questions explored in this action research initiative include: How do migrant remittances (amount, frequency, use) contribute to the economic and social resilience of households? What socio-religious dynamics (caste tensions, foreign influence) increase vulnerabilities to extremism? How do populations perceive factors of resilience (social cohesion, religious moderation) in the face of threats exacerbated by the border with Mali? What community and institutional strategies – taking into account cross-border dynamics and the socio-historical continuum with Kayes – can prevent the spread of violent extremism in this area?

The project, developed as part of a partnership between the Foundation and the Institute, will be carried out in three phases:

1. Organisation of a webinar bringing together local actors, experts, diaspora actors and partners to discuss issues related to vulnerabilities and the positive role of migration, moving away from a predominantly security-based approach to this issue.
2. Publication of a policy brief based on the results of interviews with community actors, summarising the key ideas from the webinar and offering in-depth policy recommendations based on a thorough, cross-cutting analysis of the factors contributing to resilience in these border areas of the Kayes region in Mali.
3. Presentation of the research findings as part of an interactive debate involving researchers, political and community actors and international partners at the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, promoting wide dissemination and concrete action.